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Bridgewater v. New Orleans Regional Transit Authority

Citations: 190 So. 3d 408; 2015 La.App. 4 Cir. 0922; 2016 La. App. LEXIS 482; 2016 WL 909361Docket: No. 2015-CA-0922

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 8, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Emanuel Bridgewater appeals the summary judgment that dismissed his personal injury claims against the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and the City of New Orleans after he was allegedly struck by an RTA bus on August 29, 2003. Bridgewater asserts that while reclining on a median, the bus, making a left turn and then an immediate right turn, hit him, causing significant injuries. He claims the bus driver fled the scene, and that a bystander assisted him by calling emergency services. Bridgewater alleges the police officer present failed to question him about the incident, and despite claiming no recent alcohol consumption, his blood alcohol level was recorded at 0.132 after the accident.

In August 2004, he filed a lawsuit against the RTA and the City, alleging joint liability and claiming the City failed to provide adequate signage and design to protect pedestrians. He later added Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana, Inc. as a defendant, alleging collusion to conceal liability. The City filed a motion for summary judgment in August 2005, but the hearing was postponed due to Hurricane Katrina. The RTA, in response to the appeal, seeks attorney's fees and costs, arguing the appeal is frivolous. The court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings.

In September 2014, a hearing was scheduled for the City’s motion for summary judgment, which was granted on 10 October 2014. Mr. Bridgewater filed a motion for rehearing, treated as a motion for new trial by the trial court. Subsequently, on 31 October 2014, the RTA also filed a motion for summary judgment regarding liability. Both motions were heard on 8 May 2015, resulting in the denial of Mr. Bridgewater's motion for rehearing and the granting of the RTA's motion for summary judgment on liability. A judgment was issued on 18 May 2015, followed by written reasons for judgment on 15 June 2015. Mr. Bridgewater appealed this judgment, arguing that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the accident, necessitating a trial. He also contended that the trial judge misapplied the law concerning expert opinion. 

The appeal will undergo de novo review, maintaining the same standards used by the trial court. The summary judgment procedure aims for a just, swift, and economical resolution of civil actions, allowing courts to evaluate whether there is a genuine need for trial based on the evidence presented. Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to establish this prima facie case, after which the non-moving party must present evidence of genuine issues of material fact. The judge’s role is to determine the existence of such issues, without weighing evidence or assessing truth. A "genuine issue" is defined as one that could be reasonably disputed by different parties.

A fact is considered 'material' if its presence or absence can influence recovery, affect a litigant's success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Summary judgments are favored, but any uncertainties regarding material facts should be resolved in favor of a trial. The trial court granted the City’s summary judgment based on several findings: (1) the City lacked care, custody, or control over the RTA/TMSEL and its buses or operators; (2) the NOPD officer's report was satisfactory based on the information available; and (3) the City had no obligation to warn the public about potential dangers from buses. The court denied Mr. Bridgewater’s motion for rehearing, affirming that the officer fulfilled his legal duty in reporting the accident. Under Louisiana law, a public entity is liable for damages only if it had actual or constructive notice of a defect in its custody and failed to remedy it timely. The City, as a political subdivision, has limited liability under La. R.S. 9:2800, which requires proof of ownership or custody of the damaging object, its defective condition, notice of the defect, and a causal connection to the harm suffered.

A public entity is not liable for damages resulting from items outside its care, custody, or control. In Mr. Bridgewater's case, he needed to prove that the City had such control over the RTA/TMSEL or its buses and operator that allegedly caused his injuries, which he failed to do. His evidence was limited to claims that the City and the RTA/TMSEL were partners in bus operations. The RTA, established by La. R.S. 48:1654, is a political subdivision responsible for the transit system in certain parishes, indicating that the City lacks control over it. As Mr. Bridgewater asserted that the bus involved was owned and operated by RTA/TMSEL, the City could not be held liable for any negligence related to the RTA or its employees.

Additionally, Mr. Bridgewater claimed the City was negligent for not placing proper warning signs near the accident site. However, the trial court found that the City had no such duty to provide these signs in the circumstances of the case. To establish liability under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must prove four elements: the conduct caused the harm, the defendant owed a duty of care, the duty was breached, and the risk of harm fell within the duty's scope. Failure to demonstrate any of these elements absolves the defendant of liability. The determination of duty is a legal question that requires supporting law for the claim.

