Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 13, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Robert Calvin Farris was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without benefits, with the sentences to be served consecutively. The victims, Madonna Wachter and Stephen Bryant, were found dead from gunshot wounds in their Shreveport home on January 3, 2013. Text messages on Madonna's cellphone indicated she owed Farris $600 and contained threats related to this debt. During the investigation, Farris was implicated through these messages and the discovery of matching shell casings at his residence.
Farris waived his right to a jury trial, resulting in a bench trial that began on August 25, 2016, where he was found guilty. He subsequently filed motions for a new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence and an incorrect identification by a witness. Both motions were denied by the trial court, which highlighted the overwhelming evidence against him. Farris's appeal challenges the evidence's sufficiency, asserting it was purely circumstantial and that his alibi was not adequately considered. He contends that the police failed to investigate another potential suspect and argues that the text messages could have been sent by anyone. Testimony from witnesses, including Madonna’s sister, indicated suspicions of drug involvement and provided evidence linking Farris to the case.
John Farris lived with his father, John Farris, from December 2012 to January 2013, during which time John's cellphone number, 200-5074, was used to send threatening texts to the victim, Madonna Wachter. John stated that multiple people, including Farris and Dalando Garner, used his phone, and he denied knowing Madonna or texting her. Phyllis Lane testified that her daughter, Angelia Carter, Farris's girlfriend, had the cellphone number 828-3399, which also sent threatening messages, and Farris frequently answered calls to this number. Farris's sister, Dianna Ross, claimed responsibility for sending the threatening texts from 200-5074, stating she did so out of frustration with family dynamics, despite initially telling police that Farris sent them.
Corporal Sherry Stump of the Shreveport Police Department described responding to a crime scene on January 3, 2013, where Madonna was found with cash and her cellphone nearby. The scene revealed three projectiles and two .40 caliber shell casings, along with drugs and drug paraphernalia in the victims' bedroom. Farris's fingerprints were not matched to any evidence in the house. Following a search warrant executed at his father’s home, two .40 caliber shell casings and a broken Motorola flip phone were found in the yard. Firearms expert Carla White linked all recovered shell casings to the same weapon, while the bullets' damage prevented a conclusive match.
Sergeant Patrick McConnell recounted a May 2012 traffic stop involving Farris, during which Farris identified a vehicle registered to Madonna Wachter. Investigator David W. Hensley found that the cellphone numbers associated with the victim were linked to Roy Sullivan, who passed them to his daughter Kathy and then to Dalando Garner and Angelia Carter. Both Garner and Sullivan claimed to be at a Super 8 Motel on January 2, 2013, but there was no evidence to confirm their presence there.
Detective Michael Escude monitors the inmate telephone systems at Caddo Correctional Center and reviewed calls made by inmate Farris to his mother. In a January 18, 2013 call, Farris mentioned his lawyer's assertion regarding his incarceration linked to text messages sent before Christmas, including a joking reference about getting money in blood. On March 13, 2013, he claimed innocence about his actions, stating, "I went over there and left and I didn’t do nothing." In a May 2, 2013 call, Farris discussed his photo being publicized by the police, implying his presence was known because he was there to collect money.
Detective Joshua Mayfield, from the Shreveport Police Department, examined text messages on Madonna’s phone. On December 17, 2012, Madonna informed John that she had half of a balance for him and would call later. John responded angrily, demanding his money. The following day, Angelia Carter sent a series of texts to Madonna, expressing frustration over delayed payments and threatening violence if she was not paid $500 by the first of the month.
On December 30, 2012, John texted Madonna about receiving payment for waiting a month, threatening violence if he did not get his money. Madonna replied that payment would be made after 5:30 PM on January 2, 2013. Detective Mayfield confirmed that Madonna's last call to John was at 5:14 PM on January 2, 2013, and the last call she received was from Angelia at 6:12 PM that same day. Mayfield also located a news article regarding Farris’ past involvement in a drive-by shooting, linking him to a prior murder charge.
