Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; November 17, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Defendant Melvin Randall Patterson was charged with attempted first-degree murder for shooting Bessie Jordan and Louis Grant, Jr. After a bench trial, he was convicted of attempted second-degree murder on both counts and sentenced to 30 years at hard labor, to run concurrently, without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension. Patterson appealed his convictions and sentences, which were affirmed by the court.
On July 29, 2012, during a birthday party at the Jordans' home, Patterson arrived claiming to have been invited by Mrs. Jordan's uncle. After an argument with Mr. Jordan over leaving the premises, Patterson and a female companion left but returned shortly after in a silver Dodge vehicle from which gunfire erupted, injuring both Mrs. Jordan and Mr. Grant. The victims identified Patterson as the shooter.
Testimony from Mrs. Jordan revealed she recognized Patterson from her workplace but did not know him personally. She recounted the events leading up to the shooting, noting Patterson's agitation and the subsequent gunfire as she attempted to escape. After the incident, she received medical treatment for her injuries, including surgery to remove a bullet. Mr. Grant corroborated Mrs. Jordan's account, identifying Patterson as the man whom Mr. Jordan had asked to leave. Both victims confirmed their identifications of Patterson during the investigation and in court.
Defendant entered the vehicle on the driver’s side, while a woman entered on the passenger side. Mr. Grant testified that he saw Mr. Seymour approaching from the backyard and yelled at him, causing Mr. Seymour to stop. After turning to face the street, Grant heard two gunshots and saw a man in a silver vehicle firing at him. He was shot in the upper abdomen but didn't realize it until he fell inside his house, where someone informed him of his injury. He was taken to the hospital and returned five days later for surgery to remove the bullet. Grant identified the Defendant in a photo lineup during interviews with Det. Jerry Curtis, confirming he did not see the first two shots before turning around. He noted seeing dirt flying towards him before running away.
Mr. Jordan corroborated Grant’s account, stating he was emotional and angry after the shooting of his wife and brother-in-law. He described a scuffle with police when he attempted to accompany his injured wife to the hospital and testified that he witnessed the Defendant shooting from his car. In a 911 call, he referred to "some niggas" shooting up his house, implying multiple shooters. Although he claimed to see gunfire from the Defendant, he later admitted he didn't see the actual gun.
Sgt. Stephen Plunkett of the Shreveport Police Department responded to the scene, finding a woman shot in a driveway and another person shot in the stomach inside the house. Due to chaos and fights breaking out, he did not take formal statements at that time but made observations. Recordings from his body microphone indicated references to intoxication among those present. The defense sought to introduce a recorded statement from an unknown female made 15 to 25 minutes after the shooting as an excited utterance. The state objected, arguing the statement did not meet the excited utterance exception under Louisiana law, as it was made too long after the event. The trial court ruled the statement inadmissible but allowed it to be entered as a proffer.
Ronnie Smith, the defendant's former cellmate, testified about their interactions at the Caddo Correctional Center, where they first met in 2012 and became cellmates in 2014. Smith, who had his own criminal history, including malfeasance and felony theft, was incarcerated for attempted first-degree murder at the time of the trial. He claimed that the defendant confessed to him about the shootings while they were in jail. Smith relayed that the defendant described a confrontation at a party with someone named Fred, which led to the argument and subsequent shooting. Smith asserted that the defendant expressed remorse and did not boast about the incident.
During cross-examination, the defense sought to probe Smith’s pending murder charge, but the state objected, arguing such inquiries were limited to revealing any potential deals for his testimony. The trial court ruled that the defense could only ask about motives for testifying and any perceived leverage, but not the specifics of Smith's charges, which would infringe on his Fifth Amendment rights. When Smith invoked his right to remain silent regarding his pending charge, the defense moved for a mistrial, claiming this violated the defendant's rights to confrontation and cross-examination. The trial court denied the mistrial, allowing questioning about Smith's motives but not the details of his charges.
Smith maintained that he testified out of a desire to be truthful and had not been offered any deals from the state. Det. Curtis presented evidence, including a projectile and cartridges, but the defense objected as they had not received this during discovery. The prosecutor noted the evidence was damaged and would not be submitted, leading the trial court to grant a recess for the defense to consult an expert regarding the discovery violation.
