United States v. Juan Andres Blanco (86-6305), Jorge Luis Fresneda (86-6306), Rafael Oscar Spinola (86-6307)

Citation: 844 F.2d 344Docket: 86-6305, 86-6306 and 86-6307

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 6, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants Juan Andres Blanco, Jorge Luis Fresneda, and Rafael Oscar Spinola were convicted on federal cocaine possession charges. On appeal, Fresneda and Spinola argued that their convictions were tainted by the introduction of cocaine obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure. Spinola, along with Blanco, contended that the evidence against him was insufficient, and Spinola claimed that the government failed to provide exculpatory information and that the trial should have been severed from Fresneda's. The court found no unlawful search or seizure and determined that the other claims were without merit, thereby affirming the convictions.

On May 8, 1986, Spinola and Fresneda rented a car at Miami International Airport, with Fresneda as an additional driver. After dropping Spinola off at his house, Fresneda picked up Blanco, and they drove nonstop over 1,000 miles to the Greater Cincinnati Airport, checking into the Americana Inn without reservations and paying in cash. Following suspicious behavior noted by the hotel desk clerk, local police contacted federal drug enforcement officials. Special Agent William Modesitt arrived at the hotel, observed the defendants, and investigated the rental car, discovering that Rafael Spinola had rented it the previous day.

Agent Modesitt, drawing from his extensive narcotics experience, suspected two Miami motorists at an airport hotel in Erlanger, Kentucky, were drug couriers. The hotel's remote location and the recent rental of their car from a known narcotics source city heightened his suspicions. After approaching the individuals in Room 114 with local law enforcement support, the officers entered the dimly lit room with weapons drawn but soon holstered them as the situation appeared non-threatening.

Modesitt questioned the men about their trip to Cincinnati; they claimed to be on vacation and mentioned attending a Cincinnati Reds baseball game. However, this was misleading, as the team was playing in New York that evening. The inconsistency, along with their choice of an expensive hotel instead of motels along Interstate 75, prompted Modesitt to request consent for a search of their room and vehicle, informing them of their Fourth Amendment rights.

Mr. Fresneda consented to the search, signing a consent form after being read its contents. The search yielded no significant findings, aside from a rental agreement, and initial drug-sniffing by a dog produced inconclusive results. Despite this, Modesitt remained convinced that drugs were present and decided to conduct a more thorough search of the vehicle.

Upon inspection of the rear doors of a vehicle, agents discovered three packages containing nearly three kilograms of cocaine, valued at approximately $300,000. Messrs. Fresneda and Blanco, who claimed ignorance of the drugs, were arrested. Shortly after, Mr. Spinola, the car’s renter, arrived at a hotel and made a call to a number previously dialed from Fresneda and Blanco's room. Spinola was subsequently arrested. Prior to his arrival, the hotel received calls from an individual named "Tom," inquiring about Spinola, who had no reservation. When DEA agents spoke to Tom, he denied any business with Spinola, and another call ended abruptly.

Two evidentiary hearings were held regarding the defendants' motions to suppress the cocaine evidence. The magistrate found an unreasonable seizure occurred, rendering Fresneda's consent to search invalid and recommended suppression. The district court agreed with the need for suppression but based its decision on the excessive nature of the investigative detention, noting the prolonged presence of law enforcement before consent was given and the lack of freedom for the defendants during this time.

The government then sought reconsideration, arguing the defendants lacked standing to contest Fourth Amendment violations. The district court vacated the suppression order, determining that Spinola had no privacy expectation in the car post-rental, and Blanco had no standing as a mere passenger. Although Fresneda expressed a subjective expectation of privacy, the court ruled it was not recognized by society regarding the interior of a rented vehicle's door, citing United States v. Bailey.

A jury trial resulted in the convictions of defendants Fresneda and Spinola on three counts, and Mr. Blanco on two counts, with all defendants appealing the convictions. Fresneda and Spinola challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure of cocaine, raising the question of their standing to contest the issue. The district court evaluated their subjective expectations of privacy in the rented automobile, following established case law. 

The court found that Spinola had no expectation of privacy as he had relinquished control of the vehicle by giving his keys to Fresneda, who had the burden to prove standing. Conversely, the court acknowledged that Fresneda maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in the locked car, having access to the keys and monitoring it from his hotel room. However, the court erroneously ruled that society would not recognize a bailee's expectation of privacy in the car's door panels, despite the logical inconsistency of this position compared to other areas of the car. 

The excerpt also discusses the implications of consent to search. The trial court concluded that Fresneda consented to the search voluntarily. However, if such consent was obtained following an unconstitutional seizure, it would be invalid. The central question was whether Fresneda was unreasonably seized before consenting to the search, which the court determined he was not, citing relevant precedents.

