Burrell v. State

Citations: 184 So. 3d 246; 2016 WL 154799Docket: Nos. 50,157-CA, 50,158-CA

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 12, 2016; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Albert Ronnie Burrell and Michael Ray Graham appeal a trial court judgment from the Third Judicial District Court in Union Parish, Louisiana, which denied their claims for compensation under La. R.S. 15:572.8 for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Both men spent over 13 years on death row for the 1986 double murder of William and Callie Frost, based solely on circumstantial evidence, with no physical evidence linking them to the crime. Their convictions were marred by investigative errors and recanted testimonies. 

In 2000, the trial court granted Graham a new trial, citing the state’s withholding of significant exculpatory evidence that could have altered the jury’s decision. Following this, both Burrell and Graham were granted new trials, resulting in the dismissal of all charges by the Louisiana Attorney General due to a lack of credible evidence. They were subsequently released, with no other charges ever filed regarding the Frost murders.

On August 28, 2008, Burrell and Graham filed for compensation under La. R.S. 15:572.8, which was established to provide funds for wrongfully convicted individuals. The Louisiana Attorney General’s Office recused itself from the case, leading to the appointment of a district attorney to represent the state. After a four-day trial in August 2014, the trial court denied their compensation claims. 

In their appeal, Burrell and Graham argue that the trial court misapplied the statutory requirements of La. R.S. 15:572.8, particularly regarding the burden of proof and procedural adherence. The appeal necessitates an interpretation of the legislative intent behind the statute, which was enacted to provide compensation for proven factual innocence, following relevant legal precedents on statutory interpretation.

A law with clear and unambiguous language should be applied as written without further interpretation unless its application results in absurd outcomes (La. C.C. art. 9). If the law's language is open to different interpretations, it should align with the law's intended purpose (La. C.C. art. 10). For ambiguous laws, their meaning must be derived from the surrounding context and the overall text (La. C.C. art. 12). The legislative history of La. R.S. 15:572.8 reveals that the original proposal aimed to establish an administrative process for compensation applications filed with the Board of Pardons for wrongful imprisonment, governed by the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act. Amendments made by the Louisiana Senate altered this procedure, requiring applications to be filed in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court’s civil division, as enacted in 2005. A significant 2007 amendment changed the terms "applicant" and "applications" to "petitioner" and "petitions," shifting the filing requirements to the district court where the original conviction occurred and removing the administrative nature of the process.

Burrell and Graham assert that the trial court did not comply with statutory requirements by failing to set a trial within 45 days of the state's answer, leading to prejudice due to the death of two witnesses. The state contends that Burrell and Graham waived this issue by not objecting to the delay. The critical question is whether the statute mandates the court to set a trial date independently or requires a party's request. According to La. R.S. 15:572.8(E), the attorney general represents the state, and the court must serve the petition to relevant parties, requiring a response from the attorney general within 45 days. A maximum of two 30-day extensions can be granted for cause. The court is obligated to set a hearing within 45 days following the attorney general's response, and the Louisiana rules of evidence apply unless stated otherwise.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has defined La. R.S. 15:572.8 as a unique statute governing wrongful conviction claims, distinct from other procedural laws. In Burge v. State, the court rejected the state's argument that La. R.S. 13:5107(D) applied to service procedures for all state lawsuits, emphasizing that the specific procedures outlined in La. R.S. 15:572.8 must be followed. Although this statute mandates a hearing within 45 days of an attorney general's response, it lacks remedies for failures to comply with this timeline. Petitioners Burrell and Graham failed to request a trial date until nearly three years after the 45-day limit, despite having the right to do so. The court referenced relevant criminal procedure rules, noting that parties must actively request a trial date, and that the Third Judicial District's rules grant trial courts discretion in setting trial dates. The delay in setting the trial was attributed to the parties not indicating readiness rather than any fault of the trial court. Furthermore, evidence showed that the Center for Equal Justice had made efforts to ensure proper service on the parties involved shortly after the petitions were filed.

