State v. Biddle

Docket: 1131496 and 1140603

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; August 28, 2015; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The State petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside its order that relieved Michael Scott Biddle from the residency requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Biddle, convicted in South Carolina in 1993 for a lewd act upon a child, moved to Alabama in 2014 and was required to register as a sex offender. He filed a petition claiming he was terminally ill and needed to live with his sister, which the circuit court granted despite objections from the State regarding jurisdiction and missing filing fees. The State's petition for mandamus was granted, and the appeal was dismissed. The court issued a stay on the circuit court's order pending the resolution of the petition. The standards for issuing a writ of mandamus include establishing a clear legal right for the petitioner, an imperative duty on the respondent, lack of other remedies, and proper jurisdiction.

Subject-matter jurisdiction can be challenged via a petition for a writ of mandamus, as established in Alabama case law, including Ex parte Ziglar and Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. A void judgment does not support an appeal, leaving mandamus as the sole remedy. The core issue revolves around whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over Biddle’s petition, hinging on whether it was civil or criminal. Biddle filed his petition without pending criminal charges, a filing fee, or in forma pauperis status in the criminal division. Alabama law has mandated sex offender registration since 1996, and the ASORCNA was enacted in 2011. Although there is no direct interpretation of the ASORCNA by the court, guidance from similar statutes indicates a civil nature. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Doe determined that sex offender registration laws are non-punitive and do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court establishes that the inquiry focuses on legislative intent—if the statute is intended as a civil regulatory scheme rather than punishment, it must be examined for punitive effects. The analysis involves historical perceptions of punishment, any imposed disabilities, the alignment with punitive aims, the rationality of its non-punitive purpose, and whether it is excessive regarding that purpose. Legislative intent typically prevails unless clear evidence indicates otherwise.

In Lee v. State, 895 So.2d 1038 (Ala.Crim. App. 2004), the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the repealed Community Notification Act (CNA) was not an ex post facto law, either in its text or application to adult criminal sex offenders. The court concluded that the CNA aimed to establish a civil regulatory framework without punitive effects, highlighting its legislative intent. This position was reaffirmed in Boyd v. State, 960 So.2d 717 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006). The Court of Civil Appeals in Salter v. State, 971 So.2d 31 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007), echoed this sentiment, asserting that the CNA's purpose was to protect communities, particularly vulnerable children, from the risks posed by recidivist sex offenders, and maintained that it did not function as a punitive statute.

In Windwalker v. Bentley, 925 F.Supp.2d 1265 (N.D.Ala. 2013), Jim Windwalker, a sexual offender subject to the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), challenged it as an ex post facto law. The court referenced Smith v. Doe, affirming that Windwalker’s claims were unsubstantiated, given the ASORCNA's civil intent and purpose. The court outlined that a law could violate ex post facto principles if it seeks to impose retroactive punishment or transforms a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. It analyzed the ASORCNA based on several factors, concluding that it does not constitute punishment, does not impose significant restraints on offenders, and is rationally connected to public safety goals. The court noted that any consequences experienced by offenders stemmed from their initial crimes, not the registration requirements, and highlighted that non-compliance with the ASORCNA could lead to prosecution for new offenses rather than additional punishment for the original crime. Overall, the ASORCNA was deemed consistent with legitimate, non-punitive objectives, and its regulatory nature was upheld as not excessive concerning its intended purpose.

In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the Supreme Court established that the evaluation of legislative choices should focus on the reasonableness of the regulatory means in relation to a non-punitive objective rather than on whether the legislature made the best decision. The court affirmed that the Alaska statute's regulatory scheme was not punitive in purpose or effect. Similarly, in McGuire v. Strange, 83 F.Supp.3d 1231 (M.D.Ala.2015), it was held that while the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (ASORCNA) was largely non-punitive, certain provisions concerning homeless offenders and travel permits should be severed. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (2011), reinforced this by upholding the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) against Ex Post Facto challenges, drawing parallels to the regulatory purposes of both SORNA and the Alaska statute. Both laws require sex offender registration and public dissemination of their information based on their categorized dangerousness, without making individualized assessments.

Congress intended SORNA to be a civil regulatory framework rather than a punitive measure. Consequently, the critical inquiry under the Doe decision is whether SORNA imposes punishment on offenders under the Alabama Youthful Offender Act, which the court found lacking in evidence. The legislature articulated its intent in ASORCNA, emphasizing the need for registration and notification laws in response to rising numbers of sex offenders and recidivism risks. These laws aim to enhance public safety through increased awareness and information dissemination, thereby empowering the community to protect itself. Regular registration creates ongoing contact between offenders and law enforcement, aiding investigations. Given the nature of their offenses, sex offenders have a diminished expectation of privacy. The legislature concluded that public disclosure of certain information serves the government’s interest in protecting vulnerable populations, particularly children, and that the intent behind registration and notification procedures is not punitive but protective of public safety.

The ASORCNA was amended in September 2015 to clarify that petitions for relief from residency restrictions are civil in nature, reflecting the legislature's intent to address previously ambiguous provisions. Biddle filed a petition for relief from residency requirements under ASORCNA while having no pending criminal matters, indicating that the action should have been civil. The ASORCNA mandates sex offender registration with local law enforcement to inform the community of potential dangers, particularly to protect children. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-19-70 establishes a mandatory civil filing fee for complaints, which may be waived for substantial hardship, requiring a verified statement approved by the court. The court affirmed that the legislature intended for the filing fee or hardship statement to accompany the complaint at filing. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to grant Biddle relief in a criminal matter, necessitating a new civil action to seek such relief. The petition was granted, and the writ issued, while the appeal was dismissed. Evidence presented included Biddle's medical conditions and challenges to his claims of hardship, alongside photographic evidence showing him active in his neighborhood.