No actionable negligence or liability exists without a duty owed to the plaintiff. Municipalities may incur duties through legislation or ordinances, and breaching these can lead to liability for damages. Courts assess whether any legal or policy-based duty exists under specific circumstances. Louisiana law generally does not require defendants to guard against open and obvious hazards. In this case, the City argued it had no duty to post warnings about the risk of buses leaving the road. The City submitted an affidavit from Peter Lollis, Traffic Sign Shop Acting Supervisor, who confirmed no records of such warnings existed. The plaintiff, Mr. Bridgewater, failed to present any legal basis for imposing such a duty on the City. The evidence indicated that the danger was apparent to any reasonable person near the curb of a busy road, leading the court to conclude the City had no obligation to place warning signs.

Mr. Bridgewater also claimed the City's failure to maintain the neutral ground obstructed the bus driver's view of him. However, there was no evidence supporting his assertion regarding the grass height, nor was there proof that the City had control or maintenance responsibility for that area. Consequently, no genuine material fact dispute was found.

Additionally, Mr. Bridgewater contested the trial court's ruling on the police officer's duty during accident investigations, which is defined by La. R.S. 32:398 D. This statute mandates that investigating officers handle all reportable accidents to aid in potential civil claims. The court affirmed that Officer Smith met his obligations under the law.

Officer Rogers' affidavit and accident report confirm that he fulfilled his legal duty in investigating the accident involving Mr. Bridgewater. The trial court concluded that Mr. Bridgewater's claims against the City and RTA/TMSEL lacked merit, affirming the dismissal of these claims on summary judgment due to the absence of genuine issues of material fact and the City’s lack of liability.

Regarding the RTA's liability, the trial court granted summary judgment, stating Mr. Bridgewater had no evidence to link the RTA's actions to his damages. Dr. David Aiken, an orthopedist, provided an affidavit asserting that Mr. Bridgewater’s injuries could not have been caused by a bus, claiming it was medically impossible for the injuries to result from being run over. Mr. Bridgewater failed to present an expert to counter Dr. Aiken's findings and instead submitted his own affidavit claiming he was run over by a bus.

The trial court referenced the case of Jones v. Estate of Santiago, which supports granting summary judgment when a plaintiff relies on speculative testimony without contrary physical evidence. Mr. Bridgewater contested the trial court's decision on appeal, arguing that the lack of an expert did not negate his claim, as his medical records conflicted with Dr. Aiken's affidavit and created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accident and injuries. The appellate review indicated that Mr. Bridgewater's medical records alone could challenge Dr. Aiken's conclusions, suggesting the presence of a material dispute warranting further examination.

Dr. Aiken concluded that Mr. Bridgewater could not have been run over by a bus, arguing that he would have sustained more severe injuries than the two cracked bones in his right hand. In his review of medical records from Charity Hospital, Dr. Aiken noted a fat fluid level in the right knee joint on x-ray, but no fracture. He mentioned that Mr. Bridgewater had no recorded knee pain during a follow-up on September 3, 2003, but did not detail any x-ray findings from that visit. On October 1, 2003, Mr. Bridgewater's right knee exhibited a range of motion of 5 to 120 degrees with tenderness, but no further details were provided about his knee or leg injuries.

Dr. Aiken emphasized Mr. Bridgewater's blood alcohol level of 0.132, suggesting significant intoxication at the time of the accident, which he believed undermined Mr. Bridgewater’s credibility regarding his injuries and the incident. Dr. Aiken deemed it "medically and physically impossible" for Mr. Bridgewater to have been run over by a bus.

However, a review of Mr. Bridgewater’s medical records indicates that he actually sustained fractures in both his right leg and hand, contrary to Dr. Aiken's assertions. Upon arrival at the emergency room, Mr. Bridgewater claimed to have been hit by a bus and complained of pain in his right arm and knee. The examination revealed swelling and abrasions on his right leg, and x-rays suggested the possibility of an occult fracture, although a recommended CT scan was not performed. X-rays of the right forearm showed soft tissue swelling with no fractures, while his right hand x-rays confirmed two fractures. Additionally, records from a follow-up visit on September 3, 2003, indicated that Mr. Bridgewater was there after being hit by a bus and required further x-rays of his leg.

