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State v. Green
Citations: 211 So. 3d 683; 2016 La.App. 1 Cir. 0057; 2017 WL 498682; 2017 La. App. LEXIS 156Docket: 2016 KA 0057
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 6, 2017; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Cardale Green was indicted by a grand jury for second degree murder of Derrick Casey and attempted second degree murder of Kenneth Cobbs, violating Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 and 14:27. Following a not guilty plea and a jury trial, Green was convicted on both counts. His motions for postverdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder charge and thirty years for the attempted murder charge, with sentences to run consecutively. Green appealed, raising two counseled and two pro se assignments of error. The facts of the case indicate that on January 13, 2011, police found Derrick Casey dead in a residence, alongside evidence including multiple shell casings linked to a nine millimeter firearm. The investigation pointed to Green through a cellular phone registered in his name and palm prints found on a vehicle used during the incident. Witness Shermon Mealey testified that he, along with Casey and Cobbs, interacted with Green prior to the shooting. Mealey, who was unable to enter the house due to paralysis, saw Casey enter, and after hearing gunshots, witnessed Cobbs fleeing the scene with a gunshot wound. Cobbs corroborated Mealey’s account, describing events leading to the shooting. The appellate court ultimately reversed Green's convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial. Arriving at 1841 Gracie Street, Mealey gave Casey money to handle some business. After Casey entered the house, Cobbs, who had remained outside, felt that Casey was taking too long and approached the house. He then heard gunfire and was shot in the hip while trying to flee. Cobbs returned to the vehicle with Mealey, and as they drove away, someone shot at them from the house. Cobbs testified he saw two individuals in the backyard but could not identify the shooter, asserting that the person he saw exit the house was not the defendant. Cellular records revealed that the defendant communicated with Mealey multiple times on the day of the murder; however, after 5:55 p.m., all calls to him went to voicemail, with the last outgoing call recorded at 5:41 p.m. A Taurus .480 revolver was found at Young’s residence, and a projectile from 1841 Gracie Street was linked to this weapon. In contrast, the bullets retrieved from Casey’s body were of a different caliber and not fired from the Taurus, although they were consistent with being fired from a revolver. The defendant did not testify but did provide a recorded statement, claiming he was with family in Spanish Town on the incident date and later at P.I.’s house around lunchtime, leaving two hours afterward. He stated he learned of the murder from his mother via a call to his girlfriend’s phone, asserting he lost his phone earlier that day. He denied any involvement in the murder. The document discusses the legal principles for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in appellate cases where both evidentiary sufficiency and trial errors are raised. It establishes that if the combined evidence supports a conviction, the accused is not entitled to acquittal, leading to a review of the assigned errors for potential grounds for a new trial. The court will first address the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. The defendant asserts that the evidence provided by the State was inadequate to establish all elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. He acknowledges his presence at the murder scene but argues there was no proof that he shot Casey, injured Cobbs, or possessed the intent to kill or cause significant harm to either victim. The legal standard for determining evidence sufficiency, as articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, mandates that a conviction must be based on evidence that allows a rational juror to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test requires that, if all evidence is assumed true, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded for a conviction to occur. In assessing cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence, the court must favor the prosecution when resolving conflicts in direct evidence. The crime of second degree murder involves killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, with specific intent being derived from the offender's desire for the criminal outcome or inferred from surrounding circumstances. Intent does not need to be proven explicitly but can be established through direct evidence or inferred from the defendant's actions. For attempted second degree murder, the defendant must have specific intent to kill, not just to inflict harm. Specific intent can be implied through the use of a deadly weapon. If the main issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, the State must eliminate any reasonable possibility of misidentification, and a positive identification from a single witness can suffice for a conviction. The determination of witness credibility is within the factfinder's purview, and appellate courts typically refrain from reassessing these evaluations. All individuals involved in a crime, whether present or absent, are considered principals if they directly commit, aid, abet, or counsel another in committing the offense, according to LSA-R.S. 14:24. Mere presence at the crime scene does not establish liability; only those who knowingly participate in the crime's planning or execution are deemed 'concerned'. A principal is liable only for crimes matching their mental state. An accomplice's mere readiness to assist can suffice for liability, provided the principal is aware of the accomplice's intent. In reviewing the evidence for a case of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, the jury found sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, rejecting his claim of innocence regarding his presence at the crime scene. The jury has the discretion to accept or reject witness testimony, and their credibility assessments are not re-evaluated on appeal. The defendant's