Limestone County Department of Human Resources v. Long

Citations: 182 So. 3d 541; 2014 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 205; 2014 WL 5394522Docket: 2130390

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; October 24, 2014; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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The Limestone County Department of Human Resources (DHR) appealed a judgment from the Limestone Juvenile Court that awarded custody of the child, D.R., to DHR. The procedural history began when the child’s paternal grandparents filed a dependency petition on October 17, 2013. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem and, after a hearing, found the child dependent, granting temporary custody to the grandparents and scheduling a dispositional hearing for January 17, 2014. DHR conducted a home study, recommending that the grandparents be awarded custody.

However, on January 17, 2014, the guardian ad litem reported that the grandparents no longer wished to maintain custody and that the child was in a psychiatric hospital with no placement upon discharge. The guardian requested a hearing to transfer custody to DHR. Subsequently, on January 21, 2014, the juvenile court awarded custody to DHR, with a hearing set for February 7, 2014. DHR, having entered the case on January 22, filed a motion on January 24 to alter or vacate the custody judgment, claiming a violation of due process due to lack of notice. This motion was denied on January 28.

On February 6, the guardian ad litem indicated that both the grandparents and DHR refused to pick up the child after his discharge from the hospital. A hearing was held on February 7, and on February 10, DHR sought a writ of mandamus or notice of appeal against the previous judgments. Finally, on February 18, the juvenile court issued additional orders directing DHR to take custody of the child.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-114(a), which mandates that juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving children alleged to be dependent. Moreover, upon receiving a dependency petition, the juvenile court intake officer is required to refer the case to DHR as per Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-118(b). The appeal resulted in the affirmation of the juvenile court's decisions.

Under Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-122, the juvenile court is required to serve a dependency petition with summons on the child (if over 12), parents, legal guardians, custodians, and other necessary parties. In this instance, the Department of Human Resources (DHR) was neither the legal guardian nor the custodian at the time of the petition's filing and was not considered a necessary party, as the juvenile court did not serve it. Although the court referred the case to DHR for a home study of the grandparents, this did not establish DHR as a party to the proceedings. The court determined the child was dependent and temporarily placed with the grandparents, who later withdrew as custodians. Consequently, the guardian ad litem sought emergency custody for the child, citing Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-138, which allows for protective orders in emergencies. The juvenile court granted the motion on January 21, 2014, placing the child with DHR. DHR subsequently objected to the court's failure to recognize it as a party and to provide due process before assuming custody. To challenge the juvenile court’s decision, DHR must follow Rule 13(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which allows non-served parties to petition for modification of orders. In the case of In re D.M., the court ruled that a party could not appeal a lack of service if it did not raise the issue in the juvenile court under the appropriate rule.

DHR requested a modification of a juvenile court placement order but did not cite Rule 13(a)(5). The juvenile court denied the motion, affirming that DHR failed to present valid grounds for modification, particularly regarding issues of service and formal party joinder. The court acted within its authority under Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-141, which allows for ex parte custody transfers in emergencies, and dismissed DHR's motion without a hearing as permitted by Rule 13(a)(5).

DHR claimed that the juvenile court violated its due process rights, a basis for vacating a judgment under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. Citing Montgomery County Department of Human Resources v. McDermott, DHR argued that it should have been notified and heard before any custody transfer. However, the court recognized that the previous statement regarding due process was incorrect. The Fourteenth Amendment does not extend due process protections to state agencies, including county departments of human resources, as they are not considered "persons" under its provisions. DHR's reliance on Ala. Const. 1901, art. I, § 7, was also misplaced, as that section pertains specifically to criminal prosecutions, and DHR was not in a criminal context. Other constitutional provisions ensure due process in civil cases but only for individuals, not state agencies.

The Alabama Supreme Court has clarified that the due process rights outlined in the Alabama Constitution align with those in the U.S. Constitution, as established in Elliott v. Van Kleef. It emphasizes that state agencies, including child-welfare agencies, do not possess additional due process rights beyond those provided federally. In criminal cases, the State has a right to notice and a hearing regarding pretrial motions, but this does not extend to child-welfare agencies concerning emergency custody orders. The court overrules McDermott to the extent it suggested that such agencies have inherent due process rights unrelated to statutory entitlements under the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act. Consequently, the Department of Human Resources (DHR) cannot argue for vacating the juvenile court's judgment due to a lack of notice and hearing, as it has not demonstrated any constitutional due process rights in this context. The court affirms the juvenile court's decision to grant custody to DHR, noting that DHR cannot invoke the due process rights of the child's parents. Additionally, DHR's claim regarding separation-of-powers violations is waived since it was not raised in the juvenile court. The court's application is granted, the previous opinion is withdrawn, and the judgment is affirmed, with concurrence from multiple justices.