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Williams v. Placid Oil Co.
Citations: 224 So. 3d 1101; 16 La.App. 3 Cir. 839; 2017 WL 3293794; 2017 La. App. LEXIS 1409Docket: 16-839
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 2, 2017; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Myra Williams died on August 9, 2003, at 59 from incurable malignant mesothelioma, attributed to bystander asbestos exposure from her husband, Jimmy Williams, Sr., who was exposed to asbestos at the Placid Oil Facility in Louisiana. After her diagnosis, Jimmy and their four children filed suit on March 16, 2004, against multiple defendants, including Placid Oil and Ingersoll-Rand. The lawsuit included a survival action for Myra and wrongful death claims for her family. Several defendants were dismissed without prejudice, and J. Graves Insulation was granted summary judgment, dismissing claims against it with prejudice. Prior to trial, plaintiffs reached settlements with Placid Oil, Shreveport Rubber & Gasket, and General Electric, leaving Ingersoll-Rand as the sole defendant at trial. Ingersoll-Rand manufactured compressors at the facility, which were insulated with asbestos. The company contended that aluminum sleeves covered the insulation, preventing asbestos release, a claim disputed by several witnesses. An expert testified that significant asbestos dust was emitted from the compressors, leading to substantial exposure for Jimmy and, consequently, Myra when she handled his work clothes. Following a three-day bench trial, the court found both Placid Oil and Ingersoll-Rand at fault for Myra's mesothelioma, holding them liable for their respective shares. Myra was awarded $3 million for the survival action, while Jimmy received $1 million and each child $750,000 in the wrongful death actions. Ingersoll-Rand appealed the judgment, challenging the causal connection to its products, the allocation of fault, and the damages awarded. Ingersoll-Rand contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that the Plaintiffs established a causal link between Myra's mesothelioma and its products. However, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated a clear connection between Ingersoll-Rand's compressors and Myra's disease. Testimony revealed that the compressor room at Placid Oil contained ten Ingersoll-Rand compressors, which were acknowledged by corporate representative Gerald Swimmer to contain asbestos. The compressors required asbestos insulation due to their operation at extremely high temperatures, leading to the release of asbestos fibers caused by intense vibrations during use. Frank Parker, an exposure expert, affirmed that these vibrations were a primary factor in the airborne asbestos dust. Additionally, Jimmy, who worked in the compressor room, inadvertently circulated settled asbestos fibers into the air while cleaning. Multiple witnesses testified that Jimmy's work was a likely cause of Myra's asbestos exposure, citing visible dust levels in the room. Ingersoll-Rand argued that aluminum sleeves on the insulation prevented asbestos release; however, testimony countered that many components were not covered. The trial court accepted the substantial evidence indicating significant asbestos release. Ingersoll-Rand's claim that the Plaintiffs failed to quantify the exact asbestos exposure was dismissed, as legal precedent established that plaintiffs are not required to provide precise exposure measurements. Instead, courts have determined that showing significant exposure to the product is sufficient to meet the "substantial factor" test for causation in asbestos-related claims. A plaintiff must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, two key points: first, that her exposure to the defendant's asbestos product was significant, and second, that this exposure was a substantial factor in causing her mesothelioma. Evidence indicated that Myra's mesothelioma resulted from her handling of Jimmy's work clothes and riding in the family vehicle, which he used for commuting to work. Expert testimony from Frank Parker affirmed that Myra would have experienced substantial asbestos exposure through handling Jimmy's clothing. Ingersoll-Rand's representatives acknowledged that the company was aware of asbestos-related health risks as early as the 1950s, particularly regarding its compressors, yet failed to warn employees, including Jimmy Williams Sr., of these hazards. Consequently, the trial court did not err in determining that Myra's exposure to asbestos from Jimmy's work with Ingersoll-Rand compressors was significant and a substantial factor in her mesothelioma diagnosis. Regarding the summary judgment dismissing J. Graves Insulation, Ingersoll-Rand argued that the trial court erred by finding J. Graves not at fault. J. Graves, which had been named as a defendant, successfully argued through sworn interrogatories that it did not provide asbestos-containing materials to the Placid Oil facility, despite Jimmy’s testimony about some insulation work