On September 3, 2003, a radiologist found no fractures in Mr. Bridgewater’s right leg but noted soft tissue swelling. Four weeks later, on October 1, 2003, Mr. Bridgewater returned to Charity Hospital with ongoing pain in his right hand and knee. New x-rays revealed two fractures in his right leg, specifically the lateral femoral condyle and proximal fibula, which aligned with earlier suspicions of an occult fracture. Dr. Aiken’s summary of Mr. Bridgewater’s medical records failed to mention these fractures, raising issues about the reliability of Dr. Aiken's assertion that Mr. Bridgewater’s injuries were minor and inconsistent with being struck by a bus. The trial court's role in a summary judgment motion does not include making credibility determinations or weighing conflicting evidence; rather, summary judgment is granted only when no material facts are in dispute. The court found that the trial judge incorrectly viewed Dr. Aiken’s report as uncontroverted, failing to recognize the conflicting evidence regarding the RTA’s liability for Mr. Bridgewater's injuries. The RTA argued that Mr. Bridgewater’s intoxication compromised the credibility of his account of the accident. Nevertheless, Mr. Bridgewater consistently claimed he was struck by an RTA bus, supported by the affidavit of a bystander who heard him calling for help and reported to authorities that Mr. Bridgewater had been hit by a bus.

Mr. Bridgewater was found by emergency medical technicians lying in the grass, smelling of alcohol and about four feet from the roadway, with a chief complaint of right-sided pain after being hit by a bus. He exhibited a scrape and deformity on his right knee. Officer Smith, who investigated the incident, reported that Mr. Bridgewater claimed he was sitting on the sidewalk when an RTA bus made a sharp turn and struck him. The technician indicated a possible fracture in Mr. Bridgewater's leg before he was transported to Charity Hospital, where he presented with right arm and leg pain, swelling in his right leg, and a displaced patella identified through x-rays.

Despite being allegedly inebriated, Mr. Bridgewater consistently maintained his account of the accident over several hours and subsequent weeks. The court found that reasonable minds could differ regarding the influence of his inebriated state on his recollection, which precludes summary judgment for the RTA on liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Bridgewater is entitled to a trial regarding the RTA's liability for the accident and reversed the trial court’s previous summary judgment in favor of the RTA. The court also denied the RTA's request for attorney’s fees and costs, deeming Mr. Bridgewater's appeal non-frivolous. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Joe A. Myles is a Texas resident and sergeant in the Texas Army National Guard. Mr. Bridgewater received medical treatment at Charity Hospital for a right non-displaced trapezium fracture, a non-displaced fracture at the base of the second metacarpal with intra-articular extension, and a scrape to his right knee, after which he was fitted with a cast. He claims that TMSEL was in a partnership or joint venture with the RTA to provide bus service for profit in the city. 

Louisiana Civil Code Procedure (La. C.C.P.) article 966 has undergone amendments in 2013, 2014, and 2015, which are not relevant to this appeal. Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:2800 outlines the liability of public entities for damages related to building conditions under Civil Code Article 2317, specifying that public entities are only liable if they had actual or constructive notice of a defect before damage occurred and failed to remedy it. Constructive notice is defined as the existence of facts that imply actual knowledge. 

The statute further clarifies that a "public entity" encompasses the state and its subdivisions, while a "public site" includes any publicly accessible area. For a hazard to be deemed "open and obvious," it must be apparent to everyone who might encounter it, and if it meets this criterion, the defendant has no duty to warn the plaintiff. Additionally, La. R.S. 32:398 D mandates that police departments investigate all reportable accidents within city limits and instruct involved drivers to provide specific information, including the names and addresses of vehicle owners and drivers, license numbers, and insurance details.

Officer Rogers' report details the location and timing of an alleged accident, along with the contact information of a purported witness, Mr. Joe A. Miles (or Myles). Mr. Bridgewater, the claimant, was unable to identify the bus or its driver, despite asserting to Officer Rogers that he was struck by "Louisiana Avenue Bus 27." The report notes that emergency personnel indicated Mr. Bridgewater may have sustained a possible broken or fractured leg, specifically an "occult" fracture, which is not visible on initial radiographic examinations and may take weeks to detect. Symptoms include pain and soft tissue swelling, consistent with Mr. Bridgewater's condition.

The document references medical literature on occult fractures and highlights the variability in radiological interpretations. It cites several case examples, including *Giammanchere v. Ernst*, *Shah v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2*, *Baloney v. Carter*, and *Ketchum v. Roberts*, illustrating instances where initial imaging failed to detect fractures that were later identified in subsequent examinations. These cases underscore that differing interpretations by radiologists can lead to delayed diagnoses of fractures, emphasizing the importance of thorough medical evaluation following accidents.