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Luong v. State
Citations: 199 So. 3d 139; 2014 WL 983288Docket: 1121097
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; March 14, 2014; Alabama; State Supreme Court
In February 2008, Lam Luong was charged by a Mobile County grand jury with five counts of capital murder for the deaths of his four children, as the murders involved multiple victims and each child was under 14 years old, per Alabama Code. Luong was convicted and sentenced to death for each count. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions, citing the trial court's failure to change the trial venue due to prejudicial pretrial publicity, denial of funds for defense investigation in Vietnam, and the admission of a prejudicial simulation videotape during sentencing. The State petitioned for a review, which was granted, leading to a reversal and remand. The trial court's sentencing order detailed Luong's background, including his relationship with the children's mother, Kieu Phan, and their struggles after moving back to Irvington post-Hurricane Katrina. Luong engaged in drug use and exhibited problematic behavior, prompting Kieu to move in with her mother. On January 7, 2008, Luong took all four children to the top of the Dauphin Island Bridge, where he threw them off, resulting in their deaths. The ages of the children were Ryan (3 years, 11 months), Hannah (2 years, 8 months), Lindsey (1 year, 11 months), and Danny (4 months). Afterward, Luong attempted to obtain gasoline for the van and money from Kieu for crack. Witnesses recounted their interactions with him during this time. Luong did not exhibit signs of drug or alcohol influence following the incident involving his children. Surveillance footage from a Chevron gas station showed him attempting to purchase gas shortly after he had thrown the children from a bridge. His activities continued until approximately 5:30 p.m., when a flat tire led to him being towed home. Throughout the day, Kieu's mother, Dung, attempted to contact Luong regarding the children, but he did not respond. Luong claimed he had given the children to a woman named Kim, who he said had not returned them. Following Kieu's insistence, Luong reported the children missing at the police station that night, maintaining his story about Kim, despite inconsistencies in his accounts. The next day, Luong asked police Captain Darryl Wilson for assistance in locating Kim in Biloxi, Mississippi, but admitted he did not know where she was after an hour of searching. Upon returning to the police department, Luong told Kieu that the children were dead and indicated to Captain Wilson that they were in the water. He then guided Wilson to the Dauphin Island Bridge, where he pointed out the locations where he had parked and disposed of the children. In a recorded statement, Luong confessed to throwing his children into the water, citing feelings of being looked down upon by his family. He acknowledged contemplating suicide while on the bridge but claimed he wanted to see his wife's reaction after informing her of the children's deaths. Witnesses at the scene observed a van matching Luong's description and saw him engaged in suspicious behavior, including throwing objects off the bridge while the children were still in the vehicle. The children's grandmother confirmed that one child had pigtails on the day of the incident. After initially confessing, Luong later recanted and returned to the 'Kim' story, taunting Captain Wilson by suggesting that charges would only come if the bodies were found. While in jail, Luong laughed during a phone conversation with his wife, claiming no one would discover the children. A search effort was initiated, resulting in the discovery of one child's body, Danny, several miles from the bridge days later. On January 13, a 3-year-11-month-old boy named Ryan was discovered 16.4 miles west of a bridge. Two days later, a 1-year-11-month-old girl, Lindsey, was found 18 miles west of the same bridge in Mississippi. Five days later, 2-year-11-month-old Hannah was located floating in the Gulf of Mexico, 144 miles west of the bridge. Ryan and Lindsey's deaths were attributed to blunt force trauma and drowning, while Hannah's cause of death was drowning. Key evidence against Luong included his confession to throwing his children off the Dauphin Island Bridge, corroborated by his identification of the locations and witness accounts. The State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in presuming prejudice against Luong, conflicting with precedents such as *Skilling v. United States* and *Ex parte Fowler*. It contends that criminal trials should occur in the community where the crime happened and that trial courts have discretion to ensure jury impartiality. The State acknowledges that extensive media coverage can occur for heinous crimes but asserts that this does not inherently prevent a fair trial in the original venue. The Supreme Court, in *Skilling*, stated that mere media coverage does not create a presumption of prejudice unless in extreme cases, and outlined factors to consider regarding pretrial publicity and community characteristics. Additionally, *Ex parte Fowler* clarified that extensive pretrial publicity alone does not warrant a change of venue. Jurors are not required to be completely unaware of the facts surrounding a case to deliver an unbiased verdict, as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The court referenced Irvin v. Dowd, emphasizing that, given the pervasive nature of modern communication, potential jurors are likely to have formed some opinions about high-profile cases, particularly in criminal matters. The mere existence of these preconceived notions does not automatically disqualify a juror, provided they can set aside their biases and base their verdict solely on courtroom evidence. To demonstrate prejudicial impact from pretrial publicity, the defendant must prove that such publicity has created significant bias within the community, necessitating a showing of widespread animosity stemming from that coverage. The court noted extensive media coverage surrounding the case but clarified that this alone does not imply presumed prejudice. Evaluating the situation through the Skilling factors, the court considered the community's size and diversity—Mobile County, with over 400,000 residents per the 2010 census, is large and diverse, diminishing the likelihood of finding 12 impartial jurors. Despite significant local media exposure, the court argued that if any level of pretrial publicity could universally disqualify a venue, it would preclude trials in cases with broad public interest altogether. