The University Club and the Union League Club v. The City of New York, Edward I. Koch, the Mayor of the City of New York, the New York City Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Marcella Maxwell, S. Ted Antholes, Rabbi Jacob Bronner, Joyce Hunter, Glenn Lau-Kee, James B. Levin, Wittie McNeil Leroy E. Pagano, Lydia Riviero, Julia Gared De Rodriguez, Helga Weiss Tanenbaum, Boleslaw Wierzbianski and Andrew Wolf

Citations: 842 F.2d 37; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3491Docket: 228

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; March 16, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves The University Club and The Union League Club challenging the New York City "Public Accommodations Law," specifically targeting an investigation and possible enforcement action by the city's Human Rights Commission. The district court ruled that the Union League's complaint, although presented as an "as-applied" challenge, effectively contested the law's facial constitutionality, which was already determined in a prior state court judgment (New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York). Consequently, the court found that abstention was appropriate, affirming the decision without addressing the res judicata issue.

Background details reveal that this case is part of two challenges to Local Law 63, enacted in 1984 to amend the public accommodations law, which previously exempted distinctly private institutions from anti-discrimination rules. Local Law 63 specified that an institution could not be classified as distinctly private if it had over 400 members and engaged in regular meal service or received payments from nonmembers for business purposes.

Following the law's enactment, the New York State Club Association, representing various clubs including the Union League, filed a state court challenge arguing that Local Law 63 was overly broad and infringed on the constitutional right to free association. This claim was consistently rejected in state courts and is currently under review by the United States Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Commission initiated an investigation into the operations of several clubs, including the Union League and the University Club, to assess their compliance with the new definitions of distinctly private status.

On January 30, 1986, the commission filed a complaint against Union League, the University Club, and another club for excluding women from membership, violating public accommodations law. This initiated a formal investigation that concluded with a probable cause finding on July 7, 1987, and an invitation for a conciliation meeting, which the clubs declined. Subsequently, in March 1986, Union League and the University Club filed a federal action in the Southern District of New York seeking a declaratory judgment against the constitutionality of a new definition of "distinctly private" and a permanent injunction against the ongoing administrative proceedings. The district court dismissed most of their claims based on res judicata, asserting that NYSCA properly represented their interests in state court. The court found the causes of action to be identical, dismissing the clubs' argument regarding the differences between the state and federal challenges. Only a selective prosecution claim was allowed to be repleaded, but the clubs chose to appeal instead of amending their complaint. The University Club later admitted women and withdrew its appeal, leaving Union League to continue. The discussion indicates that the court need not address Union League's argument about claim identity, as it concludes that the district court should have abstained from hearing the case. Additionally, Union League's claim that the city waived its right to urge abstention was rejected, as the city can support the lower court's judgment on any record basis without needing a cross-appeal.

The case parallels Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, where the Supreme Court established that federal courts should abstain from intervening in state administrative proceedings that address significant state interests, specifically in cases of ongoing investigations into allegations of discrimination. In both instances, the respective commissions found probable cause of gender discrimination and were engaged in conciliation and adjudication efforts when the subjects sought federal intervention, citing constitutional rights infringements.

The court, referencing Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, outlined a three-part test for determining the appropriateness of Younger abstention: (1) whether there is an ongoing state proceeding, (2) whether an important state interest is involved, and (3) whether the federal plaintiff has an adequate opportunity for judicial review of constitutional claims during or after the state proceeding.

The first two criteria are met, as there is an ongoing state proceeding with no formal hearing or sanctions imposed, and the elimination of sex discrimination is deemed a significant state interest. The third criterion is more intricate but still supports abstention; constitutional issues may be adjudicated through an Article 78 proceeding under New York law. Although challenges to legislative acts are not permissible in such proceedings, constitutional claims related to the application of statutes can be raised. Thus, Union League can assert its as-applied constitutional claims in either an Article 78 proceeding or in subsequent enforcement petitions to the New York Supreme Court, ensuring adequate judicial review is available.

Union League asserts it cannot present its claims before the commission because it believes the commission has already classified it as a public accommodation and deemed other factors irrelevant. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, Union League does not need to present constitutional claims at the administrative level, as adequate judicial review in state court suffices. Second, Union League can raise its constitutional claims before the commission, focusing on its assertion that it operates as a private club entitled to intimate association rights. Union League claims the commission has limited the relevant factors for determining its private status to those specified in Local Law 63, which it argues has already classified it as a public accommodation. However, the commission's decision to consider only those factors under Local Law 63 does not preclude it from evaluating the constitutionality of applying that law to Union League, including other factors it deems relevant. The commission has not prejudged Union League's public accommodation status; it has merely found probable cause and plans to hold a hearing for a final determination. Union League's confusion between the statutory interpretation of Local Law 63 and its constitutional implications underlines the flaw in its argument. The commission is expected to consider additional constitutional factors, allowing Union League to present its case for First Amendment protection against the application of Local Law 63 in state court. As such, since an ongoing state proceeding involves significant state interests and Union League has the opportunity to raise its as-applied constitutional claims, abstention is warranted. Lastly, Union League's claim that the administrative process is "remedial" rather than "coercive" does not negate the appropriateness of abstention, as referenced in a footnote from the Supreme Court's ruling in Dayton Christian Schools.

The application of the Younger abstention doctrine to ongoing state administrative proceedings aligns with the ruling in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, which allows litigants to file a Sec. 1983 suit in federal court without exhausting state administrative remedies. However, unlike the remedial context in Patsy, the proceedings in question are deemed coercive, contradicting Union League's assertion that civil proceedings are inherently remedial. The nature of a hearing that could impose civil penalties is considered coercive, as established in the case of Culvert, which involved potential penalties for unfair labor practices. The court highlights that the Younger principle has been applied to civil matters that involve significant state interests, affirming that the commission's proceedings are indeed coercive, which is the primary concern for Union League. The proceedings do not serve as remedies for Union League but are instead directed against it. Consequently, the district court's judgment is upheld.