On November 14 and December 8, 2008, the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office requested and received extensions of time due to a conflict of interest, leading to the appointment of Jerry Jones, the district attorney for the Fourth Judicial District, to represent the state. Jones subsequently filed for another extension due to his late appointment, which was granted, and the state filed an answer by January 21, 2009. No further pleadings occurred until June 26, 2012, when Burrell and Graham sought to consolidate their cases and filed for summary judgment. Following the denial of their motion, they requested a trial date, which was set after a pretrial conference for September 23, 2013.

Burrell and Graham asserted that procedural delays prejudiced their case due to the death of two key witnesses, claiming these witnesses would have been available had the case gone to trial within 45 days of the state’s answer. Nonetheless, the trial court found no prejudice, noting that witness statements were on record and had reviewed all evidence thoroughly. Additionally, neither party requested a trial date until late 2012, and no supervisory review was sought regarding procedural adherence under La. R.S. 15:572.8. 

Burrell and Graham also argued that the trial court incorrectly applied the standard of proof for compensation under La. R.S. 15:572.8, which requires a petitioner to demonstrate that their conviction has been reversed or vacated and to provide clear and convincing evidence of factual innocence. The statute outlines specific burdens of proof, which Burrell and Graham met through documentation related to their conviction and the state’s decision not to prosecute. The trial court's findings confirmed that they had not established their factual innocence as defined by the statute.

Compensation for wrongful conviction requires more than a vacated conviction; it necessitates proving factual innocence under a clear and convincing standard, which is more stringent than a mere preponderance of evidence but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Burrell and Graham must demonstrate it is highly probable they are factually innocent of the murders for which they were convicted. Louisiana R.S. 15:572.8 outlines factual innocence but lacks clarity on the proof required. The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguishes actual innocence from legal innocence, stating that mere insufficiency of evidence is inadequate to prove actual innocence. A credible claim requires new, noncumulative, and conclusive evidence that undermines the prosecution's case, including reliable scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence not presented at trial. While scientific evidence like DNA is acknowledged, the legislature intended that claims could also be substantiated with other credible evidence. In this case, Burrell and Graham have received new trials due to violations of the Brady standard, yet they have not presented new positive evidence of their factual innocence. Instead, they argue that the state's concession of a lack of credible evidence should suffice for compensation, mistakenly asserting that the clear and convincing standard is a lower burden than beyond a reasonable doubt.

A lack of credible evidence alone does not fulfill the burden under La. R.S. 15:572.8 for proving factual innocence. The petitioner, a former defendant, must meet a clear and convincing standard, which differs from the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While a single witness's testimony can support a factual conclusion if believed, self-serving claims of innocence, as presented by Burrell and Graham, are insufficient without corroboration. The trial court did not accept their uncorroborated assertions and noted the absence of physical evidence implicating or exonerating them in the Frost murders. The court referenced In re Williams, where a new trial was granted due to the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, leading to the dismissal of murder charges. In Williams, the court recognized that factual evidence about the crime must be presented to ascertain factual innocence. Here, the trial court applied a relaxed evidentiary standard, reviewed extensive evidence, and conducted a four-day bench trial but ultimately found that Burrell and Graham did not prove their factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

An expert psychological evaluation post-conviction revealed Burrell's severe cognitive limitations. Testimony from Amy Opal (Hutto) indicated that her previous statements during a group interview with the St. Clair family were influenced by them. In her later affidavit, she clarified that she did not see blood on Graham but instead observed Kenneth St. Clair with blood and counting money. At trial, the state presented evidence linking Burrell to the description of a man with glasses, and he was seen driving Graham and Kenneth St. Clair on the day of the murders. Although Burrell and Graham successfully undermined the credibility of the witnesses and highlighted flaws in the investigation of the Frost murders, there was insufficient evidence to support their factual innocence. They argued that they were entitled to a new trial and compensation for wrongful conviction due to undisclosed evidence and ineffective counsel. However, the burden of proof for establishing factual innocence under La. R.S. 15:572.8 is more stringent than for a new trial. The court concluded that Burrell and Graham had not met this burden adequately, as they failed to provide new credible evidence proving their innocence. Therefore, the trial court's judgment denying their compensation claim was affirmed, with costs of the appeal assessed to them. The application for rehearing was denied, noting procedural aspects regarding Graham's claim under La. R.S. 15:572.8.