Barnett v. Barnett

Citations: 193 So. 3d 460; 15 La.App. 5 Cir. 766; 2016 La. App. LEXIS 1034; 2016 WL 3031838Docket: No. 15-CA-766

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 26, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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The case involves a divorce between Jac Barnett and Melisa Barnett, initiated by Jac on November 12, 2013, alleging Melisa's fault due to adultery and ill-treatment, and requesting community property partition and temporary restraining orders against Melisa. Melisa countered with her own divorce petition, claiming Jac was at fault for cruel treatment, seeking spousal support, exclusive use of the marital home, and similar restraining orders.

On April 1, 2014, the court awarded Jac exclusive use of the marital home and granted Melisa interim spousal support. Subsequently, Jac accused Melisa of contempt for removing items from the home and damaging property, while Melisa claimed Jac was in arrears on spousal support. A hearing on September 23, 2014, led to the domestic hearing officer denying Jac's contempt claim due to lack of a court order regarding the items and finding Jac owed $14,000 in spousal support but not making that amount executory. Both parties objected and requested a de novo hearing.

At the October 22, 2014 hearing, they reached an agreement resolving Melisa’s contempt claim, with Jac agreeing to pay a total of $41,814 in spousal support. The issue of fault was raised by Melisa in a motion filed on April 30, 2014, leading to a hearing set for January 16, 2015, while Jac filed a rule to show cause for divorce based on their separation of 160 days.

A divorce judgment was finalized on November 3, 2014, granting Jac a divorce from Melisa. Subsequently, a hearing on fault and Jac's contempt rule occurred on January 16, 2015, spanning three months and concluding with a judgment on May 1, 2015. The trial court dismissed Jac's fault allegations against Melisa, finding he did not meet the burden of proof required to establish fault in the marriage's dissolution. Additionally, Jac's contempt rule regarding Melisa's removal of property was denied, while Jac himself was held in contempt for not paying interim spousal support, with the possibility of purging the contempt by paying $14,000 in arrears.

Jac appeals, arguing that the trial court wrongly imposed the burden of proof on him rather than Melisa regarding her fault, asserting that Melisa's claim for spousal support should have shifted this burden. He also contends the court erred in not finding Melisa in contempt for removing items and in holding him in contempt without a pending rule against him.

In assessing fault, Jac's initial complaint cited Melisa's alleged adultery, which he needed to prove for divorce under Louisiana law. However, the divorce was granted based on separation for 180 days, rendering the fault claims moot. Melisa's request for spousal support hinged on her being free from fault, which both parties and the court initially agreed was her burden to prove. Despite this, the trial court's judgment incorrectly stated that Jac failed to prove Melisa's fault, indicating a misapplication of the legal standards. Errors in burden of proof are considered prejudicial, altering the fairness of proceedings.

When trial court legal errors disrupt the fact-finding process and the record is complete, a reviewing court must perform a de novo review. In this case, Jac's allegations of fault became moot after he secured a judgment of divorce under La. C.C. art. 102. The sole remaining issue of fault pertained to Melisa's claim for final periodic spousal support, for which she was required to prove her freedom from fault. The trial court erroneously placed the burden on Jac to demonstrate Melisa's fault in the marriage's dissolution, necessitating a de novo review to establish whether Melisa met her burden.

While statutory law does not define fault for spousal support denials, jurisprudence equates it with the grounds for separation under former La. C.C. art. 138 and current grounds for fault-based divorce under La. C.C. art. 103. Previous grounds included adultery, habitual intemperance, cruel treatment, and abandonment, while current grounds encompass adultery, felony convictions, abuse, and protective orders.

Fault that disqualifies a spouse from receiving support involves serious conduct that violates marital duties and is a proximate cause of separation. Minor disputes do not constitute legal fault; rather, a spouse must demonstrate cruel treatment, characterized by persistent mental harassment that makes the marriage insupportable. 

The burden of proof regarding a claimant spouse's fault for spousal support is not well-defined. In Lagars v. Lagars, the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that this burden may shift to the non-claimant spouse even when the divorce results from the non-claimant's adultery. However, it is unclear how to shift this burden when the divorce is based on separation over time. In Hutson, the court found that the claimant spouse sufficiently proved her freedom from fault through her own testimony and corroborating evidence, shifting the burden to the non-claimant spouse to demonstrate fault.

