Berrien v. State
Docket: No. 1D15-931
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; April 12, 2016; Florida; State Appellate Court
The trial judge erred by vacating a predecessor judge’s final order that dissolved a domestic violence injunction against Appellant and subsequently pursued indirect criminal contempt charges for Appellant's non-attendance at a compliance hearing. Once the injunction was dissolved following an evidentiary hearing led by the original judge, Appellant was no longer obligated to comply with it, and the successor judge lacked authority to reinstate the injunction or penalize Appellant for non-compliance. The final order of dismissal stripped the court of jurisdiction to reinstate the injunction without a party's motion and due process proceedings. Generally, a successor judge cannot amend the legal errors of a predecessor or reverse their final orders. Exceptions exist only in cases of mistake or fraud, neither of which was present here. The petitioner had the right to seek modification or dissolution of the injunction based on changed circumstances, which was demonstrated during the hearing. The evidence showed that the couple had separated, were living in different cities, had resolved domestic violence issues amicably, and had established shared parenting arrangements. Appellant's prior completion of a batterers’ intervention program was acknowledged, and the judge found sufficient grounds to exercise discretion in dissolving the injunction. Consequently, all conditions of the dissolved injunction were also nullified. Judge Colaw succeeded Judge Brasington after the latter issued a final order dissolving an injunction. Colaw noted that the Appellant did not attend compliance hearings related to the original injunction, raising concerns about the Appellant's adherence to requirements such as a batterers’ intervention program and substance abuse evaluation, as well as the protection of children. However, after the dissolution of the injunction, there were no pending motions or circumstances that would allow the court to take further action on the injunction. The authority of a judge over an injunction does not persist after its dissolution by another judge, and no impropriety was found in Judge Brasington's handling of the motion to modify the injunction. Colaw's disagreement with Brasington's decision did not provide grounds for jurisdiction to vacate the order. Consequently, the court vacated Judge Colaw's order and upheld the dissolution of the injunction as of October 2, 2014. All subsequent inconsistent orders were also vacated. Additionally, it was noted that a successor judge can modify or vacate interlocutory rulings by a predecessor, but this does not apply to the final order in this case. The parties involved in domestic violence injunctions are entitled to due process rights, including reasonable opportunities for discovery, which the trial court may regulate.