Snow v. State

Citations: 197 So. 3d 549; 2015 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 106; 2015 WL 9263850Docket: CR-13-1554

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 17, 2015; Alabama; State Appellate Court

Lead Opinion SummaryLead Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Brian McCall Snow was indicted on three charges: trafficking in methamphetamine, unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree, and second-degree arson. He entered a blind plea of guilty on May 14, 2014. Subsequently, Snow attempted to withdraw his plea, claiming he wasn't thinking clearly at the time of his admission. This motion was denied by the Mobile Circuit Court during a hearing on July 17, 2014, after which he was sentenced to life imprisonment for each conviction, with the sentences running concurrently. Snow was also ordered to pay all mandatory fines, fees, assessments, and court costs.

On appeal, Snow argued that the circuit court improperly sentenced him as a habitual felony offender, asserting that his sentencing should have adhered to presumptive sentencing standards. He contended that the State failed to prove any aggravating factors justifying a departure from the recommended sentence and claimed the circuit court did not provide reasons for this departure. The State countered that the presumptive sentencing standards did not apply in this case and that Snow's arguments were not preserved for appellate review.

The applicability of the presumptive sentencing standards was examined, noting they only apply to nonviolent offenses listed in specific worksheets and do not apply to offenses carrying a mandatory life sentence or certain violent crimes. The manual outlines that worksheets must be completed for offenses classified as "worksheet offenses" during sentencing events, which may encompass multiple convictions. Under these standards, the "most serious offense" is determined by a set of rules, with significant discretion granted to circuit courts in sentencing decisions.

Discretion allows a circuit court to deviate from sentencing recommendations in exceptional cases based on proven aggravating and/or mitigating factors. The court must consider all such factors, but the decision to depart from the presumptive sentence is at the court's discretion. Before departing from a recommendation, the prosecution must establish the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on this unless waived.

In this case, Snow was indicted for and pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine (28 grams or more but less than 500 grams), unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance, and second-degree arson. The trafficking and manufacturing charges are Class A felonies, with the potential for life imprisonment or a sentence between 10 and 99 years, while arson is a Class B felony. The circuit court held a sentencing hearing after Snow's guilty plea.

The State argued that the trafficking conviction was the most serious offense, suggesting that it carried a maximum penalty of life without parole, but this was contested. Snow's trafficking was under a specific statute that did not impose the same maximum penalty as that for trafficking larger quantities of methamphetamine. Therefore, the presumptive sentencing standards applied to Snow’s case.

It was necessary to determine whether the circuit court applied these standards and if any procedural defects were waived. The record shows that prior to Snow’s plea, the State filed notices indicating the intent to use the Habitual Felony Offender Act and to prove aggravating factors, alleging that Snow played a major role in the crime and that it posed risks to health and safety.

During the guilty plea colloquy, the court confirmed the defendant, Brian Snow, was pleading guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine in the first degree, and second-degree arson, acknowledging his guilt. The prosecution highlighted an aggravating factor, indicating Snow's actions posed a great danger to health and human safety. The court clarified that the State must prove this factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence presented by the prosecutor detailed an incident on May 18, 2012, where deputies discovered a meth lab, and Snow was seen attempting to ignite it, causing a fire. The lab was located within 500 feet of a residence. Following his arrest, Snow admitted to having operated the lab previously. 

The court accepted Snow's pleas, adjudging him guilty of the specified charges with the aggravating factor recognized. At sentencing, the prosecutor noted a range of sentencing options available due to the aggravating factor, including life imprisonment or life without parole. Snow did not provide mitigating evidence, and the court ultimately imposed concurrent life sentences for each conviction, deviating from the sentencing guidelines. The document references the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003, which established voluntary sentencing standards, later modified to presumptive standards effective October 1, 2013, applicable to nonviolent offenses, allowing for judicial discretion in sentencing.

The Alabama Sentencing Commission is tasked with updating existing voluntary sentencing standards to include definitions of aggravating and mitigating factors that permit deviations from presumptive sentencing recommendations. These modifications are to be included in the commission's annual report to the Legislature within the first five days of the 2013 Regular Session. The circuit court considered the presumptive sentencing standards before sentencing Snow, who did not object to the court's decision to depart from these standards based on a lack of evidence for aggravating factors or insufficient reasoning for the departure. Established legal principles dictate that issues not raised at trial cannot be reviewed on appeal. Snow's failure to object at the trial court level resulted in waiver of his arguments, which were deemed unpreserved for appellate review.

Snow also claimed that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to a lack of clarity regarding whether he was sentenced under presumptive guidelines or as a habitual offender. This issue was raised for the first time on appeal, violating the requirement that such claims must be preserved by a timely objection or a motion to withdraw the plea. Although Snow attempted to withdraw his plea, he did so based on not “thinking clearly” at the time, failing to assert the misinformation regarding his sentence until the appeal. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. Additionally, while the circuit court initially neglected to assess mandatory fines, the case was remanded to impose those fines, and the classification of Snow's conviction for arson in the second degree as a Class B felony does not influence the application of presumptive sentencing standards. The Presumptive and Voluntary Sentencing Standards Manual identifies specific aggravating factors relevant to sentencing considerations.