Melisa and Jac married in 1987 and had two children. Melisa stopped working outside the home shortly after marriage, managing the household and participating in philanthropic activities while assisting with Jac's rental properties, especially after Hurricane Katrina. Melisa became ill in 2008 with Graves disease and underwent multiple surgeries, including open heart surgery in May 2012, which hindered her ability to maintain their home. Although they had previously employed maids, the last one left in 2011, and no new help was hired. Melisa described their marriage as lacking major conflicts, stating she was a good wife and denied any infidelity. She believed Jac's impatience with her after her illness contributed to their separation and suspected he divorced her because she was no longer an asset to him.

Jac raised allegations of Melisa's fault, specifically adultery and failure to maintain the household. He presented surveillance footage from October 2018, showing Melisa having lunch with contractor Alphonso Sanchez and visiting his workplace. The surveillance captured no physical contact between them, and Jac admitted there was no evidence of sexual relations. Melisa clarified the context of their meetings, indicating she was discussing renovations for rental properties and had left her car at Sanchez's business for cleaning after an accident involving bleach. Melisa’s testimony sufficiently demonstrated her lack of legal fault in the marriage's dissolution, shifting the burden to Jac to prove otherwise.

On October 29th, Melisa visited Mr. Sanchez’s office to discuss renovations but denied any romantic involvement with him. Although Jac claimed Melisa previously had an affair with Mr. Sanchez, which she admitted at the time but later reconciled, Melisa stated Jac never accused her of infidelity during their marriage. Jac's belief that Melisa was having an affair was based on circumstantial evidence, including her work for Mr. Sanchez and loans she made to him. However, the court found Jac's conclusions speculative and determined that he did not prove Melisa committed adultery by a preponderance of the evidence, thus allowing her to receive spousal support.

Jac argued that Melisa's failure to maintain the house constituted legal fault. He testified that Melisa neglected cleaning duties, presented photographs to support his claims, and noted their previous employment of maids. However, he acknowledged hiring a maid service only after filing for divorce. Melisa countered that the home's condition was due to broken plumbing, which she attempted to fix, and cited her health issues post-surgeries as reasons for her inability to clean. The court concluded that Melisa's health and the absence of a maid service during her illness did not constitute legal fault.

Jac also claimed Melisa was in contempt of court for removing furnishings and damaging property. The definition of contempt includes actions that obstruct justice or undermine the court's authority, categorized as either direct or constructive. The court did not find sufficient basis to support Jac's contempt claim against Melisa.

To establish constructive contempt, a court must determine that a person intentionally and knowingly violated a court order without a justifiable excuse. The proceedings are aimed at upholding the court's dignity rather than benefiting any litigant, with the trial court given broad discretion in these matters.

Jac filed a contempt rule on April 10, 2014, claiming Melisa removed furnishings from their marital home and caused damage. The domestic hearing officer recommended denying Jac's contempt claim, citing the absence of a specific court order regarding the removal of items. The officer acknowledged the dispute over whether the removed items were separate or community property. During a subsequent trial court hearing, Jac argued that Melisa took his inherited property, while Melisa contended she only took her own and shared community property.

Although there was a court order granting Jac exclusive use of the marital home effective April 15, 2014, this did not apply to Melisa's actions on April 4, 2014. The court had previously ordered that neither party could alienate or dispose of community property, but the items were stored rather than disposed of. Ultimately, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not holding Melisa in contempt.

Jac also claimed the trial court wrongly found him in contempt for not paying interim spousal support. On August 19, 2014, Melisa filed a contempt rule against Jac for non-payment, but by the October 22, 2014 hearing, they reached a settlement, which Jac agreed to document as a court judgment. However, the May 1, 2015 judgment mistakenly found Jac in contempt for spousal support failure, despite no pending rule at the time of the hearings in early 2015. 

Consequently, the portion of the May 1 judgment finding Jac in contempt for not paying spousal support was reversed, while the denial of Jac's contempt rule was affirmed. Additionally, the judgment regarding fault for the marriage's breakdown was vacated, as it improperly shifted the burden of proof to Jac. Following a de novo review, the judgment found Melisa free from fault concerning the marriage's termination. The final decision resulted in an affirmation in part, reversal in part, and vacating of certain judgments.