Condon v. Logan

Citations: 190 So. 3d 778; 2016 WL 1244660Docket: No. 2015-CA-0797

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 30, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Sandra Cabrina Jenkins presided over a personal injury lawsuit stemming from an alleged automobile accident involving plaintiff Lauren Condon and defendants Carol Logan and her insurance provider. Prior to trial, Condon sought partial summary judgment regarding liability, which was granted by the trial court on March 19, 2015. However, the court later granted a motion for a new trial on this judgment. Following this, Condon refiled her motion, which was denied on April 21, 2015. On May 22, 2015, the court set aside its April judgment and reinstated the March judgment favoring Condon.

Defendants appealed the May order, and the appellate court found that the trial court lacked authority to overturn the April judgment or reinstate the March judgment. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the May 22 order and reinstated the April 21, 2015 judgment.

In the background of the case, Condon alleged that Logan negligently caused an accident on March 25, 2011, by striking the rear of her vehicle while driving on the Pontchartrain Expressway. Condon's claim was supported by Logan's traffic citation for "following too closely." Defendants denied the occurrence of a collision or negligence. Condon's motion for partial summary judgment included her assertion that Logan could not counter her claims due to a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, which precluded her from providing testimony. Condon argued that this lack of opposing testimony and evidence established that no material facts were in dispute, warranting summary judgment on liability.

Defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment by submitting affidavits from Fred Logan, Mrs. Logan's husband, and Dr. Shibu Varughese, her physician, along with a written statement from Mrs. Logan in the police accident report dated March 25, 2011. They argued that, despite Mrs. Logan's dementia preventing her from testifying, the affidavits provide admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding liability under La. C.E. art. 804. The defendants claimed that Mrs. Logan's statements to her husband and her written statement were admissible hearsay.

In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants’ submissions, contending they did not meet La. C.C.P. art. 967 requirements. The plaintiff asserted that Fred Logan's affidavit lacked personal knowledge regarding Mrs. Logan’s statements, and the police report required an affidavit from the investigating officer to be admissible. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the police report and Mrs. Logan's statements were inadmissible hearsay under La. C.E. art. 803(8)(b). Concerning Dr. Varughese’s affidavit, the plaintiff maintained that the defendants failed to disclose him as an expert witness timely and did not provide necessary qualifications or supporting medical records. The plaintiff further contended that La. C.E. art. 804 did not apply as the defendants did not demonstrate the declarants' unavailability or the trustworthiness of the hearsay evidence and failed to provide proper notice.

The trial court held a hearing on March 13, 2015, subsequently granting the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants’ exhibits and the motion for partial summary judgment, determining that Mrs. Logan was solely at fault for the accident. This ruling was made final for appeal purposes on March 19, 2015. Defendants filed for a new trial on March 20, 2015, claiming that the plaintiff's deposition demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact, and submitted an affidavit from Officer Ryan Fanguy, who stated that Mrs. Logan denied the collision. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a new trial on March 27, 2015, and scheduled a new hearing.

Following a hearing on April 7, 2015, the trial court issued a judgment on April 21, 2015, partially granting and denying the plaintiff's motion to strike and denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiff then filed a timely supervisory writ with the Court on May 21, 2015, seeking review of the April 21 judgment.

On May 22, 2015, the trial court vacated its April 21, 2015 judgment denying the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and reinstated its earlier March 19, 2015 judgment granting that motion. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her supervisory writ from appellate consideration, and the court granted her request on May 26, 2015. In response to the reinstatement of the March 19 judgment, the defendants filed a timely motion for a suspensive appeal, which the trial court approved.

The appellate court noted that the May 22 order was not labeled as a final judgment, although the reinstated March 19 judgment was considered final under Louisiana law (La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B). The appellate court determined that the reinstatement order constituted a final, appealable judgment. 

On the merits, the defendants contended that the trial court lacked authority to issue the May 22 order because the granting of their motion for a new trial had already vacated the March 19 judgment. The appellate court concurred, citing established jurisprudence that an original judgment is nullified by the granting of a new trial, and thus could not be reinstated. The court emphasized that once a judgment is signed, it cannot be modified or set aside by the judge except as prescribed by law, and that a new trial motion applies only to final judgments.

A trial court's authority to grant a new trial or modify a judgment is limited to the time period for filing a motion for a new trial, which is seven days from the notice of judgment, as per La. C.C.P. art. 1974. In this case, the trial court reconsidered its April 21, 2015 judgment denying the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment more than a month after the ruling. A denial of a motion for summary judgment is classified as an interlocutory, non-appealable judgment and cannot be certified as final for immediate appeal. The proper procedure for reconsideration of such a judgment requires the moving party to re-file the motion prior to trial. The trial court erred in reconsidering its previous denial on its own motion and consequently lacked the authority to reinstate a previously vacated judgment. As a result, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s May 22, 2015 order and reinstated the April 21, 2015 judgment. The court also noted that neither party sought review of the April 21 judgment, and it does not have jurisdiction over interlocutory judgments. Consequently, the court did not address additional assignments of error raised by the defendants.

The order has been vacated, and the judgment from April 21, 2015, has been reinstated. The plaintiff contends that Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:81(A) imposes a duty on motorists not to follow another vehicle too closely, considering speed, traffic, and road conditions. Mr. Logan's affidavit reveals that he has been married to Mrs. Logan for 56 years; she claimed in 2011 that she was accused of rear-ending another vehicle but denied any collision. Since early 2013, Mrs. Logan has shown increasing signs of dementia, which impairs her memory and ability to testify regarding the 2011 incident. Dr. Varughese confirms Mrs. Logan's dementia diagnosis in August 2014, affirming her inability to recall the events from March 25, 2011. On that date, Mrs. Logan stated in a signed document that the car ahead stopped suddenly, but she managed to brake in time to avoid a collision. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 804 outlines conditions under which a declarant may be deemed "unavailable as a witness," including mental illness, and specifies that certain statements may be admissible if deemed trustworthy. Additionally, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 967 mandates that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and include admissible facts, with provisions for supplementing affidavits with additional evidence.

La. C.E. art. 803 outlines exceptions to the hearsay rule, noting that investigative reports from law enforcement are generally excluded unless specified otherwise by law. On April 21, 2015, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial, which included key rulings on evidentiary matters: the court struck Dr. Varughese's affidavit and parts of Mr. Logan's affidavit that referenced Mrs. Logan’s statements about the accident, while denying the motion to strike other parts of Mr. Logan's affidavit, Mrs. Logan's statement, the accident report, and Officer Fanguy's affidavit. La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B states that a partial judgment does not constitute a final judgment unless the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay. The April 21 judgment included both granted and denied motions regarding defendants’ exhibits, which are considered pretrial evidentiary rulings and do not affect the case's merits, as per La. C.C.P. art. 1841.