McLendon v. Nikolits

Citations: 211 So. 3d 92; 2017 WL 362555; 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 765Docket: No. 4D15-4003

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 24, 2017; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Damoorgian, J. Todd and Shire McLendon appealed a final summary judgment favoring the Palm Beach County Property Appraiser regarding the denial of their request for an agricultural tax classification. The appellate court reversed the judgment, granting the McLendons their requested agricultural classification. The undisputed facts reveal that the McLendons owned a five-acre parcel in Palm Beach County, using it since 2006 for aviculture, which involves raising wild birds for sale as pets. They invested approximately $50,000 in necessary infrastructure, and from 2006 to 2012, their property received an agricultural tax classification for both aviculture and cattle grazing.

In 2012, the Property Appraiser reduced the classification from 4.5 acres to 2.25 acres, citing section 193.461(1) of the Florida Statutes. The McLendons appealed this decision to the Palm Beach County Value Adjustment Board (VAB), which ruled that the entire 4.5 acres should be classified agriculturally. However, in 2013, the Property Appraiser again denied the agricultural classification for the aviculture portion, claiming that aviculture was mistakenly classified as an agricultural purpose. The McLendons contested this with the VAB, which appointed a special magistrate who reversed the Property Appraiser's decision.

The Property Appraiser subsequently appealed to the circuit court, arguing that tax exemptions were limited to activities explicitly listed as 'agricultural purposes' in section 193.461(5). The court, reviewing the VAB's decision, concluded that aviculture was intentionally excluded from the statute's definition, interpreting the lack of mention of aviculture as legislative intent to limit agricultural activities. The court also expressed concerns about potential abuse if pet breeding were included as agricultural. Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the Property Appraiser, leading to the McLendons losing their agricultural classification for 2013, prompting this appeal. Under Florida law, only lands used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes qualify for agricultural classification.

Subsection (5) of the statute defines 'agricultural purposes' broadly, listing activities such as horticulture, floriculture, viticulture, and various forms of animal husbandry, among others. The key legal question is whether the phrase 'but is not limited to' introduces ambiguity. The First District Court ruled that this phrase is clear, indicating that the list is not exhaustive, and thus section 193.461(5) is unambiguous. The term 'farm product' is defined as 'any animal useful to humans,' which includes products derived from such animals. While aviculture is not explicitly mentioned, it can qualify for agricultural exemptions if it serves a function useful to humans. The McLendons presented affidavits from experienced professionals asserting the usefulness of aviculture for companionship, conservation, entertainment, education, and science. The trial court acknowledged aviculture's role in providing entertainment. Given the unchallenged evidence, the court concluded that the McLendons’ birds qualify as 'useful to humans,' thereby meeting the criteria for a farm product under the relevant statutes. Consequently, the McLendons are entitled to an agricultural tax exemption for the portion of their property used for aviculture. The decision was reversed and remanded. Additionally, section 194.035(1) states that special magistrates are appointed to assist in administrative hearings, with the burden of proof falling on the initiating party in de novo circuit court proceedings.