Congress enacted a 120-day eviction moratorium under the CARES Act for federally-assisted rental properties, which expired in July 2020. Following this, the CDC issued a nationwide eviction moratorium on September 4, 2020, citing the need to prevent COVID-19's spread. This order, based on the Public Health Service Act, allows for a temporary halt in evictions to facilitate self-isolation for those infected or at risk, support local health measures, and reduce homelessness. The moratorium has been extended by Congress and the CDC, with the current expiration set for June 30, 2021. The plaintiffs in this case have challenged the CDC Order on statutory and constitutional grounds, prompting motions for expedited summary judgment from both the plaintiffs and the Department, which the Court has granted to the plaintiffs while denying the Department's motions.
To qualify for protection under the moratorium, tenants must provide a declaration to their landlord confirming they have made efforts to obtain government assistance for rent, expect to earn less than $99,000 in 2020 or did not report income in 2019, are unable to pay full rent due to substantial income loss or medical expenses, are making timely partial payments, face potential homelessness if evicted, understand that rent obligations remain, and acknowledge the moratorium's expiration date of December 31, 2020. Unlike the CARES Act, which applied only to specific federally backed properties, the CDC Order encompasses all residential properties nationwide and imposes criminal penalties for violations, including fines and imprisonment. The initial expiration date of the CDC Order was extended multiple times, first to January 31, 2021, then to March 31, 2021, and finally to June 30, 2021, reflecting worsening conditions and evidence linking evictions to COVID-19 transmission.
The plaintiffs, including property managers and real estate associations, initiated legal action on November 20, 2020, contesting the eviction moratorium on various statutory and constitutional grounds. They argue that the moratorium exceeds the CDC’s authority, violates administrative procedures, fails to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and infringes on property rights and due process. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and other appropriate remedies. The case involves the plaintiffs' expedited motion for summary judgment, the Department’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and a partial motion to dismiss, claiming congressional ratification of the CDC Order through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. All motions are pending review.
At least six courts have recently examined challenges to the national eviction moratorium imposed by the CDC. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay on a district court ruling in Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States Dep’t of Hous. Urb. Dev., which found that the CDC exceeded its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264(a). Other cases, such as Skyworks, Ltd. v. Ctrs. for Disease Control, reached similar conclusions. Conversely, two district courts, Brown v. Azar and Chambless Enterprises, LLC v. Redfield, declined to block the CDC Order at the preliminary injunction stage. Additionally, Terkel v. Ctrs. for Disease Control declared that the federal government lacks constitutional authority for a nationwide eviction moratorium.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute regarding material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the case, while a genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. In agency action reviews, summary judgment assesses whether the agency's action is supported by the administrative record and aligns with the APA standard.
Standing to sue is limited to cases and controversies defined by Article III of the Constitution. A plaintiff must show a concrete injury that is traceable to the defendant's actions and can be remedied by the court. The three real estate management company plaintiffs have demonstrated such injuries due to tenants invoking the eviction moratorium, establishing standing. It is sufficient for one plaintiff to show injury for the case to meet Article III requirements, regardless of other plaintiffs’ standing.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 264) to create and enforce regulations to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. This authority includes the ability to conduct inspections, fumigation, disinfection, and destruction of contaminated items or animals, as well as detaining individuals believed to be infected. The Secretary has delegated this authority to the CDC Director, who can intervene when state or local health measures are insufficient.
In evaluating whether the CDC's eviction moratorium exceeds statutory authority, the Department proposes using the Chevron framework, which applies when Congress grants an agency the power to create regulations with the force of law. Although the CDC did not follow standard APA notice-and-comment procedures for the eviction moratorium, Chevron deference is not limited to such regulations. The order was issued under broad rulemaking authority, intended for general applicability, published in the Federal Register, and carries potential criminal penalties. As such, it qualifies for Chevron deference, requiring courts to first assess whether Congress has directly addressed the specific issue involved.
Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act is jointly managed by the CDC and the FDA, which does not prevent the application of the Chevron framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations. Although courts typically refrain from applying Chevron when multiple agencies administer a statute, both the FDA and CDC are sub-agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As such, there is no significant risk of conflicting directives that would undermine Chevron's principles, which assume congressional intent for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations. Courts must first ascertain whether the statutory language clearly addresses the issue at hand. If the text is ambiguous, they proceed to evaluate if the agency's interpretation is permissible, using comprehensive statutory interpretation methods. The relevant language of the Public Health Service Act empowers the CDC, with the Secretary's approval, to enact regulations necessary to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, including measures like inspection and disinfection. However, the Secretary's authority is not absolute; it is defined and limited by the specific provisions of the Act, which emphasize that actions must be necessary for enforcing regulations related to public health.