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed articles from the Mobile Press-Register regarding Luong's case, noting that while the coverage was generally unfavorable, it primarily focused on factual details about the offenses and legal proceedings. Most information in the articles was presented as evidence during the trial. Although public opinions expressed online included condemnations of Luong, some comments affirmed his right to a fair trial. The Court determined that the digital opinions of local citizens did not warrant a presumption of an unfair trial. Luong's claim that extensive media coverage of his confession and guilty plea created prejudicial pretrial exposure was rejected, as the confession was admitted as evidence, negating any presumed bias that could affect jury impartiality. Moreover, a significant portion of the media coverage occurred over a year prior to the trial, which supports the likelihood of selecting an unbiased jury, as established in precedent. The trial court implemented measures to prevent media interference with the jury, and there was no indication of such interference. The Court concluded that the jury’s ability to reach a verdict based solely on trial evidence demonstrated the absence of prejudicial influence from the media coverage. Luong's admission of throwing his children off a bridge undermines any presumption of jury bias or impartiality, as there was no evidence suggesting that the jury could conclude he killed some but not all of his children. The jury's verdict does not indicate presumed prejudice. Luong's argument regarding community involvement in the case was assessed against precedents such as State v. James and Rideau. The Court distinguishes this case from James due to the larger population of Mobile and the nature of community involvement; in James, the community engaged in a search based on a deception by the defendant, while in Luong's case, community efforts began only after he admitted the children were dead. Additionally, the media coverage of Luong’s case was objective and did not involve pretrial prejudicial broadcasting, unlike in Rideau. As such, the circumstances of Luong’s trial do not warrant a presumption of prejudice, distinguishing it from both James and Rideau. The Court also referenced Wilson v. State, where a smaller community's dynamics led to a different conclusion regarding prejudice. Evidence suggested public belief that Wilson, a white male, had killed a black male employee, leading to public outcry when the sheriff did not arrest him. Historical context included Wilson’s grandfather being tried and acquitted for the murder of a young black activist. This trial was perceived by some as an opportunity to avenge the activist's death. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that there was pervasive bias and prejudice in the community against Wilson, warranting a change of venue. Conversely, in Luong’s trial, the record did not show similar community bias or prejudice. While the community expressed grief over the deaths of four children involved in the case, their actions, such as searching for the bodies and fundraising for funerals, indicated compassion rather than bias against Luong. The court found no evidence of community demands for Luong’s arrest or prejudice during the trial, despite the inflammatory nature of the offenses. After evaluating pretrial publicity, community involvement, and the characteristics of Mobile County, the court concluded that there was no basis to presume bias against Luong. The record showed that jurors were aware of the offenses, but the initial community shock had dissipated by the time of the trial. The court emphasized that disqualifying jurors solely based on prior knowledge of a case could obstruct justice, especially in high-profile cases. The law allows informed citizens to participate in legal proceedings, and lingering public awareness of notorious crimes does not inherently indicate bias. The Court ruled that the trial court acted within its discretion by not finding presumed prejudice against Luong and by refusing to transfer his case. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment on this matter was reversed. Additionally, the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by claiming that the trial court's refusal to conduct individual voir dire regarding the impact of pretrial publicity on potential jurors precluded Luong from demonstrating actual prejudice. The State cited established case law emphasizing the trial court's broad discretion in voir dire and assessing juror bias, referencing Skilling and Patton v. Yount. Although the State acknowledged that individual voir dire is preferred in cases with significant publicity, it contended that the trial court's use of juror questionnaires and group questioning sufficiently evaluated potential juror bias and did not constitute a constitutional violation. The trial court required jurors to complete questionnaires addressing their exposure to the case through various media and to respond to collective questions relating to their ability to remain impartial. During the voir dire, the judge directly asked if