Gessa v. Manor Care of Florida, Inc.

Docket: No. 2D07-1928

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 29, 2009; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Angela I. Gessa, represented by Miriam G. Falatek, contests the trial court's decision to compel arbitration in her negligence lawsuit against Manor Care of Florida, Inc. Gessa was admitted to Manor Care on two occasions, during which she or Falatek signed admission documents containing an arbitration agreement. A key document, not explicitly titled, included a warning about waiving statutory rights and contained arbitration and limitation of liability provisions. Gessa filed suit under the Nursing Home Residents Act, seeking damages for alleged mistreatment. Manor Care responded by moving to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement. Gessa opposed this motion, claiming the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable due to its limitation of liability provisions, which capped noneconomic damages at $250,000 and prohibited punitive damages, arguing these were contrary to the rights granted by the Act.

The trial court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable and that the limitation of liability provisions could be severed from the arbitration agreement, thus not rendering it substantively unconscionable. Gessa's appeal does not challenge the trial court's findings on unconscionability but argues that the limitation of liability provision is unenforceable due to public policy concerns and that the severance was erroneous. Manor Care contends that the trial court did not address the public policy issue and that the order to compel arbitration should be upheld. The appellate review indicated that the trial court specifically addressed only the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.

The trial court determined that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and found that the potentially offensive clauses, specifically the limitation of liability provision, could be severed from the arbitration agreement. The court noted that these clauses were not integral to the contract. However, the trial court did not explicitly rule that the limitation provision was void due to public policy, nor did it sever the clause during the hearing, choosing instead to explore the issue further without making a definitive ruling. Despite the lack of a severability clause in the arbitration agreement, the court's factual finding—supported by competent evidence—that the limitation provision was not essential to the arbitration agreement leads to the conclusion that it is severable. The court's decision aligns with Florida Supreme Court precedent, which stipulates that the severability of a contract depends on the intention of the parties and the nature of the contract as a whole. Consequently, the trial court’s order to proceed with arbitration was affirmed, although the broader question of whether the trial court should first decide on the public policy issue before severing the provision remains unresolved.