An expert confirmed the cartridges could be tested, leading the trial court to grant a continuance for this process. Testing revealed two cartridge casings were fired from the same weapon, but no weapon was recovered for further analysis. The trial resumed on October 28, 2014, with Det. Curtis testifying he did not interview witnesses at the scene but later spoke to Mrs. Jordan, who identified the Defendant as the shooter from a photographic lineup. Mrs. Jordan did not see the Defendant shooting but noted gunfire from a silver vehicle he entered shortly before. Mr. Jordan, also interviewed, claimed he did not see the gun but witnessed the car during the gunfire. The state rested, prompting the defense to motion for judgment of acquittal under La. C. Cr. P. art. 778, arguing a lack of physical evidence linking the Defendant to the shooting and inconsistencies in witness statements, as none witnessed the Defendant firing. The defense contested an alleged confession by the Defendant, claiming Mr. Smith fabricated it to gain favor with prosecutors. This motion was denied.
Cpl. Johnson of the Shreveport Police Department testified about the chaotic scene at the Jordan residence, including an altercation with Mr. Jordan, who had to be handcuffed. Cpl. Johnson noted that Mr. Grant stated he did not see anyone firing a weapon. Sheron Horton, a neighbor, testified she heard gunfire but did not see who shot. The Defendant chose to testify, waiving his right to silence. He disclosed three prior felony convictions and explained he was at the party at the Jordans’ house, did not have a gun, and was leaving when shots were fired. He denied shooting at anyone and claimed Mr. Smith lied about a confession, asserting that Smith learned about the incident from his legal documents. The Defendant admitted to drinking but denied drug use and stated there were no issues with the Jordans or Mr. Grant, believing they were mistaken in identifying him. On rebuttal, Mrs. Jordan clarified she did not speak with Cpl. Johnson at the scene but later provided a statement to Det. Curtis. Following post-trial briefs, the trial court ruled on November 19, 2014, finding the Defendant guilty of two counts of attempted second degree murder, detailing the evidence and reasoning for its decision.
The trial court evaluated witness testimonies and evidence, noting that the Jordans and Mr. Grant identified Defendant as the shooter from a photographic lineup, and Defendant admitted to being at the scene. Charged as a fourth felony habitual offender, Defendant sought a post-verdict judgment of acquittal on the basis of insufficient evidence, which was denied. During sentencing on March 23, 2015, the court provided a range of 10 to 50 years for attempted second degree murder, emphasizing that probation, parole, or suspension of sentence was not applicable. The court observed an undue risk of recidivism, the need for correctional treatment, and determined that a lesser sentence would undermine the seriousness of the offense. Factors such as deliberate cruelty to the victims, creation of a risk of death or injury to multiple individuals, and the use of a firearm were highlighted. Ultimately, Defendant received a 30-year sentence on each count to be served concurrently, with no mitigating circumstances found, and was informed that the offense qualified as a crime of violence. The state later withdrew its habitual offender bill, and Defendant did not seek a motion to reconsider the sentence but appealed the convictions and sentences.
On appeal, Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction of attempted first degree murder, claiming inconsistencies in witness testimonies undermined their credibility. The state countered that sufficient evidence existed when viewed favorably towards the prosecution. The appellate court was tasked first with assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, as a potential acquittal would affect the relevance of other claimed trial errors. The standard for determining sufficiency requires that a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the complete record.
The appellate review standard for sufficiency of evidence claims requires courts to assess whether, when viewing evidence favorably for the prosecution, any rational fact-finder could have determined that the crime's essential elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard, outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, prohibits appellate courts from substituting their evaluation of evidence for that of the fact finder and does not allow them to assess witness credibility or reweigh evidence. Great deference is given to jury decisions regarding witness testimony.
Direct evidence directly proves a fact (e.g., a witness's testimony), while circumstantial evidence relies on inferred conclusions from collateral facts. When circumstantial evidence is used to establish a crime's essential element, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Conflicting testimonies where credibility is at issue pertain to the weight of evidence rather than its sufficiency. The trier of fact must make credibility determinations and can accept or reject witness testimony within rational limits.