any juror believed they could not set aside their pre-existing knowledge of the case, prompting a juror to affirm that they could not remain impartial. The court addressed the jurors regarding their ability to set aside preconceived opinions formed from pretrial publicity and render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on courtroom evidence. All jurors, except one, indicated their capability to do so. The court denied the request for individual voir dire on pretrial publicity, asserting that it is not a right but rather a discretionary measure. It highlighted efforts made to ensure thoroughness in jury selection, including a detailed questionnaire provided to the venire and ample time for review. The court referenced Alabama case law affirming that the decision to allow individual voir dire is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of that discretion. The court also acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the trial court's duty to ensure a fair jury selection process amid concerns of pretrial publicity. Primary reliance on the trial court's judgment is justified as the judge is situated in the locale affected by the publicity and can evaluate its impact on jurors based on firsthand observations. Appellate courts, reviewing the media's influence post-factum, lack the immediate context and insight available to trial judges, who assess juror impartiality considering factors such as demeanor, sincerity, and body language—elements not fully captured in the trial record. The document references Ex parte Brown, where the court considered whether the trial court's refusal to conduct individual voir dire, despite significant pretrial publicity, violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury. In this case, the judge asked the venire whether they had knowledge of the case; out of 66 members, 42 responded affirmatively. The judge emphasized the importance of jurors' oaths and their ability to remain impartial despite any preconceived notions. The judge provided time for jurors to reflect on their ability to deliver a fair verdict based on the evidence and law presented. The judge emphasized the importance of ensuring that jurors can remain fair and impartial despite pretrial publicity regarding the case. After a lunch recess, the judge probed the jury pool about any prior knowledge of the case that might affect their verdict. Defense counsel expressed concerns about the significant pretrial publicity and requested individual questioning of jurors to gauge their awareness. The judge defended his extensive voir dire process, asserting that he had thoroughly examined the jurors on the issue and that individual questioning was warranted only if a juror showed uncertainty about their impartiality. During this process, two jurors admitted they could not be fair and were excused, while the judge denied the defense's request for further individual questioning. The case's similarities to Mu’Min v. Virginia were also raised, highlighting that Mu’Min faced extensive media coverage about his prior criminal history and the details of the current charges, raising questions about the impact of such publicity on juror impartiality. In the case of Mu’Min, the petitioner submitted 64 proposed voir dire questions and requested individual voir dire, which the trial judge denied. Instead, the judge divided the venire into panels of four to address publicity concerns. When veniremembers disclosed prior exposure to information about the case, the judge individually assessed their impartiality. The defendant contended that not questioning jurors about the specific content of the media exposure violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge only needed to evaluate the extent of exposure to determine juror impartiality. In the current case involving Brown, a request for individual voir dire was similarly denied, and the judge asked the entire venire about their ability to remain impartial. The case had substantial pre-trial publicity, including 53 front-page articles, radio broadcasts, and statements from prosecutors and law enforcement highlighting the severity of the crimes and the defendant's prior offenses. The court noted that the only significant difference from Mu’Min was the method of questioning, as the trial judge in Mu’Min utilized smaller panels. The court concluded that the trial judge had sufficient information to determine juror impartiality without requiring individual questioning, aligning the case closely with the precedents set in Mu’Min and Brown. The Court is tasked with determining whether the trial court erred in not conducting individual voir dire regarding jurors' ability to set aside pretrial publicity and deliver a fair verdict. The trial court demonstrated awareness of pretrial publicity and community sentiment, and it actively sought to ensure an unbiased jury through various methods, including questionnaires and oral inquiries. Most jurors assured the court they could be impartial despite their prior knowledge of the case, with only one juror expressing potential bias. The Court concluded that individual voir dire is only necessary when there is doubt about the sincerity of jurors' assurances, and the record indicated that the jurors were thoughtful and genuine in their responses. Furthermore, the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly determined that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying funding for Luong’s counsel to travel to Vietnam for mitigation evidence gathering. The trial court must evaluate the reasonableness of the defense's investigative efforts, considering the evidence already available and whether it justifies further investigation. The principles established in *State v. Bui* support the trial court's discretion in this matter. Luong sought court approval for funds to enable his legal counsel to travel to Vietnam to investigate his background