circumstantial evidence argument was dismissed as the jury reasonably rejected his hypothesis of innocence, and no alternative hypothesis raised reasonable doubt. The defendant's statements regarding his whereabouts were inconsistent with evidence from his cellular records, which indicated he was active on the phone well into the evening of the murder, contradicting his claim of leaving the scene earlier. His last communication was shortly before the reported shooting, further implicating him in the crime. The jury's conclusions were deemed rational based on the evidence presented. Mealey identified the defendant as the individual who rode on the hood of his car from Hurst Street to Gracie Street, with the defendant's left palm print found on the vehicle. Although Cobbs could not identify his shooter, he testified that two shooters emerged from a house. Ballistics revealed that at least two firearms were involved; a Taurus .480 revolver was found in Young's residence and was linked to a bullet lodged in a couch at the Gracie Street house. However, bullets recovered from Casey’s body during the autopsy were of a different caliber and not fired from that revolver. Smaller caliber shell casings were discovered both on the living room floor and on the roadway outside the Gracie Street house. An appellate court must not replace the fact finder’s evaluation of evidence and witness credibility with its own, especially when overturning a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis rejected by the jury, as established in State v. Calloway. Consequently, the assignment of error presented lacks merit. In the pro se assignment of error, the defendant claimed a violation of his right to counsel of choice under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the court allowed the withdrawal of two qualified attorneys. Initially, a public defender was appointed at the arraignment on June 9, 2011, but later withdrew due to a conflict with co-defendant Young. David Rozas took over representation in July 2011. After several continuances, the trial was rescheduled multiple times, with Rozas ultimately relieved of duty on February 19, 2013. Carson Marcantel was then appointed, but he moved to withdraw on June 13, 2013. The defendant indicated he was hiring new counsel, leading to the enrollment of Joel Porter and Tiffany Foxworth, which prompted a hearing on potential conflicts. Despite the State's concerns regarding the Rules of Professional Conduct, the district court granted the motion to enroll both attorneys. The matter was subsequently continued for a status conference. The State submitted a writ application for review of a district court ruling, which was denied by both this Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Prior to these rulings, the State had filed complaints against attorneys Foxworth and Porter with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board. After being notified of the investigation, Foxworth and Porter moved to withdraw as counsel for the defendant. During a hearing on November 21, 2013, despite the defendant's objection, the district court granted the motion to withdraw. The court subsequently continued the case to April 29, 2014, cancelling the original trial date of March 24, 2014. Porter requested reconsideration of the withdrawal ruling, arguing that it had been filed out of caution and insisted there was no conflict of interest. He expressed his intent to continue representing the defendant vigorously. However, the district court refused to revisit its decision, affirming that Porter was relieved from representation. Following this, Porter attempted to file a writ but did not proceed. On December 3, 2013, Porter, Foxworth, and another attorney filed a motion to re-enroll, but this was denied on December 5, 2013, with the case maintained for further proceedings in April 2014. An additional writ application filed by Porter was dismissed due to rule violations. The defendant claims that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by denying him counsel of choice, a right also protected under the Louisiana Constitution. Louisiana law ensures that criminal defendants can choose their counsel or have one appointed if they are indigent. The Louisiana Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court recognize that this right extends to defendants with privately retained counsel or counsel hired by collateral sources, with any denial constituting structural error requiring reversal. The right must be exercised reasonably and cannot obstruct court procedures or justice. In this case, attorneys Porter and Foxworth, previously enrolled as counsel, filed a motion to withdraw due to a disciplinary complaint against them, intending to protect themselves rather than abandon the case. Despite favorable rulings from higher courts, they did not withdraw their motion, which led to surprise when the district court granted it. Afterward, Porter sought reconsideration and filed a motion to re-enroll, clearly expressing the defendant's desire for continued representation. There is no evidence of manipulation by counsel to disrupt court proceedings. Therefore, the district court's denial of the motions to re-enroll was deemed an abuse of discretion. The district court ruled that there was no conflict preventing the defendant from being represented by attorneys Porter and Foxworth, a finding that was upheld by higher courts despite the defendant's persistent wish to retain them. This situation contrasts with State v. Brown, where the withdrawal of counsel was deemed appropriate due to an actual conflict of interest. The current case's error in denying the defendant his counsel of choice constitutes a structural error, which is not subject to harmless error review, thus validating this assignment of error. As a result, the court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial, while pretermitting discussion on other assignments of error. Chief Justice Whipple dissented. Additionally, co-defendant Mark Young faced similar charges but was acquitted in a separate trial. Evidence collected from the victim included a projectile from the chest and fragments from the shoulder and collarbone. The trial was postponed at the defense's request to March 24, 2014.