Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; October 7, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
The appeal involves the State of California's Department of Child Support Services (CSS) attempting to register a 2011 support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to collect arrears from a 1987 child support judgment against David L. Hampton. In January 2012, Louisiana's Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS-CSE) filed a petition to register this order. However, on November 5, 2013, a district court vacated the UIFSA registration and prohibited CSS from collecting arrears exceeding $77,699.67. DCFS-CSE's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied, prompting the current appeal.
In 1987, a California court ordered Hampton to pay $160 monthly in child support for his two children. By July 1992, he was significantly behind on payments. After moving to Louisiana in 1992, his ex-wife sought to register the support order for enforcement. A Louisiana district attorney's office reduced his support obligation to $103 per month in 1993 without an evidentiary hearing. Over the following years, Hampton made sporadic payments, eventually completing his obligations under the reduced order by 2008, leading Louisiana DCFS-CSE to close his case.
In 2010, CSS initiated a direct income assignment from Hampton's employers, which led him to file a petition against DCFS-CSE, seeking to stop the income assignment and for reimbursement of already deducted funds, claiming he had fulfilled his obligations. DCFS-CSE contended in its exceptions that it was no longer involved in the case, having closed it in 2008.
Without an existing enforcement order for child support, CSS had no obligation to appear in court. On October 15, 2010, Hearing Officer Lisa Trammel-Sullivan dismissed DCFS-CSE from the case due to improper joinder, allowing Hampton 30 days to amend his petition to include CSS as the proper defendant. She noted that the resolution of whether a prior California order was superseded by a later Louisiana judgment awaited a transcript of Judge Boddie’s ruling and expressed concern over the fairness of California collecting on an old judgment after Louisiana had managed the case for over 13 years.
Hampton amended his petition to name CSS, which was later served. A hearing was set for January 21, 2011, but CSS requested a 60-day continuance and was allowed to appear via tele-trial. Meanwhile, Hampton filed an ex parte motion to modify Judge Boddie’s 1993 judgment to clarify that it superseded the California judgment, which Judge Sharon Marchman denied but scheduled a hearing on the matter. During this hearing on April 5, 2011, DCFS-CSE stated Louisiana was no longer involved and that CSS had not received proper notice. Judge Alvin Sharp signed the nunc pro tunc judgment on the same day.
Sixteen months later, he nullified this judgment. The scheduled April 8, 2011, hearing on Hampton’s amended petition did not occur as planned, but Hearing Officer Vicki L. Green rendered a judgment on April 8, 2011, confirming the modification of the 1993 judgment and ordering CSS to cease collection efforts against Hampton. On January 12, 2012, DCFS-CSE filed a petition to nullify the nunc pro tunc judgment, arguing CSS was not notified of the rule to show cause hearing, and sought to register arrearages for enforcement. The petition claimed Hampton owed CSS a total of $74,871.06.
Following a hearing on August 7, 2012, Judge Sharp nullified the nunc pro tunc judgment and set a hearing for UIFSA registration for October 9, 2012, which was later rescheduled to January 15, 2013. The UIFSA was registered on March 12, 2013, with a subsequent hearing for setting arrearages on April 16, 2013. Hearing Officer Sullivan recommended vacating the UIFSA registration, referencing the prior ruling on October 15, 2010, which established that Judge Boddie’s judgment had superseded the California order.
On April 18, 2013, DCFS-CSE objected to Hearing Officer Sullivan’s recommendation to vacate the UIFSA, leading to a rehearing set for June 11, 2013. Following the rehearing, on July 30, 2013, the hearing officer again recommended vacating the UIFSA registration. DCFS-CSE sought a rehearing before District Judge Benjamin Jones, who upheld the recommendation on November 5, 2013, and signed the judgment. Subsequently, DCFS-CSE filed motions for a new trial on November 27 and December 17, 2013. After a hearing on January 10, 2014, Judge Wilson Rambo denied the motion on April 23, 2014, stating that California had acquiesced to a reduced support order established 18 years prior, with no subsequent applications for rehearing or appeal. This resulted in no arrearage owed to California.
