Buck Town Contractors & Co. v. K-Belle Consultants, LLC

Docket: No. 2015-CA-1124

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 6, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The case involves the interpretation of Louisiana's Private Works Act (PWA), specifically La. R.S. 9:4801, et seq. The court amended the judgment and affirmed in part while remanding for further proceedings. The defendant, New Orleans Jazz Heritage Festival and Foundation, Inc. (NOJHF), owns the Jazz Heritage Center, which was restored by general contractor Donahue Favret Contractors, Inc. (Donahue) between 2013 and 2014. A contract with Donahue was recorded as required by law. Subsequently, NOJHF entered into a contract with K-Belle Consultants, L.L.C. (K-Belle) to take over as general contractor; however, this contract was not recorded.

Plaintiff Buck Town Consultants, Co. (Buck Town) subcontracted with K-Belle for drainage and concrete work but claimed it did not abandon the project despite K-Belle's assertion to the contrary. Buck Town sent a 'Notice of Claim and Privilege' to NOJHF on January 6, 2015, and later filed suit against K-Belle, its surety, NOJHF, and NOJHF's surety on January 28, 2015. This notice, crucial for securing claims under the PWA, was also not recorded. NOJHF terminated its contract with Donahue on February 12, 2015, without notifying Buck Town, and filed a certificate of substantial completion regarding K-Belle on March 3, 2015, again without notice to Buck Town.

NOJHF filed exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action, arguing Buck Town's claims were unprotected, which the trial court granted, dismissing NOJHF from the lawsuit. This appeal followed. The PWA allows subcontractors to sue owners for amounts owed and secures such claims with a privilege on the property. The court reviewed the case under a de novo standard, emphasizing the rights granted to subcontractors by the PWA, including the statutory claim against the owner and the privilege on the immovable property where the work was performed.

The claim and privilege granted to a subcontractor under La. R.S. 9:4802 are contingent upon the timely preservation of those rights as outlined in La. R.S. 9:4822. Specifically, a subcontractor must file a statement of claim and privilege within either thirty days or sixty days, depending on whether the contract notice was timely filed. Failure to do so extinguishes the rights under La. R.S. 9:4823(A). Strict compliance with the Private Works Act (PWA) is required, with courts holding subcontractors responsible for proving timely filing. If a subcontractor does not meet this burden, it forfeits its rights against the owner. While technical defects in notice may not defeat a claim if the notice serves its intended purpose, the PWA must still be strictly construed. In this case, Buck Town had until May 2, 2015, to file its lien but failed to do so within the stipulated time frame. Furthermore, NOJHF, the owner, did not provide required notice to Buck Town regarding the substantial completion of the project, making NOJHF liable for all costs and attorney fees associated with establishing the claim due to this failure.

Buck Town was found to have not timely filed its claim or privilege and also failed to properly preserve it. The court referenced Byron Montz, Inc., stating that there is no statutory basis to extend the filing period for a claim when an owner does not comply with the notice requirement under R.S. 9:4822(L). The court emphasized that the time periods in the Private Works Act are peremptive and that the Legislature intended to extinguish the rights of claimants who do not file within the specified time limits. Consequently, the trial court's judgment dismissing Buck Town’s claims against NOJHF was affirmed due to Buck Town’s failure to preserve its privilege. However, NOJHF was held liable for all costs and attorney’s fees related to the claim or privilege because it admitted to not complying with La. R.S. 9:4822. The judgment was amended and remanded to the trial court to determine reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, leaving other issues unresolved in this appeal.