The Supreme Court has established, since Terry v. Ohio, that law enforcement officers may stop individuals for questioning based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In this case, Agent Modesitt had reasonable grounds to suspect Messrs. Fresneda and Blanco of narcotics trafficking due to several factors: their travel from Miami, a known drug source; the rental of a car just a day prior, scheduled to be returned shortly; their choice of an airport hotel paid for in cash; and their non-businesslike appearance. Agent Modesitt, with nearly two decades of drug enforcement experience, recognized patterns in drug courier behavior, such as rapid travel and meeting contacts near airports, which supported his suspicion. The officer's decision to approach the suspects was deemed sensible and reasonable.

Agent Modesitt approached the motel room politely, identifying himself without using loud or abusive language. Although the officers drew their weapons prior to entering, this precaution was justified given the circumstances. The overall actions taken by Agent Modesitt were aligned with common law enforcement practices in potentially dangerous situations involving suspected drug couriers.

The detention and questioning of Messrs. Fresneda and Blanco were found to comply with the Fourth Amendment, supported by precedents such as United States v. Knox and United States v. Renfro. Law enforcement acted within reasonable bounds, similar to detaining occupants during a search warrant execution, with only nineteen minutes passing from their arrival to securing Mr. Fresneda's consent for a search. The district court determined that Fresneda's consent was voluntary, rejecting claims of coercion, and affirmed that he understood he was not obligated to sign the consent form. Testimony indicating that he was threatened with a weapon was dismissed as unsupported. Fresneda was deemed to have taken a calculated risk regarding the concealment of cocaine, knowing that denying consent would likely lead to a search warrant.

Defendants Spinola and Blanco argued insufficient evidence for their convictions. The jury found them guilty of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). The government’s burden included demonstrating that both defendants were aware of and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy to possess a controlled substance.

Messrs. Spinola and Blanco were found to have knowingly and voluntarily participated in an illegal conspiracy involving the transportation of a significant quantity of cocaine from Miami to Erlanger, Kentucky. Evidence indicated that they cooperated with Fresneda, who was involved in the drug transport, and there was an individual in Cincinnati awaiting their arrival. Mr. Blanco's defense of mere presence was undermined by his attempt to fabricate a false explanation for his presence in Cincinnati, indicating guilty knowledge. The court likened the credibility of Blanco's claim of ignorance regarding the drugs in the vehicle to an implausible scenario of negligence.

The evidence was deemed substantial enough to support the jury's verdict of guilt. Both Spinola and Blanco were found complicit in possession with intent to distribute cocaine, with Fresneda admitting his intent to distribute. Spinola provided the vehicle for transport, while Blanco assisted in the journey.

Spinola was also convicted under the Travel Act for traveling across state lines with the intent to facilitate illegal activities, supported by evidence of phone calls made to further that intent upon arrival in Northern Kentucky. 

Spinola's argument that his conviction was unconstitutional under Brady v. Maryland due to the late disclosure of a DEA report was rejected. The report was found to be incriminating rather than exculpatory, and defense counsel received it in time to utilize it for cross-examination, thus maintaining the fairness of the trial.

Lastly, Spinola's claim for a separate trial from Fresneda was denied, as he argued that Fresneda would have testified in his favor. However, Fresneda's prior invocation of the Fifth Amendment during questioning about the vehicle raised questions about the reliability of such testimony.

Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can request a separate trial if a co-defendant is willing to testify in their favor without invoking the Fifth Amendment. In this case, Fresneda's purported waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights was deemed illusory, as it was contingent on being tried before Spinola. The court rejected the notion that Rule 14 allows co-conspirators to dictate trial order. Fresneda's testimony was only marginally exculpatory, not addressing key evidence against Spinola, such as his rental of a vehicle containing cocaine and communications leading up to its arrival in Northern Kentucky. The court found that judicial efficiency was better served by trying the defendants together, affirming the district court's decision not to sever the trials.

Fresneda voluntarily consented to a search of his hotel room and vehicle, having been informed of his constitutional rights. During the search, Fresneda unlocked the car with a key, while a co-defendant, Mr. Blanco, remained in the hotel. There was an indication of Fresneda's awareness of potential drug-related issues when he remarked post-arrest about regretting not using his own truck for transport. Spinola contested the district court’s decision to allow the government to retract its claim that he had standing, but the court found no evidence of a formal stipulation and concluded that Spinola was not prejudiced, as he did not rely on the government's initial stance to his detriment. Legal questions of standing are not typically subject to stipulation.