In the case at hand, the defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, defined by specific intent to kill or inflict serious harm on multiple persons, but was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, which requires a specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm.
To establish attempted second degree murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and that he committed an overt act to further this intent, as outlined in La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. Merely intending to inflict great bodily harm is insufficient for a conviction. Specific intent is defined as a mindset where the offender desires the criminal consequences of their actions, which may be inferred from the circumstances and the act of deliberately firing a gun at a person. The evidence presented included testimonies from three witnesses who confirmed that the defendant sought entry to a birthday party, was denied, and subsequently fired shots from a car at individuals gathered outside. Both Mrs. Jordan and Mr. Grant were injured in the shooting, corroborating the defendant’s involvement. His actions, including arguing to gain entry and returning to shoot at the house, indicated a specific intent to kill. The court found that a rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendant intended to kill the victims based on these circumstances.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly excluded certain statements made shortly after the incident, claiming they were excited utterances under La. C.E. art. 803(2) and should be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. The statements in question, made by unidentified individuals regarding the shooter’s vehicle and actions, were said to challenge Mrs. Jordan’s credibility and the identification of the shooter.
The defendant seeks to admit a statement from an unknown female witness who described the shooter's car as black. The state opposes this, citing poor audio quality, lack of an excited tone, and the statement being made approximately 20 minutes post-incident, arguing it does not qualify as an excited utterance. Hearsay is defined as a statement not made under oath, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is generally inadmissible unless a legal exception applies. One such exception is for excited utterances, which are spontaneous statements made while under stress from a startling event. The timing of the statement is crucial; it must occur close enough to the event to indicate a lack of reflective thought. Additionally, factors such as the declarant's actions between the event and the statement can suggest whether reflective thought had resumed. Although the declarant's gunshot wound could qualify as a startling event allowing spontaneous statements, none of the recordings or witness accounts clarify the backgrounds of those who commented on the car, including whether they had been drinking. The chaotic scene during the incident complicates the determination of whether the witnesses' tone was genuinely excited or influenced by other factors, such as fights occurring among the crowd. Ultimately, any hearsay testimony admitted would be considered harmless error if it merely corroborates other evidence presented at trial.
Insufficient evidence exists regarding the location of witnesses during the incident, which prevents the defendant from successfully claiming that their statements qualify as excited utterances under the hearsay exception. The statements were made 15 to 20 minutes post-crime, and no details were provided about the declarants’ actions between the crime and the statements. Consequently, the defendant did not fulfill the burden of proof necessary to support his claims, rendering this argument meritless.
Regarding the prohibition of cross-examination of former cellmate Smith, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing questions about Smith's pending attempted murder charge, which could reveal bias. However, the state asserts that the trial court permitted significant cross-examination, where Smith denied receiving any deals or benefits for his testimony. The state emphasizes that only convictions may affect a witness's credibility, as outlined by Louisiana law, and that inquiries into mere arrests or charges are not permitted. While the defendant had the right to confront Smith, the court maintains that the cross-examination effectively revealed potential biases for the jury's consideration. Errors in confrontation rights are subject to harmless-error analysis, and in this case, the defendant was still able to address any potential biases during the trial.
Mr. Smith consistently denied any agreements or expectations of benefit during questioning, asserting his sole intention was to tell the truth. His pending charge was deemed irrelevant to the Defendant’s case, and inquiries into its details would have infringed on his right to remain silent. The Defendant did not demonstrate that he was deprived of the right to cross-examine the witness regarding potential bias or interest, nor did he prove that the trial court erred in limiting inquiries into the witness’s felony charge. Consequently, the assignment of error was deemed without merit. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of Melvin Randall Patterson. Although Patterson's motion for appeal referenced his convictions and sentences, no specific assignment of error or argument concerning the sentences was provided, resulting in no discussion on that matter. Additionally, there was a discrepancy regarding the date of occurrence, noted as July 17, 2012, in the bill of information, while trial testimony indicated July 29, 2012. A statement recorded by Sgt. Plunkett was referenced, but the trial court did not admit this evidence. The Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted second degree murder, which were alternative verdicts to the attempted first degree murder charges, despite both parties inaccurately labeling the rulings as guilty on two counts of first degree murder.