performed by J. Graves. The trial court granted J. Graves’ unopposed motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against it with prejudice. Ingersoll-Rand's challenge to the summary judgment is deemed meritless, as it failed to timely appeal the decision, making it legally barred from contesting the judgment now. Additionally, under Louisiana law, Ingersoll-Rand could still be held liable for the full amount of damages awarded, including any share attributed to J. Graves, unless the plaintiffs settled with J. Graves. Ingersoll-Rand did not provide evidence showing any work by J. Graves at the Placid Oil facility or that asbestos-containing materials were involved. Ingersoll-Rand contended that the trial court erred in assigning it 50% liability in the survival action. However, the court upheld this allocation, citing that Louisiana’s comparative fault law does not apply to asbestos exposure cases where significant injury-producing exposures occurred before August 1, 1980. The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Cole v. Celotex Corp. established that the key events in long-latency occupational disease cases involve repeated exposures leading to ongoing damages, even if the disease manifests later. The court found that Placid Oil was strictly liable as a premise owner under La.Civ. Code art. 2317 without the need for proving knowledge of danger. This strict liability imposes an absolute duty on the owner to identify risks associated with their property. Consequently, the trial court correctly assigned Placid Oil a single virile share of the survival damages. Ingersoll-Rand's argument for reduced liability based on the timing of its product's involvement was deemed irrelevant; what mattered was the established significant exposure to its asbestos-containing products, which were a substantial factor in causing Myra’s mesothelioma. Additionally, under La.Civ. Code art. 2324 prior to 1987, a solidary obligor could be liable for the entire judgment, ensuring full recovery for plaintiffs. While Ingersoll-Rand could seek a reduction in liability, the trial court noted that Ingersoll-Rand failed to provide proof of other parties' fault or call witnesses to support its claims. Thus, the trial court found no error in holding Ingersoll-Rand liable for an equal virile share of the damages awarded. Ingersoll-Rand failed to demonstrate liability for the involvement of other entities in Myra’s exposure to asbestos, as the trial court noted that mere mention of these entities did not substantiate any claim of fault. A defendant must present evidence indicating a non-party's actual fault when attributing blame. The trial court concluded that the only parties with proven claims were Placid Oil and Ingersoll-Rand. Ingersoll-Rand argued that six other entities were at fault; however, three of these—Garlock, Flexitallic, and Pittsburgh-Corning—were bankrupt, and Louisiana law at the time did not allow for liability offsets due to co-defendant insolvency. The court also found insufficient evidence to establish fault against other specified parties, including Hudson Engineering and Shreveport Rubber & Gasket. Hudson was involved in construction but no evidence linked them to asbestos, while Ingersoll-Rand's claims regarding Shreveport Rubber were based on vague testimony without proof of asbestos involvement. The court emphasized that the burden of proof for negligence against third parties rests with the non-settling defendant, requiring substantial evidence of significant exposure to the product in question. A non-settling defendant must demonstrate that a settling defendant not only manufactured an asbestos-containing product but also that the product was used in a way that emitted dust; mere presence of asbestos is inadequate for liability. In the reviewed case, the trial court found no fault beyond Ingersoll-Rand and Placid Oil in a survival action, as Ingersoll-Rand failed to provide necessary evidence. Ingersoll-Rand contested being assigned 100% liability in a wrongful death action, claiming that liability findings in survival and wrongful death actions are equivalent unless the causes differ. This claim was rejected, referencing the Louisiana Supreme Court case Walls v. American Optical Corp., which clarified that survival and wrongful death actions are distinct, occurring at different times and allowing for different recoverable damages. The court emphasized that the "exposure theory" established in Cole for direct tort and survival actions does not apply in wrongful death cases, as the circumstances and legal frameworks are fundamentally different. The supreme court ruled that the applicable law for wrongful death claims in long-term exposure cases is the law in effect at the time of death. The trial court noted that wrongful death claims are governed by this law, in contrast to survival claims, which are determined by the law at the time of exposure. The court found that Ingersoll-Rand was not entitled to a percentage reduction in fault without proving