United States v. Lee Andrew Campbell A/K/A John Evans
Docket: 87-1192
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; May 17, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Lee Andrew Campbell appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, arguing that his seizure prior to consenting to a search of his coat violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court found that Campbell was lawfully seized based on reasonable suspicion derived from his behavior upon arriving in St. Louis from Los Angeles, a known drug source. DEA agents had observed the flight and specifically noted Campbell’s rapid movements, frequent glances behind him, and lack of baggage claim, which suggested suspicious activity.
Agent Scott, in plain clothes, approached Campbell after he left the terminal, identified himself, and requested to see Campbell's airline ticket and identification. Campbell provided a one-way ticket purchased with cash and a Missouri ID under the name John Evans, causing Scott to notice Campbell's nervous demeanor. After a search of Campbell's carry-on bag yielded only clothing, Scott requested permission to search Campbell's coat pockets. Although Campbell hesitated, he ultimately consented. During the search, Scott felt a package in an inner pocket, which Campbell attempted to block but did not physically resist. Scott retrieved a plastic bag containing a white powder, confirming the presence of cocaine. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the seizure was lawful and the consent to search was voluntary.
Agent Scott informed Campbell that he believed a substance he held was cocaine and intended to take him to the airport police office, to which Campbell responded he was "not going anywhere." Agent Harold then approached and assisted in handcuffing Campbell. Upon reaching an interview room, the agents searched Campbell and discovered a second package of cocaine taped to his back. Scott field-tested the first package, confirming it contained cocaine, leading to Campbell's arrest and the reading of his Miranda rights. The total amount of cocaine seized was 237.6 grams of pure cocaine.
Campbell moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the initial encounter constituted an unlawful seizure without reasonable suspicion, citing Wong Sun v. United States and Reid v. Georgia. He contended that his matching the drug courier profile did not justify the stop. The district court denied the suppression motion, ruling that the initial encounter was consensual and did not require justification. It further concluded that the encounter evolved into a Terry-type investigative seizure, justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court found Campbell had consented to the search of his belongings, and once the powder was found, probable cause for his arrest existed.
The document emphasizes that not all interactions with law enforcement constitute Fourth Amendment seizures, referencing cases like INS v. Delgado and Florida v. Royer. The court clarified that while consensual encounters require no objective justification, they can escalate into seizures requiring reasonable suspicion. The determination of whether a seizure occurred hinges on whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave under the circumstances, with the legal standards for reasonable suspicion and probable cause subject to both factual and legal review.
The district court correctly determined that the initial encounter between Agent Scott and Campbell was consensual, as Scott identified himself as a narcotics agent and asked Campbell questions without using force or coercion. Campbell voluntarily stopped and provided his airline ticket and identification in response. This interaction did not raise Fourth Amendment issues since it was deemed a permissible and consensual encounter.
However, the court also acknowledged that the retention of Campbell's ticket and identification card could signify a Terry-type investigatory stop, as such retention generally limits a suspect's ability to terminate questioning and leave. The used, one-way ticket held limited practical value for Campbell, and the identification was merely a state-issued card, not a driver's license. Consequently, the retention of these documents was not as significant in establishing a seizure. Despite this, the district court's finding supported the conclusion that the consensual encounter had escalated into a Terry-type seizure. The government accepted this conclusion, leading to the assessment of whether the seizure was justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
The Fourth Amendment requires that for an investigative seizure, police must have specific, objective facts that, when combined with reasonable inferences, justify suspicion of criminal activity. Courts assess the totality of circumstances rather than individual facts to determine reasonable suspicion. Factors considered include the behavior of the suspect and the context in which it occurs, as well as the experience of law enforcement officers in interpreting such behaviors.
In evaluating the situation involving Agent Scott, several key observations about Campbell were noted: he arrived on a flight from Los Angeles, a known drug source city; the flight was under surveillance; he exhibited unusual behavior such as walking quickly, looking behind him multiple times, not checking the boards, carrying only a small bag, wearing a winter coat in July, and purchasing a one-way ticket in cash. Additionally, his nervous demeanor persisted even after presenting his identification, which was valid.
