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State v. Ramsay
Citation: 2021 Ohio 2870Docket: 19CA0016-M
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; August 23, 2021; Ohio; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Gavon Ramsay appeals his life imprisonment sentence without parole imposed by the Medina County Court of Common Pleas for the murder of a 98-year-old woman. Ramsay, at 17 years old, broke into the victim's home, murdered her, abused her corpse, and concealed it in a closet. Following the discovery of incriminating video evidence on his cell phone, he was indicted on multiple charges, including aggravated murder and burglary. After pleading no contest, he was sentenced to life for aggravated murder, alongside consecutive sentences for other offenses. On appeal, Ramsay contested his life sentence and argued that the trial court failed to merge his offenses for sentencing. The appellate court ruled it could not review his aggravated murder sentence under Revised Code Section 2953.08(D)(3) and found no basis for merging the offenses, thus affirming the trial court's judgment. Ramsay's appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court led to a significant ruling in State v. Patrick, allowing appellate review of aggravated murder sentences when constitutional claims are raised. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Ramsay's case for further consideration. On remand, the appellate court requested additional briefs from both parties. Ramsay also filed an application to reopen his case, proposing new assignments of error, but this was denied as moot. He did not raise any further assignments in his supplemental brief, limiting the appellate court's review to the original assignments of error. Mr. Ramsay's sentencing arguments are deemed not moot despite the State's assertion that Section 2967.132 renders them so. Effective April 12, 2021, this section allows for parole eligibility for juvenile offenders, except for aggravated homicide offenses; Mr. Ramsay's aggravated murder conviction qualifies for parole eligibility after 25 years. If the trial court's sentencing is found erroneous, he could potentially receive a sentence with eligibility after 20 years, which is shorter than the statutory 25 years. Mr. Ramsay raises two assignments of error: first, that the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence without parole despite evidence demonstrating his potential for reform; second, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider his age as a mitigating factor, as established in State v. Long. He contends that he is not among the few juvenile offenders deemed irredeemable. The State argues against addressing Mr. Ramsay's points, claiming he did not initially appeal on constitutional grounds regarding Eighth Amendment violations. However, the court disagrees, noting that Mr. Ramsay's arguments implicitly invoke Eighth Amendment standards concerning juvenile sentencing established by significant U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Thus, his arguments remain valid and the court can apply the relevant legal standards from previous cases to his situation. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Section 2953.08(D)(3) allows for appellate review of a juvenile sentenced to life without parole for constitutional challenges, as outlined in Patrick, Ohio St.3d. 2020-Ohio-6803. Appeals involving legal questions are reviewed de novo, while those regarding sentencing discretion are reviewed for abuse of discretion, per State v. Hill. Mr. Ramsay argued that the trial court failed to consider his age as a mitigating factor when sentencing him. The Supreme Court's decision in Long mandates that a sentencing court must explicitly consider a juvenile's youth as a mitigating factor before imposing a life without parole sentence, although it does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility. During sentencing, the trial court acknowledged Mr. Ramsay's age and the nature of youth-related impulsivity but ultimately deemed him unfit to reenter society, despite recognizing his youth as a mitigating factor. Mr. Ramsay's argument also contended that his life sentence without parole violates the Eighth Amendment unless he is found irreparably corrupt. He disputed the trial court's characterization of him as irreparably corrupt, citing psychological evaluations that indicated a guarded prognosis for redemption, his improved behavior after discontinuing Zoloft, and his participation in prison educational programs. He highlighted expert testimony that linked Zoloft to potential violent behavior, arguing this context undermines the court's conclusion about his character. The United States Supreme Court, in Montgomery and Jones, clarified the requirements for sentencing juveniles to life without parole. Montgomery established that a lifetime sentence is disproportionate for most juveniles, except in cases of "irreparable corruption." However, Jones limited this interpretation by stating that Miller does not necessitate a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing such a sentence, only requiring that the sentencer consider the offender’s youth and characteristics. The Court specified that states cannot impose a mandatory life sentence without parole on offenders under 18 and confirmed that Montgomery applies retroactively. In Mr. Ramsay's case, the court rejected his argument that he cannot be sentenced to life without parole unless his crime demonstrates irreparable corruption, emphasizing that this criterion is not essential for Eighth Amendment compliance. Consequently, Ramsay's contention regarding the trial court’s finding of his irreparable corruption does not warrant appellate review under Section 2953.02. Ramsay's first and second assignments of error concerning his sentencing were overruled, and his third assignment, arguing for the merger of aggravated burglary and kidnapping charges with the aggravated murder charge, was also overruled. The court upheld its previous ruling on this matter, citing the law-of-the-case doctrine. Ultimately, the judgment from the Medina County Court of Common Pleas was affirmed, with the court noting that Ramsay had not sufficiently developed an as-applied Eighth Amendment disproportionality claim. The court ordered the execution of its judgment and instructed appropriate actions for record-keeping and notification. Costs were assessed against Ramsay.