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Hospice Family Care v. Allen
Citations: 218 So. 3d 1222; 2016 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 154Docket: 2140861
Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; June 10, 2016; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Hospice Family Care (HFC) appealed a Madison Circuit Court judgment that granted Joseph Allen, the widower of employee Suzanne Sharp Allen, death benefits and burial expenses under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act following her fatal automobile accident on February 3, 2014. Allen initially filed a complaint against multiple parties, including HFC, which he added later in an amended complaint seeking benefits. The court ordered a separate trial for the workers’ compensation claim, which concluded with a judgment on June 19, 2015, determining that Suzanne was an employee of HFC, financially supported Allen at her death, and was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The court awarded Allen $6,500 for burial expenses, $51,254.64 in accrued benefits, and $605.09 weekly for future benefits over 428 weeks. HFC contended that the claim was barred by the "going and coming" rule, argued that the employee was on a personal errand at the time of her death, claimed improper application of the Act, sought a setoff for insurance benefits already paid, and contested the burial expense amount awarded. The appellate court's review follows Section 25-5-81(e) of the Alabama Code, which states that while there is no presumption of correctness in legal issues, factual findings by the circuit court can only be reversed if not supported by substantial evidence, defined as evidence that a reasonable person could use to infer the fact in question. The court's scope of review is limited to determining if the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, rather than reevaluating conflicting evidence. Trial court findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, as established in case law. In this case, the employee, a registered nurse for HFC, was involved in a fatal automobile accident while traveling home after visiting patients. On the day of the accident, she had informed a colleague of her route from her last patient's residence and intended to stop at a pharmacy before going home. Evidence confirmed she had filled a prescription that day. The accident occurred at approximately 3:46 p.m., and she was pronounced dead shortly after. HFC provided life and accidental-death insurance coverage to the employee, with beneficiaries including her partner Allen and daughter Lauren Sharp. Allen incurred burial expenses totaling $7,474. HFC supplied each nurse with a laptop and cellphone for work, but not vehicles, compensating for mileage only from home visits to the employee's residence. Allen testified that the employee's schedule varied based on patient needs, often requiring additional work after her official hours. Debra Chandler, HFC's director of nursing, mandated that nurses complete charting within 24 hours of home visits, allowing them to do so from any location, although returning to the office close to dark was discouraged for safety reasons. The charting process included documenting medical data, contacting doctors, and leaving voice-mail for on-call nurses. Michelle Millirons, HFC's HR director, confirmed that charting could occur at various locations, including patient residences or the office. Quality coordinator Kirsten Langston indicated that charting typically took up to three hours daily, while coordinator Donna Davenport noted that voice-mails could be sent from any place. Nurses could leave for personal errands without prior approval but were required to be available for patients' needs. Leave requests were necessary for extended absences. On February 3, 2014, the employee did not request time off and failed to chart or inform the night-shift nurse of patient status. HFC asserted that the employee's accident did not arise during the course of employment, referencing the "going and coming rule," which generally excludes injuries occurring while traveling to or from work from compensability under the relevant Alabama statute. HFC failed to address the circuit court's findings on whether the employee was 'coming from work.' In such cases, the determination of whether an employee's activity is within the course of employment during an accident must be made on a case-by-case basis. According to Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-31, injuries are compensable if they arise out of and occur in the course of employment. Courts are instructed to interpret the workers’ compensation law liberally, yet this interpretation must be supported by the statute's language. An injury is considered to occur in the course of employment if it happens within the employment period, at a reasonable location, and while fulfilling job duties or incidental tasks. Alabama law generally excludes injuries from coverage when they occur while an employee is commuting to and from work, as established by various court cases. Exceptions to the 'going and coming' rule include circumstances where the employer provides transportation, where the accident occurs on the employer's property, or when an employee is engaged in duties furthering the employer's business while commuting. In this case, the employee was acting in furtherance of HFC's business. HFC required the employee to be available until 4:30 p.m., provided her with a laptop and phone for remote work, and discouraged her from returning to the office due to safety concerns in the area. The accident occurred before 4:30 p.m., and the employee had not requested leave on that day, routinely completing job duties from home. Thus, the evidence supports that the employee was still performing her duties at the time of the accident, qualifying for an exception to the commuting rule. Nurses were encouraged to complete their tasks at home, indicating that at the time of the accident, the employee was still engaged in HFC’s business and her workday had not ended. The circuit court reasonably determined that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, making her death compensable. The court addressed whether the employee's brief stop at a pharmacy, deemed a personal errand, would bar benefits under the Act. Alabama law states that an employee remains covered unless there is a substantial deviation for a purely personal objective. However, the employee's deviation was minimal and transitory, as she had just completed her errand and was returning home to finish work tasks. Testimony confirmed that she was not "off the clock," frequently worked from home, and had not completed her daily duties. Additionally, it was not against HFC policy for employees to run personal errands without prior approval. The court did not err in finding that the personal errand did not constitute a substantial deviation. HFC's argument for a setoff on life-insurance and death benefits to prevent double recovery was acknowledged, as Alabama law allows employers to provide various insurance types without limiting workers' compensation benefits. HFC references Ala.Code 1975 § 25-5-57(c), which permits set-offs when calculating workers' compensation amounts under certain conditions. HFC clarifies it is not seeking a set-off under § 25-5-57(c)(1), which allows reductions for benefits if the employer provided the necessary disability, retirement, or sick pay plans. Although HFC claims to have provided "life insurance" and "accidental death benefits," it does not assert that these fall under the aforementioned plans. HFC then shifts focus to § 25-5-57(c)(3), indicating it seeks a set-off under this provision, which allows salary continuation during the benefit period for injured employees. However, voluntary contributions to a Section 125 cafeteria plan are excluded from employer-provided benefits. The court finds that prior cases cited by HFC regarding set-offs do not align with the death benefits in this situation. Additionally, § 25-5-57(c)(3) is interpreted to apply specifically to living employees and not to deceased employees. Consequently, the circuit court's award of $6,500 in burial expenses is deemed erroneous, leading to the reversal of this portion of the judgment, with instructions to award appropriate burial expenses per § 25-5-67. The court affirms the remainder of the circuit court's judgment. Furthermore, Allstate opted out of the action, and the circuit court later allowed the Healthcare Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Fund to intervene to assert its subrogation rights under § 25-5-11(a). An appeal can typically only be made from a final judgment, which conclusively resolves the issues before the court and clarifies the rights of the parties involved, as defined in Bean v. Craig. In this case, the circuit court did not sever Allen's claims against Pogue and Maples as allowed under Rule 21 but chose to conduct a separate trial for the workers' compensation case under Rule 42(b). Consequently, the judgment was deemed non-final since it did not address all issues or clarify all parties' rights. The only exception permitting an appeal from a non-final judgment occurs when a trial court certifies a judgment regarding fewer claims or parties as final under Rule 54(b). Following this, the circuit court was given jurisdiction to decide on such certification and subsequently issued an order on April 21, 2016, certifying the judgment as final under Rule 54(b), thus making it appealable.