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Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC v. Noble
Citation: 215 So. 3d 1044Docket: 1141158, 1141166, and 1141168
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; July 8, 2016; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC, Maria Bolyard, CRNA, Parkway Medical Clinic, Inc. (d/b/a Parkway Medical Center), and Dr. Jeffrey Markham (collectively referred to as "the appellants") initiated three petitions for a permissive appeal following the Morgan Circuit Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment in a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by Paula B. Noble, representing the estate of Thomas A. Noble. Key facts include that Thomas Noble died on November 18, 2011, and Paula was appointed as the personal representative of his estate on January 18, 2012. After filing a petition to close the estate in August 2012, Paula was discharged as personal representative. Subsequently, on November 15, 2013, Paula filed a wrongful-death action against the appellants, just before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on November 18, 2013. On December 16, 2013, realizing her lack of capacity to maintain the wrongful-death action, Paula successfully petitioned the probate court to be re-appointed as personal representative for the purpose of the lawsuit. The appellants later filed motions for summary judgment, asserting that Paula lacked the capacity to sue, as she was not the personal representative at the time of filing, which occurred after the expiration of the limitations period. Parkway and Dr. Markham joined this argument, while Northstar and Bolyard filed their summary judgment motion on April 24, 2015. Paula responded to the appellants' motions on May 29, 2015. Paula contended that her wrongful-death action is valid and not subject to the two-year limitations period outlined in § 6-5-410(d) because her reappointment as personal representative of Thomas’s estate is retroactively effective to the date of Thomas’s death, the filing of her original petition for letters of administration, or her initial appointment as personal representative. She also asserted that Parkway and Dr. Markham waived any defense of lack of capacity by failing to plead it. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motions for summary judgment on June 19, 2015, determining that Paula was considered personal representative at the time the wrongful death action was filed, as she had not been removed or replaced. Paula amended her complaint on July 9, 2015, to include her reappointment details, after which the appellants answered. On July 24, 2015, the circuit court permitted the appellants to appeal its denial of summary judgment under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., and the petitions for permission to appeal were subsequently granted. The appellate court's review standard is de novo, particularly focusing on whether the trial court misapplied the law to the undisputed facts. The circuit court certified a controlling legal question regarding the validity of a wrongful death complaint filed by a previously appointed personal representative of the deceased's estate, considering the timeline of appointments and the closure of the estate. A wrongful-death action in Alabama, governed by § 6-5-410 of the Ala. Code 1975, is a statutory cause of action that did not exist at common law, requiring strict adherence to the statute as intended by the legislature. Only a personal representative, defined as an executor or administrator of the deceased's estate, may initiate such an action. If someone not appointed in this capacity files a wrongful-death suit, it is deemed a nullity. In the discussed case, the appellants contend that Paula's wrongful-death action is invalid because she was not the personal representative of Thomas’s estate when she filed the complaint on November 15, 2013. Although Paula had previously been the personal representative, she was discharged by the probate court’s August 16, 2012, order. Paula argues that this order only pertained to administrative duties and did not affect her ability to bring a wrongful-death action on behalf of Thomas’s heirs. However, the court determined that the probate court's order was a final judgment, clearly discharging Paula from all responsibilities as personal representative, thus closing the estate without leaving it open for any further actions. As a result, Paula was not authorized to file the wrongful-death action, rendering it invalid. An individual can only act as a personal representative in a wrongful-death action if they have been properly appointed by a court and cannot continue to act once that authority has ended, whether through death, resignation, or discharge. Under Alabama law § 6-5-410(a), a wrongful-death action must be initiated by a legally appointed personal representative, defined as an executor or administrator. Paula was discharged from her position as personal representative prior to filing her wrongful-death complaint on November 15, 2013, rendering the action a nullity. The court then assessed the implications of Paula's subsequent reappointment on December 16, 2013, which occurred after the two-year statute of limitations for filing a wrongful-death action had expired. The appellants contended that Paula’s reappointment was irrelevant since she lacked authority when she filed the complaint, arguing that it couldn't relate back to any prior appointment. Paula claimed her reappointment should relate back to her original petition or the filing of the complaint, but the court disagreed. Citing Wood v. Wayman, the court reiterated that the relation-back doctrine does not apply to extend the limitations period if the personal representative was appointed after it expired. An exception exists only if the delay was due to inadvertence by the probate court, which was not the case here; Paula’s delay was due to her own actions. Consequently, the court maintained that the general rule from Wood applies, and Paula was not the personal representative at the time she initiated the wrongful-death action. Paula's request to overrule the precedents set by Wood and Pool is denied. The Court reaffirms its position from the January 29, 2016 ruling in Alvarado, which upheld the principles established in Wood, and applied these again in Ex parte Hubbard Properties on March 4, 2016. The Court finds Paula's arguments unconvincing and emphasizes that any amendments to the wrongful-death statute, § 6-5-410, are the responsibility of the legislature, not the Court. Consequently, Paula's complaint is deemed a "nullity," meaning it has no legal effect, and thus, the appellants were not required to assert an affirmative defense regarding Paula's capacity or standing. A nullity can be treated as if it never occurred, aligning with previous rulings that declared actions initiated by someone lacking the status of personal representative under § 6-5-410 as void. The Court reverses the circuit court’s denial of the appellants’ summary-judgment motions and remands the case for further proceedings. Justices Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Main concur, while Justices Shaw, Murdock, Wise, and Bryan dissent. The opinion also references a similar conclusion reached by the Southern District of Mississippi in Nailen v. Ford Motor Co., which reinforces the Court's ruling regarding the necessity of a personal representative for such actions. It is noted that Paula was previously the administrator of the deceased's estate but had been discharged and released from that role 17 months prior to filing the action. In Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, the Alabama Supreme Court defined 'personal representative' in the context of wrongful death statutes, identifying it as the executor or administrator of an estate. The court ruled that the individual filing a wrongful death suit must be the personal representative at the time of filing, and any amendments to substitute or comply with this requirement after the suit has commenced do not prevent dismissal of the case. Consequently, the current suit must be dismissed because the plaintiff was not the personal representative of the deceased at the time of filing. Furthermore, the plaintiff, Paula, does not argue on appeal that her reappointment as personal representative relates back to the time of the deceased's death, and her reliance on Alabama Power Co. v. White for her argument is misplaced, as that case deals with issues under the Workers’ Compensation Act, which are not relevant to the present case involving a claim under a different statute.