Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 8, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Employer ERA Helicopters, L.L.C. appealed the trial court's dismissal of its lawsuit against former employee Daniel Amegin, which sought to recover $80,000 paid for his AW139 helicopter training. Amegin had signed a Pilot Training Agreement acknowledging his employment status and agreed to reimburse ERA if he left within two years post-training. After resigning six months post-training, Amegin refused repayment, leading to ERA's suit. Amegin filed an exception of no right of action, claiming the reimbursement clause violated La.R.S. 23:921, which prohibits contracts that restrain a person from exercising their profession. The trial court upheld the exception and dismissed the case. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, emphasizing that the exception of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition based solely on its allegations. The court clarified that the burden lies with the party filing the exception to prove the petition fails to state a cause of action. The appellate court ruled that unless the petition's allegations negate every reasonable hypothesis supporting ERA's claim, the exception should be overruled. Thus, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Mr. Amegin contends that the Pilot Training Agreement, which mandates repayment of $80,000 for his AW139 helicopter training if he leaves ERA within two years, imposes a financial burden that restricts his ability to pursue lawful employment. However, the court disagrees, noting that the agreement does not hinder Mr. Amegin from seeking other employment as a helicopter pilot or in any other field. Instead, the training likely enhances his job prospects. Mr. Amegin compares his situation to past cases where liquidated damages clauses were deemed restrictive under La.R.S. 23:921, specifically referencing McCray v. Cole, where a similar clause was invalidated for restraining competition. The court clarifies that the Pilot Training Agreement's repayment clause is a primary obligation to recover the training costs, not a secondary enforcement mechanism against competition. If Mr. Amegin had remained employed for a year post-training, the repayment amount would have halved. The court concludes that the repayment provision does not violate La.R.S. 23:921(A)(1) and that Mr. Amegin did not meet his burden of proof against ERA’s petition. The trial court's ruling dismissing the case is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Amegin also references similar cases from Alabama and California.