and interview family members for mitigation evidence. He provided an affidavit from Dr. Paul Leung, a mitigation expert, who asserted that Luong's experiences as a black Amerasian in Vietnam were significant for mitigation. However, the affidavit lacked specific details about Luong's childhood that would necessitate further investigation. As a result, the trial court determined that it acted within its discretion in denying the request for travel funds. The court did, however, suggest videoconferencing with Luong's relatives to explore potential evidence, allowing for a future request for travel funds if warranted. Additionally, the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court exceeded its discretion by admitting a videotape and testimony from Cpt. Darryl Wilson regarding a demonstration related to the case. The Court of Criminal Appeals had deemed the evidence irrelevant due to a lack of similarity to the actual events. The State contended that this ruling conflicted with established legal precedent allowing for the admission of any relevant evidence, asserting that the videotape and testimony were pertinent to the jury's assessment of the aggravating circumstances surrounding Luong's sentencing. Ala.Code 1975 applies in this case. Luong objected to the admissibility of a videotape and Cpt. Wilson’s testimony before the sentencing hearing but failed to object specifically when the evidence was admitted, which is necessary to preserve the issue for appellate review, as established in Parks v. State and Huff v. State. Despite this, Luong's death sentence allows for appellate review under the plain error doctrine, which permits review of unpreserved issues if the error is particularly egregious and affects the fairness of judicial proceedings, as noted in United States v. Young and Ex parte Price. During the sentencing phase, Section 13A-5-45(d) allows for the admission of any relevant evidence, and the Alabama Rules of Evidence do not apply, as stated in Rule 1101(b)(3). Previous cases, such as Whatley v. State and Harris v. State, support the notion that evidence rules are more relaxed during sentencing hearings, allowing for various forms of evidence, including hearsay. The trial judge has discretion in managing the proceedings, and defendants should have ample opportunity to present their case, as emphasized in Harris v. State. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial court acted within its discretion by allowing a mannequin to be used as evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial to illustrate the victims' deaths. The case referenced prior rulings, particularly Duke, which argued that the mannequin's dissimilarity to the victims might lead to undue prejudice, lacking sufficient probative value. The court noted that the admissibility of such demonstrative evidence is typically at the trial judge's discretion, as long as the conditions of the experiment are reasonably similar to the actual events. Significant case law, including Minor v. State and Hawkins v. State, supports the notion that dissimilarities in conditions do not necessarily preclude admissibility but may affect the evidence's weight. The trial court must assess whether the prejudicial impact of the demonstration outweighs its probative value, a determination that must be made in accordance with Rule 403 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence. The court affirmed that the core question regarding the admission of evidence—whether it was probative and relevant—hinges on balancing its relevance against potential prejudicial effects. The probativeness test evaluates whether an experiment or demonstration closely resembles the actual event. In this case, the court reviewed a videotape showing Cpt. Wilson dropping sandbags from the Dauphin Island Bridge and heard his testimony regarding the weights of the sandbags, their drop point, and the weather conditions, which were similar to those during the offenses. Luong, the defendant, did not cross-examine Cpt. Wilson on the videotape or the conditions during its recording. The videotape was deemed relevant and illustrative of the offenses, contributing to the determination of whether the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court found that the probative value of the videotape outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice against Luong, despite his concern that its visual impact could bias the jury. Luong had admitted to the acts depicted in the video, and the court noted that he had the opportunity to challenge Cpt. Wilson's testimony but chose not to. Given that the jurors observed the sandbags' fall rate during the videotape, the court concluded that the evidence did not unfairly affect Luong's substantial rights or the jury's deliberations. The trial court's decision to admit the videotape and Cpt. Wilson’s testimony was upheld, reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals’ finding that the trial court had exceeded its discretion. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Chief Justice Moore, along with Justices Bolin, Shaw, and Bryan, concurred in the decision, while Justices Parker, Murdock, and Main dissented, and Justice Wise recused herself. Luong was convicted of killing his four children by throwing them off a bridge. He claimed that extensive television coverage prior to the trial may have influenced public perception, but the court noted the lack of evidence regarding the content of this coverage, as neither transcripts nor videotapes were submitted for review. Consequently, the court could not assess any potential prejudice against Luong due to the coverage. The opinion cites Rule 45A of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, which mandates that the Court of Criminal Appeals must identify and address any plain errors in death penalty cases that could have adversely affected the appellant's substantial rights.