Stephen J. Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., J.E. Blankenship and B.E. Welch v. Synpol, Inc.

Citation: 843 F.2d 190Docket: 86-2966

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; May 26, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judgment against three former employees of Synpol, Inc., who claimed they were constructively discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The court found that Synpol's implementation of a Special Early Retirement Incentive Program (SERIP) did not amount to constructive discharge. Background evidence revealed that Synpol, facing a downturn in the market for its products, initiated a cost reduction strategy that included the SERIP, which targeted employees eligible for early retirement. Under the SERIP, 28 employees were offered early retirement with an incentive bonus, and 21 accepted the offer, which included a release of claims against the company. The appellants argued that the program's conditions created an atmosphere of coercion, as they believed refusal to participate would result in job loss without severance pay. However, all employees who declined the SERIP remained employed, undermining claims of constructive discharge. The court concluded that the evidence presented did not establish a genuine issue for a jury regarding the alleged coercive nature of the SERIP.

Appellants claim they were constructively discharged by Synpol, which requires determining if a reasonable person in their situation would feel compelled to resign. The review is conducted in favor of the nonmovants to identify any genuine material fact issues that necessitate a trial. Generally, implementing an early retirement plan does not inherently suggest age discrimination under the ADEA. While such plans can offer employees beneficial options—such as financial packages and the choice to continue working—they may also irrevocably alter the status quo. A precedent case, Downey, indicated that threats of discharge impacting benefits could create genuine issues for age discrimination claims, but it involved unique circumstances rather than a general plan offered to multiple employees. 

In the current case, Synpol's SERIP plan presents two significant factors: it was not available to all employees nearing retirement but only to non-essential, non-collective bargaining unit employees, which complicates claims of discrimination. Despite the appellants alleging they were singled out, their evidence does not counter Synpol's assertion that SERIP was not extended to eligible non-essential managerial employees, aligning with collective bargaining agreements that prevent unilateral changes in working conditions for union-covered employees.

An employer facing workforce reductions to ensure survival is not obligated to forgo a viable early retirement bonus program to avoid ADEA liability. The absence of objective criteria for employee selection could imply age discrimination; however, no such evidence exists in this case. An early retirement plan can exclude certain eligible employees if justified by objective factors. Appellants argue the offer was not truly voluntary due to the limited time for consideration, perceived threats from supervisors regarding job security and severance, and the overall tone of communication. Nevertheless, these factors do not amount to objective evidence of intolerable working conditions that would compel resignation. The fifteen-day consideration period, while brief, is significantly longer than the twenty-four-hour ultimatum deemed coercive in a previous case. Appellant Bodnar had sufficient opportunity to seek legal advice and assess his options. While rapid action may be necessary in a struggling business, the inherent risk of job loss does not indicate age discrimination. The SERIP provided appellants a chance to mitigate their risk, unlike other employees. Their subjective feelings of coercion do not provide a basis for a jury issue, especially in a constructive discharge context, which requires an objective evaluation of voluntary conduct. The court affirms the trial court's judgment, concluding that even if the appellants had voluntarily released their rights under Title VII or the ADEA, their constructive discharge claims lack sufficient evidence. The court also declines to address objections to affidavits submitted by appellants, as the claims of involuntariness remain unsubstantiated.