Detective Mayfield obtained a search warrant for John Farris’s residence. Upon arrest, Farris confirmed his cellphone number as 200-5074 and attributed threatening text messages sent to a homicide victim to his son, Robert. Mayfield later encountered Farris and Dalando Garner at Angelia Carter's home, where Garner denied any knowledge of drug dealings or homicides linked to Farris, while Carter indicated Farris used her phone for communications. Dianna Ross informed Mayfield of her belief that Farris was involved in the homicides, citing Farris's anger over money owed by victim Madonna and his use of multiple phone numbers to contact her. Ross noted Farris had cut his hair post-homicides, which she found suspicious based on prior incidents. Mayfield acknowledged uncertainty regarding phone possession at the time of the murders. Farris claimed an alibi, stating he was in Texas with his sister, which was contested by her delayed testimony. The excerpt shifts to legal standards for assessing evidence sufficiency in criminal cases, citing relevant case law, emphasizing that appellate courts review evidence favorably to the prosecution without reassessing witness credibility or reweighing evidence. The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is clarified, noting that direct evidence confirms facts, while circumstantial evidence allows inference of facts based on related circumstances.
Circumstantial evidence used by the state to prove an essential element of a crime requires the court to assume all facts it supports while excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The trier of fact is responsible for assessing the credibility of this evidence, and appellate review applies the standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, favoring the fact finder’s conclusions. If the jury reasonably dismisses the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, the defendant is deemed guilty unless a reasonable alternative hypothesis exists that a rational juror could not dismiss. An alternative hypothesis must be sufficiently credible to raise reasonable doubt, not merely exculpatory.
In cases of conflicting testimony, the resolution lies in the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency, as the trier of fact determines witness credibility. The court's review of this discretion is limited to ensuring fundamental due process.
Second degree murder is defined as killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, which can be inferred from the context and the defendant's actions. The discharge of a firearm at close range towards a person suggests such intent. The jury's determination of intent is a factual question.
In this case, the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for second degree murder. Expert testimony confirmed the manner of deaths, establishing the perpetrator's specific intent. Circumstantial evidence identified the defendant as the perpetrator, including threatening text messages sent to the victim regarding a $500 debt, which the trial judge reasonably attributed to the defendant based on his access to the phone numbers used.
Madonna identified 'Robert' as the sender of threatening messages, and saved the number 200-5074 as 'DeRoss-200 Robert' and 'Dad’s phone.' The defendant's sister first claimed she sent the messages but later said the defendant did. During a phone call from jail, the defendant acknowledged sending some messages. On January 2, 2013, Madonna planned to pay the defendant money she owed. Her last call was to 200-5074 at 5:14 p.m., and she received a call from 828-3399 at 6:12 p.m. An eyewitness reported seeing a black male on the victims’ porch around 6:00 p.m. The defendant admitted in a jail call that he was at the victims’ house that night for the money. Forensic evidence linked .40 caliber shell casings from the crime scene to the defendant’s father's house. The defense presented an alibi from the defendant's sister and argued the police did not investigate other suspects, but the trial court rejected this. The evidence presented was deemed sufficient for the trial judge to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Farris claimed error in denying a motion to suppress evidence from Madonna’s cellphone, arguing that the police needed a warrant as there is no 'crime scene exception' to the warrant requirement. Citing multiple precedents, he asserted that the warrantless search was unreasonable without exigent circumstances. The Fourth Amendment and Louisiana Constitution guarantee protection against unreasonable searches. The state must prove the admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant, and trial courts have significant discretion in ruling on suppression motions, which will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion.
In Louisiana, individuals adversely affected by unlawful searches or seizures can challenge their legality in court, as established by La. Const. Art. I, § 5. Unlike federal law, Louisiana allows for a party to raise violations of another's constitutional rights. However, an unreasonable search requires an invasion of someone's privacy rights. The determination of such an invasion aligns with the Fourth Amendment standard, necessitating a person to have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched area.
A reasonable expectation of privacy is assessed both subjectively (the individual's belief) and objectively (society's recognition of that belief). Case law, including Mincey v. Arizona, asserts that a warrantless search is unjustified even if a homicide occurred on the premises, as the individual retains a right to privacy in their home. Conversely, in State v. Hudson, the court ruled that a defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a deceased victim's home, as no living person held a privacy interest there. The ruling emphasized that an invasion of privacy is essential for claiming an unreasonable search.
The court also found that exigent circumstances allowed for the preservation of evidence, permitting officers to seize items in plain view. In the case at hand, Detective Mayfield accessed the deceased victim's cellphone without a warrant, leading to evidence against the defendant. The court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, stating that the defendant had no possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in the cellphone, distinguishing it from cases where a home was searched.
The defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of Madonna’s cellphone under La. Const. Art. I, § 5, as her rights to privacy were not violated, and thus there was no unreasonable search. The defense argues that the consecutive life sentences imposed are excessive, claiming the trial court did not adequately justify them based on the heinous nature of the crime, the victim's actions, and the disregard for human life. They contend that these circumstances are common to many murders and that the court failed to address each individual offense. Although the trial court did not rule on the motion to reconsider the sentence, this does not impede appellate review of the sentence's constitutional excessiveness, and the court retains jurisdiction over the motion. A two-pronged test is used for reviewing sentence excessiveness: confirmation that the trial court considered the criteria in La. C.Cr. P. Art. 894.1 and assessment of whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A sentence is deemed excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or constitutes unnecessary suffering. The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is life imprisonment without parole, which has been upheld as constitutional. When multiple convictions stem from a single act, sentences are typically served concurrently unless explicitly ordered otherwise, and consecutive sentences are not automatically deemed excessive.
The court has discretion to impose consecutive sentences rather than concurrent ones, requiring justification based on the evidence or record. When consecutive sentences are given, the court must articulate the factors considered, including the defendant's criminal history, the seriousness of the offenses, the nature of the crimes, the impact on victims, the defendant's potential danger to the public, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. Even if specific reasons for consecutive sentences are not provided, remand is unnecessary if the record supports such a decision. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive life sentences, citing considerations such as the violent nature of the murders and evidence of the victims' attempts to offer money to the perpetrator. The court's rationale aligned with the aggravating and mitigating factors outlined in Louisiana law. Furthermore, the consecutive life sentences were deemed not excessive when compared to the offenses, as they were not disproportionate or shocking to justice.
The defendant also raised pro se claims regarding the indictment, asserting improper denial of a motion to quash. The state countered that the defendant was correctly charged with two counts of second-degree murder via a short form indictment, properly signed and filed. The state maintained that it provided sufficient notice of the charges, and the defendant waived his right to object by failing to address the pending motions before trial. The indictment was deemed properly formatted, with the grand jury's endorsement of a "true bill" confirmed. The charges stated that Robert Calvin Farris committed two counts of second-degree murder on January 2, 2013, involving victims Madonna Dean Wachter and Stephen Bryant.
The indictment adhered to the requirements of La. C.Cr. P. Art. 465(A)(3), and the state provided sufficient discovery and responded adequately to the defendant's request for a bill of particulars. The trial court did not rule on the defendant's motions to quash, and the defendant waived this claim by failing to object. A pro se claim of trial judge bias based on a misstatement about eyewitness identification and the rejection of the alibi testimony was found to lack merit, with the presumption of judicial impartiality upheld. The defendant did not present substantial evidence to support the claim of bias necessary for recusal.
Regarding the expert testimony from Carla White on firearms identification, defense objections to her qualifications were overruled. White's testimony indicated that firearms identification is a subset of tool mark identification, and she was deemed qualified as an expert. The defendant's arguments against her testimony primarily concerned its credibility and weight, not admissibility. Under La. C.E. Art. 702, an expert may testify if their specialized knowledge assists in understanding the evidence, is based on sufficient data, follows reliable principles, and is applied appropriately to the case facts.
Trial courts have significant discretion in assessing the qualifications of expert witnesses, and such determinations will only be overturned upon a clear abuse of discretion. In the case at hand, the trial court properly accepted White as an expert in firearms identification based on her relevant education and experience. White has previously qualified as an expert in multiple jurisdictions and provided a certified report that detailed her comparison of shell casings and bullets, concluding they were fired from the same gun without needing the actual weapon.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the court reporter failed to record the entire trial, particularly regarding an eyewitness identification mentioned by the trial judge that was not reflected in the record. However, the record does contain testimony from an eyewitness who saw an unidentified man near the victims' home on the relevant date. The defendant did not demonstrate any missing transcripts, and the trial judge's statement about identification did not constitute evidence of absent testimony. Consequently, the defendant's appeals were deemed without merit, leading to the affirmation of his convictions and sentences.
It was also noted that Diane Stokes Farris confirmed that both she and Dalando Garner used John Farris's cellphone, which, although subscribed to LaRonda Carter, was given to Madonna, indicating LaRonda had no privacy interest in it.
