Bryan Kerr Dickson, a former inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas, filed a pro se lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence and intentional torts by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials. Dickson claimed that despite expressing fears for his safety due to his convictions, BOP transferred him to USP Beaumont, where he was subsequently assaulted by another inmate. Following the assault, he was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU), where he alleged further mistreatment, including denial of mental health care, lack of access to legal resources, encouragement of suicidal behavior, and physical abuse.
The district court dismissed Dickson's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity. Specifically, it found that the discretionary function exception of the FTCA applied to his negligence claims and that the law enforcement proviso did not apply to his intentional tort claims. Dickson appealed the dismissal, arguing that the district court incorrectly applied both exceptions. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings, reviewing the jurisdictional issues de novo.
A 12(b)(1) motion places the burden of proof on the party claiming jurisdiction. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity, allowing monetary claims against the United States for negligent acts by government employees, but this waiver has exceptions that maintain sovereign immunity, including the 'discretionary function exception.' This exception applies when a government employee's actions, while potentially actionable under state tort law, are required or allowed by federal law or policy. At the pleading stage, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claims are outside this exception. The Supreme Court's two-part test assesses whether the challenged act involved judgment or choice by the employee and whether the judgment is the type the exception aims to protect, which is based on public policy considerations. If an employee acts against mandatory directives, they cannot claim discretion. In the case at hand, Dickson's complaint alleges negligence regarding his transfer and housing, which the district court found fell under the discretionary function exception, as federal statutes grant the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) discretion in inmate classification and placement.
Decisions regarding a prisoner's placement in the general population are typically discretionary, as established in Ashford v. United States. Dickson failed to identify any specific policy that would impose a nondiscretionary duty on the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regarding his placement at USP Beaumont, or to show that such a duty was violated. Consequently, he did not overcome the discretionary function exception to his claim. Similarly, his negligence claims related to denied mental health treatment were dismissed as he did not demonstrate that these denials violated nondiscretionary duties or that they were based on public policy considerations. The relevant regulations he cited were not applicable to the actions he challenged.
Additionally, the 'intentional tort exception' under the Federal Tort Claims Act preserves the government's immunity for claims like assault and false arrest, but there is a 'law enforcement proviso' that waives this immunity for certain intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers. The district court acknowledged that BOP officials qualify as law enforcement officers but ruled that the law enforcement proviso did not apply in this case, as the officials were not acting in a law enforcement capacity when the alleged torts occurred. However, this interpretation was flawed, as the Supreme Court clarified in Millbrook that the relevant factor is the officers' status as law enforcement officers, not the specific activities they were engaged in at the time of the alleged acts. As such, the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to actions by law enforcement officers within the scope of their employment, irrespective of whether they were engaged in law enforcement activities.
The Government has acknowledged that the case of Millbrook is applicable and concedes that Dickson’s intentional tort claims should be remanded for further consideration. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of these claims due to lack of jurisdiction is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings to determine whether BOP officials acted within the scope of their employment during the alleged torts. The court clarifies that intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is not excluded from the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, despite the district court's previous ruling that it lacked jurisdiction because the IIED claim was related to an alleged assault and false imprisonment. The court argues that Dickson's allegations include conduct not derivative of those claims, specifically that BOP officials encouraged him to commit suicide and made derogatory remarks. It emphasizes that even if the BOP officials were found not to be acting within the scope of their employment, the IIED claim would still not be jurisdictionally barred. The appellate court affirms the dismissal of Dickson's negligence claims, reverses the dismissal of his intentional tort claims, and remands for further proceedings. Additionally, Dickson's motion to unseal the record and appeal is granted, while his motions for summary judgment and to expedite are denied as moot. The court refrains from commenting on the sufficiency of Dickson's IIED allegations for surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