that others were more likely than not at fault. It determined that Placid Oil was not at fault for Myra's wrongful death, as Ingersoll-Rand failed to show any actual or constructive knowledge that Placid was aware of asbestos dangers at its facility. The trial court assessed strict liability on Placid Oil in the survival action based on its role as property owner, not as an employer, under the version of La.Civ. Code art. 2317 applicable at the time of Myra’s asbestos exposure. However, by the time of her death in 2004, the law had changed to La.Civ. Code art. 2317.1, which introduced a requirement for the owner or custodian to have knowledge of any defects that caused damage. Ingersoll-Rand did not provide evidence that it had informed Placid Oil of hazards related to its compressors. The case cited by Ingersoll-Rand, Warren v. Sabine Towing and Transp. Co., was deemed distinguishable because it involved a comparative fault system, whereas the current case involved pre-comparative fault law for the survival action and comparative fault for the wrongful death action. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning 100% fault to Ingersoll-Rand in the wrongful death action. Ingersoll-Rand also contended that the $750,000 award to each of Myra’s children was excessive, although it did not contest the $1,000,000 award to Jimmy Williams, Sr. In Raymond v. Government Employees Ins. Co., the court outlined the principles governing appellate review of damages. It emphasized that judges and juries have significant discretion in assessing both general and special damages, as established by Louisiana Civil Code article 2324.1. The trial court's determination of damages is a factual finding deserving of deference on appeal. The appellate court must respect the credibility assessments and factual inferences made by the trial court, especially in cases of conflicting testimony. Disturbing a damages award requires clear evidence that the trial court abused its discretion. An appellate court's role is not to impose its own judgment on what constitutes an appropriate award but to ensure that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion. The court reiterated that if a record indicates two permissible views of evidence, the factfinder's choice cannot be deemed manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Appellate courts should avoid re-weighing evidence or substituting their findings, adhering strictly to established standards of review. Disagreements often arise regarding the measure of damages in legal cases, particularly in wrongful death claims, which aim to compensate survivors for their injuries stemming from the loss of a decedent, as outlined by La.Civ. Code art. 2315.2. Key elements for determining wrongful death damages include loss of love and affection, loss of services, loss of support, medical expenses, and funeral expenses. Ingersoll-Rand contends that damage awards to adult children should be lower than those awarded to minors, citing previous cases involving higher awards for minor children. However, while awards for minors are generally higher, this does not automatically render the awards for adult children excessive. Testimonies revealed that Myra was central to the Williams family, and her death significantly impacted family gatherings and relationships. The children described their profound loss, detailing the emotional toll of witnessing their mother's painful decline due to mesothelioma. Their strong connections with Myra were emphasized, with daily communications and caregiving highlighted. The court referenced prior rulings that upheld substantial wrongful death awards in cases of strong familial bonds, asserting that the adult status of the children does not diminish the closeness of their family or the devastation caused by Myra's death. The trial court awarded $750,000 each to the Williams’ children for wrongful death damages. While these amounts may seem high, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirmed the awards. Ingersoll-Rand raised a concern regarding the absence of specific legal interest in the judgment, but the court clarified that legal interest attaches by operation of law under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4203, regardless of whether it is explicitly stated in the judgment. This principle has been upheld in prior cases, confirming that legal interest on tort damages is automatically applied until the judgment is satisfied. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all respects, allocating the appeal costs to Ingersoll-Rand. Additional defendants named included several companies associated with Placid Oil, and the court noted that Ingersoll-Rand's right to seek contribution from J. Graves for its share does not impact the plaintiffs' total judgment against Ingersoll-Rand unless a settlement occurs. The record indicates Jimmy Williams, Sr. was exposed to asbestos while working at Placid Oil in the 1970s, suggesting that pre-comparative fault law applies to this case.