Templeton v. KyKenKee, Inc.

Citations: 182 So. 3d 510; 2015 WL 3448091Docket: 1130411

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; May 29, 2015; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Nicholson Manufacturing Limited sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to grant summary judgment in its favor, arguing that the amendment to substitute Nicholson for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of the statutory limitations period and did not relate back to the original complaint. The case arose from the wrongful death of Casimiro Deleon Ixcoy, who died after being struck by a falling log at KyKenKee, Inc., where machinery manufactured by Nicholson was in operation. After the incident on December 31, 2010, an attorney was retained on January 5, 2011, to preserve evidence, and a complaint was filed on December 28, 2012, against several defendants, including fictitious ones. On January 2, 2013, just after the two-year limitations period ended, Templeton sought to formally substitute Nicholson as a defendant, alleging product liability for a defective debarker machine. Nicholson asserted the statute of limitations as a defense and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court initially denied. In its petition for a writ of mandamus, Nicholson contended it had a clear legal right to the order, the trial court had a duty to grant it, there was no adequate remedy available, and the court had jurisdiction. The Court ultimately granted Nicholson's petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to enter summary judgment.

The case presents an exception related to fictitious parties and the relation-back doctrine in Alabama law. The court has assessed trial court decisions denying summary judgment motions based on statute of limitations defenses. Specifically, the two-year statute of limitations applies to claims against Nicholson, with the relevant accident occurring on December 31, 2010, and the original complaint being filed on December 28, 2012. The plaintiff, Templeton, attempted to amend the complaint on January 2, 2013, to substitute Nicholson for a fictitiously named defendant, after the limitations period expired.

According to Rule 9(h) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may designate an opposing party by a fictitious name if unaware of their true identity, and may amend pleadings once the true name is discovered. Rule 15(c)(4) allows such amendments to relate back to the original pleading date, contingent on the plaintiff being ignorant of the opposing party's identity. The plaintiff must demonstrate ignorance and also exercise due diligence in identifying fictitiously named defendants for the relation-back principle to apply. The court emphasizes that ignorance must be genuine; the plaintiff should not have known or been on notice regarding the identity of the substituted defendants. The obligation for due diligence exists both prior to and after filing the complaint.

If a plaintiff knows or should have discovered the identity of a fictitiously named party at the time of filing a complaint, relation back for amendments substituting a new defendant is not allowed, and the statute of limitations is not tolled. The plaintiff must demonstrate due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named defendant to relate the amendment back to the original complaint. In this case, Nicholson argues that Templeton lacked due diligence in discovering Nicholson’s identity as the manufacturer of a debarker machine involved in an accident. Nicholson points to a sheriff's incident report and a Department of Labor decision that identified Nicholson, asserting that these sources were readily available to Templeton. The legal precedent cited includes Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, where the plaintiff failed to act diligently despite having access to medical records that indicated the entity to be sued. The court concluded that a reasonable plaintiff with such information should have made an effort to identify the correct defendant. Similarly, past cases reinforce that if a plaintiff knows or has sufficient information to discover the identity of fictitiously named parties at the time of filing, relation back is not permitted, and the limitations period remains in effect.

Templeton had access to public information that could have revealed the manufacturer of the debarker machine, specifically photographs in an incident report showing the 'NICHOLSON' label and a Department of Labor decision identifying Nicholson as the manufacturer. Although Templeton claims he did not possess the incident report when the complaint was filed and asserts that his counsel received it only after the statute of limitations expired, the report had been publicly available since September 2011. He also contends that the Department of Labor's decision is invalid due to being 'unsigned' and 'non-final,' yet it still identified Nicholson as the manufacturer. The court emphasized that the lack of information does not excuse a failure to exercise due diligence, citing a similar case (Crowl) where the plaintiff failed to identify the actual defendant before the limitations period expired. Just as Crowl could have discovered the identity of Kayo Oil Company through public property-tax records, Templeton could have identified Nicholson through the available incident report and Department of Labor decision. The court concluded that Templeton should have sought out these documents, which are standard in investigations of work-site-related deaths, to establish due diligence in identifying the unknown defendant before filing the complaint.

Templeton's lack of possession of essential documents stems from a failure to exercise due diligence in identifying the manufacturer, Nicholson. The debarker machine was clearly labeled with the manufacturer's name, and previous case law establishes that ignorance of a product's manufacturer cannot be claimed when a simple inspection would reveal this crucial information. Despite Templeton's argument that he was denied access to the accident site in December 2012, case law indicates that such refusal does not excuse the failure to inspect the product. Templeton had the opportunity to seek a court-ordered inspection and had access to other public sources, such as the incident report and Department of Labor records, which could have disclosed Nicholson’s identity. Consequently, the trial court was compelled to grant Nicholson’s motion for summary judgment based on a lack of due diligence within the statute of limitations. The court issued a writ of mandamus for this judgment, with some justices concurring and one dissenting. Templeton's assertion that his new counsel acted diligently shortly before the limitations period expired does not mitigate his pre-existing duty to investigate, as he had nearly two years to do so.