These collective facts distinguished the case from Reid v. Georgia, where reasonable suspicion was not established based solely on a law enforcement officer's hunch. In Reid's situation, the evidence did not support a reasonable belief that criminal activity was occurring. In contrast, the combination of Campbell's behaviors provided a sufficient basis for Agent Scott to develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Reid does not prohibit the use of courier profile characteristics but emphasizes that general characteristics alone cannot justify a seizure without specific evidence of suspicious behavior. In this case, Agent Scott had sufficient particularized evidence regarding Campbell's behavior—his nervousness, rapid movements, and unusual attire during summer—to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, specifically drug trafficking. This suspicion was further supported by Campbell's profile characteristics, such as traveling from a known drug-source city and using a one-way, cash-paid ticket.
The encounter with Agent Scott did not escalate to a full-scale arrest until the discovery of white powder in Campbell's coat pocket, at which point probable cause was established. The initial interaction remained within the bounds of a Terry-type investigatory stop, characterized by limited purpose and duration, occurring in a public area without coercive confinement. Consequently, Campbell's consent to search his coat pockets was valid, as he was justifiably detained based on reasonable suspicion. He argued that the circumstances were coercive enough to invalidate his consent, referencing legal precedents on the nature of consent, but the court found the search and its outcomes admissible.
The district court determined that Campbell voluntarily consented to the search of his coat, a conclusion that is upheld on appeal unless proven clearly erroneous. The court's finding is supported by the record, showing no evidence of threats or coercion from Agent Scott. The circumstances of the stop were not inherently coercive; Campbell was approached by one agent in a public airport without uniforms or weapons present. He was not physically restrained or told he could not leave. Unlike other cases where individuals were explicitly informed of drug suspicions or read their rights, Scott merely mentioned observing Campbell's behavior, without accusations or Miranda warnings. Campbell was asked if he "would mind" a search, to which he consented. Although he was not explicitly informed that he could decline, the absence of such warnings does not negate the voluntariness of his consent. Knowledge of potential incrimination does not invalidate consent. Thus, the district court's finding of valid consent stands, affirming that Campbell's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, leading to the denial of his motion to suppress and the affirmation of his conviction.
Serious questions arise regarding the credibility of Agent Scott's testimony about whether he returned Campbell's airline ticket and identification after examining them. During the magistrate hearing, Scott stated he inspected these items but did not clarify if they were returned. Campbell claimed that Scott kept the items in his pocket and did not return them. The government offered to recall Scott for further questioning but did not follow through. The magistrate found Scott more credible regarding Campbell's consent to search, but did not address the return of the ticket and identification. In trial, both Scott and Agent Harold testified that the items were returned before Campbell's arrest, but Campbell did not testify. The district court, which reviewed the pleadings and evidence, did not confirm if it examined the magistrate's hearing transcript. The only evidence supporting the claim that Scott failed to return the items comes from Campbell's testimony before the magistrate. Instead of remanding, the court will rely on the district court's findings, noting that if Scott had returned the items, the incident would have been consensual rather than a seizure.
Additionally, the "drug courier profile" used by agents includes characteristics typical of drug traffickers, such as Campbell's one-way cash ticket from a source city and his early morning arrival with carry-on luggage. There is contention over the profile's sufficiency to justify Campbell's seizure; Campbell argues it is inadequate, while the government claims it is a "profile-plus" situation. While the profile can aid experienced officers in determining the need for investigation, a strict rule validating it is unnecessary. The legality of the seizure should be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances, with the profile being one of many factors considered. Scott noted Campbell was the only passenger in a coat among casually dressed travelers.
In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of reasonable suspicion regarding the detention of a suspect, Royer, based on several factors: he carried heavy luggage, dressed casually, appeared nervous, purchased a one-way ticket with cash, and used an assumed name on his baggage tag. Eight justices concurred that these circumstances warranted an investigatory seizure. The document also references multiple circuit court cases that explore the relevance of coercion in determining voluntary consent and whether a seizure has occurred. It emphasizes that absent evidence of coercion, such as Scott retaining the ticket and identification, the interaction did not escalate to a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as illustrated by various case law precedents.