The Secretary has the authority to implement additional measures under § 264(a), but these measures must relate closely to the specified categories within the statute and be aimed at "animals or articles" that are identified as sources of dangerous infection to humans. The national eviction moratorium does not meet these criteria, as it fundamentally differs from measures like inspection or disinfection. The term "articles" cannot reasonably encompass evictions, which contradicts its conventional meaning as a commodity or specific item. Furthermore, the Secretary has not established that evictions are sources of infection, and the presence of asymptomatic COVID-19 cases does not expand the Secretary's authority beyond the explicit limitations of § 264(a). The Department's interpretation of § 264(a) as granting broad rulemaking authority disregards the specific measures Congress outlined, which set clear boundaries on the Secretary's actions to prevent the spread of disease. This interpretation must be rejected to uphold the statute's text and structure, and judicial tools of construction must be employed to evaluate the scope of the Secretary's delegated authority.
The Secretary's authority under the statute is limited, contrary to the Department's broad interpretation. Statutory construction principles dictate that every clause must be given effect; thus, an expansive reading of § 264(a)’s first sentence would render the second sentence redundant. The surplusage canon supports a narrower interpretation of the statute. Additionally, the canon of constitutional avoidance suggests that statutes should be construed to prevent serious constitutional issues unless it contradicts Congress's clear intent. An overly broad interpretation might suggest an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary, which has been a concern in prior court rulings. Furthermore, under the major questions doctrine, Congress must clearly express intent when assigning significant economic and political decisions to agencies. The imposition of a nationwide eviction moratorium is a matter of considerable significance and has been widely debated, with multiple states implementing their own moratoriums during the pandemic. Congress has also addressed eviction moratoriums at the national level through specific legislation. Accepting the Department’s expansive interpretation would imply a broad delegation of authority that could cover many contentious issues, which is not supported by Congress's clear intent.
The Secretary's authority to act against the spread of disease is questioned due to the expansive interpretation that could allow for unlimited power under the Public Health Service Act. The argument cites the Supreme Court's caution against broad delegations of authority, suggesting that Congress did not intend to grant such significant power to an agency through vague language. Notably, the CDC has rarely invoked § 264(a) for disease control, and its application to implement a temporary eviction moratorium is unprecedented. The court expresses skepticism towards any agency claiming newfound regulatory powers over substantial economic aspects based on existing statutes.
The Department argues that subsequent sections of the statute, specifically § 264(b) and (d), allow for the detention of individuals believed to be infected, implying that § 264(a) has no limitations on the Secretary’s authority. However, this argument lacks persuasiveness as the court notes that these provisions address individual liberty rather than property interests and are confined to specific circumstances regarding individuals entering the U.S. or suspected of infection.
Ultimately, the court concludes that while the Public Health Service Act empowers the Department to take measures against disease spread, it does not authorize a nationwide eviction moratorium. Additionally, the Department contends that Congress ratified the CDC’s actions by extending the moratorium in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which postponed the expiration of the initial CDC Order. This legislative action is cited as an affirmation of the CDC's authority, despite the court's findings regarding the limits of that authority.
Congress has the authority to ratify previously unauthorized actions, but must do so explicitly. In this case, while Congress temporarily extended the eviction moratorium and acknowledged the CDC's order under the Public Health Service Act, it did not approve the CDC's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) or grant additional authority. Congress's limited extension for 30 days does not imply support for the CDC's claims. The court emphasized that mere acquiescence does not legitimize the CDC's interpretation. After Congress withdrew support for the CDC order, the legality of the eviction moratorium relies solely on the Public Health Service Act, which does not permit a nationwide moratorium.
Both parties agree that if the Secretary exceeded his authority, vacatur of the CDC Order is warranted; however, the Department seeks to limit this to plaintiffs with standing, a stance inconsistent with precedent. The court underscores that unlawful regulations typically result in vacatur for all, not just individual petitioners. Hence, the CDC Order must be set aside, as the Public Health Service Act does not grant the CDC the authority to impose a nationwide eviction moratorium. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for expedited summary judgment and denied the Department's motions. A separate order will follow this decision.
