Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 17, 2015; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Jeremy K. Harrison was convicted of manslaughter under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-3, and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was also ordered to pay court costs, a $1,000 fine, a $200 fee to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund, and restitution. The case stemmed from a fight on October 30, 2010, between Harrison and Reginald Gibbs, during which Harrison shot Gibbs. Harrison claimed self-defense and sought immunity from prosecution under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-3-23(d), which grants immunity for justified use of force unless deemed unlawful.
Despite the State's objections, the trial court held a pretrial hearing to evaluate Harrison's claim of immunity. The court, after reviewing laws from other states with similar immunity statutes, decided that a pretrial hearing was appropriate. The trial court ultimately found that Harrison did not meet the burden of proof for immunity and denied his motion. On appeal, the State did not contest the hearing's validity but noted a lack of Alabama caselaw interpreting § 13A-3-23(d). The Court recognized the need to determine whether a pretrial immunity hearing is required under this statute, which was amended in 2006 without defining "immune from criminal prosecution" or outlining procedures to establish immunity or the lawfulness of the defendant's actions.
The State contended that the question of immunity should be resolved by a jury at trial. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Auburn University, emphasized the distinction between immunity and affirmative defenses. Immunity aims to protect defendants from unwarranted liability and the burdens of prolonged litigation. The court highlighted that qualified immunity should be adjudicated early in the proceedings to prevent unnecessary trial costs if the defense is conclusive. The privilege of qualified immunity is considered an immunity from trial itself, not merely a defense against liability, and is forfeited if the case proceeds to trial erroneously. The trial court's decision to postpone ruling on sovereign immunity defenses until trial denied the petitioners their right to avoid the burdens of litigation. Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court erred in not addressing these defenses at the summary judgment stage. The document also notes the principles guiding statutory interpretation in Alabama, emphasizing the importance of ascertaining legislative intent and adhering to the plain language of statutes. "Immune" is defined as being exempt from liability, while "criminal prosecution" refers to legal proceedings against an accused individual.
The legislature intended to exempt from trial an accused who uses force justified under 13A-3-23, unless the conduct is deemed unlawful. A pretrial determination must be made regarding the justification of the defendant's actions, as submitting the immunity question to a jury would undermine the right to immunity. If a case is wrongly allowed to proceed to trial, the right to immunity is effectively lost. Alabama law permits a self-defense argument at trial, but treating immunity under 13A-3-23(d) as an affirmative defense would render it redundant, suggesting that the legislature aimed to create a meaningful provision. The statute must be interpreted to give effect to all its parts without rendering any section superfluous or insignificant. Other states with similar statutes have recognized the right to a pretrial determination of immunity based on self-defense laws.
Courts in various states have aligned their interpretations of immunity with the Alabama Supreme Court's definition, recognizing immunity as a substantive right. An accused asserting immunity based on a self-defense claim is entitled to a pretrial determination of that immunity. Notable cases from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina support this position. Although the Alabama legislature has not specified a detailed procedure for immunity hearings, procedures from other jurisdictions are considered instructive. The Georgia Supreme Court has established that immunity serves as a significant barrier to criminal proceedings, requiring defendants to prove their entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence prior to trial, similar to the burden for defenses based on insanity or mental incompetence. If a defendant fails to prove immunity before trial, they can still assert an affirmative defense during trial, where the state must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Alabama law, Rule 15.4 permits pretrial motions asserting defenses or objections, allowing the court to resolve issues of fact without a jury unless constitutionally required. Therefore, a defendant claiming immunity due to self-defense is entitled to prove that claim by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing. In this case, the trial court correctly determined that Harrison deserved such a hearing, but he is not entitled to relief based on claims made during or after the trial regarding his immunity from prosecution. The purpose of immunity is to protect defendants from unnecessary liability and the burdens of prolonged litigation.
Harrison had the right to assert self-defense as an affirmative defense during trial, which would lead to acquittal rather than immunity from prosecution. Prior to the trial, he was given the opportunity to establish his self-defense claim at a hearing held on June 30, 2013. At this hearing, Timothy Reid, a nightclub security guard, testified about an incident on October 30, 2010, where he witnessed a fight between Harrison and another patron, Gibbs. Reid described seeing Harrison, who was smaller and bleeding, engaged in the altercation with Gibbs. Reid intervened, asking Harrison not to use a gun he had pointed at Gibbs. After lowering the gun, Harrison was attacked by Gibbs, leading to a scuffle on the ground during which a gunshot was heard, resulting in Gibbs falling. Harrison subsequently left the scene. The trial court concluded that Harrison did not meet the burden of proof to show he was justified in using deadly force in self-defense under Alabama law, specifically referencing Sections 13A-3-23(a) and 13A-3-23(c) of the Alabama Code. These statutes outline conditions under which the use of physical force, including deadly force, is justified and stipulate that a person cannot claim justification if they provoked the altercation.
The initial aggressor is defined as one who may later justify the use of physical force if they withdraw from the encounter and communicate this intent, but if the other party continues to threaten unlawful force. In the case of Harrison and Gibbs, there was no evidence presented regarding how their fight began, preventing the trial court from identifying the initial aggressor. Testimony indicated that after separating, Harrison retrieved a gun and pointed it at Gibbs, which the trial court could interpret as Harrison instigating a new altercation. As a result, the court determined that Harrison did not prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
When evidence is presented ore tenus, the trial court's findings are presumed correct, and appellate review is limited to issues preserved during the trial. Harrison's claim of improper jury charges regarding self-defense was not preserved for appeal due to his failure to object during the trial. Therefore, the appellate court will not reconsider the evidence or the trial court’s rulings, and Harrison is not entitled to relief on his pretrial immunity claim or his appeal regarding jury instructions.
A specific objection is necessary to preserve an issue for appellate review, as it alerts the trial judge to potential errors, allowing for corrections before jury deliberation. Under Rule 21.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., a party cannot claim error regarding jury instructions unless they object before the jury retires, specifying the objection and its grounds. Harrison did not raise any objections to the trial court's jury instructions, resulting in his arguments being unpreserved for appeal. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The court noted that Harrison was indicted for murder but convicted of manslaughter. Additionally, the majority denied relief in the case of Watters, determining that a writ of mandamus was inappropriate. Harrison did present a second witness who confirmed his treatment for two broken ribs following the incident.