DCFS-CSE appealed the denial of the motion for a new trial, which is generally not appealable as it is an interlocutory judgment. However, Louisiana law favors appeals, and doubts about an appeal's validity should favor the appellant. Although several assignments of error pertain to the denial of the new trial, the first asserts that the trial court erred in affirming the earlier hearing officer’s recommendations. Judge Jones reiterated his support for the hearing officer’s position, as reflected in the signed judgment, which confirmed recommendations dating back to October 15, 2010.
DCFS-CSE argues that a recommendation from a hearing officer, deemed a "final judgment," resulted in erroneous rulings based on "res judicata," including a judgment dated November 5, 2013. This judgment adopted an earlier hearing officer's recommendation to vacate CSS's UIFSA registration, asserting that previous findings constituted a final judgment. DCFS-CSE claims that the November 5, 2013, judgment was legally and evidentially flawed and that the trial court incorrectly denied a motion for a new trial. The document cites La. C.C.P. art. 1972, which outlines grounds for granting a new trial, particularly when a judgment appears contrary to law and evidence.
Historically, interstate child and spousal support in Louisiana was governed by URESA, which allowed support orders from one state to be registered and enforced in another as if issued there. Under URESA, the responding state was required to assess the existence of a support obligation and could modify the amount awarded. A 1987 support order from Riverside County was registered in Louisiana in 1993. During a registration hearing, it was revealed that a prior order from Los Angeles County concerning additional children existed. Consequently, based on the assistant district attorney's recommendation and Hampton's reduced income, the court adjusted the Riverside County support obligation to $103 per month, which Hampton and DCFS-CSE consented to without an evidentiary hearing.
The key issue is whether this modification by Judge Boddie replaced the California judgment. URESA’s anti-nullification provision indicated that a support order from Louisiana does not nullify or is nullified by a support order from another state unless explicitly stated by the court.
Amounts paid under a support order from another state will be credited against support obligations under a court order from this state for the same period. Courts are permitted to issue new support orders that differ from earlier orders, as such new awards are effective only prospectively, not nullifying previous orders. This interpretation aligns with the principle that proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) are de novo, allowing courts to independently assess support obligations based on current conditions. Courts in other states have similarly concluded that a responding court can set different payment amounts while the original order remains enforceable unless explicitly stated otherwise.
In the case of State v. Watkins, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that a 1978 California support order was not nullified by a 1994 Louisiana support order unless the Louisiana court specifically indicated modification or nullification. The court ruled that the 1998 dismissal of the Louisiana suit did not cancel the California order, interpreting the dismissal language as not intended to nullify but merely to conclude an enforcement action and cease further arrearages under the 1994 order.
The relevant May 10, 1993, judgment ordered the defendant to pay $103 monthly for child support, with additional stipulations for income assignment and medical insurance. Although the judgment did not explicitly state it superseded the California order, there was an indication during the hearing that Judge Boddie believed his judgment would replace it. The assistant district attorney noted a prior judgment had established a different support amount for other children, suggesting the complexity of the support obligations involved.
The court determined that the Riverside court was not aware of a previous support order for two other children, which should have been considered before issuing a new support award. The assistant district attorney proposed reducing the support amount to $103 per month based on Hampton’s current income, which Hampton accepted. Judge Boddie remarked that new information had emerged, leading to a recalculation of the support obligation, and emphasized that it would become an enforceable court order. Although the judgment did not explicitly state it superseded the California support order, it was interpreted as such based on Judge Boddie’s suggestions for further discussion with California. The judgment reducing the support obligation was not contested nor the product of a formal evidentiary hearing, initiated by the assistant district attorney on Hampton's behalf, who also agreed to the reduction. California did not contest this judgment.
When Hampton sought to prevent California from enforcing a direct income assignment in 2010, DCFS-CSE claimed improper joinder due to having closed its file on the case, indicating it believed Judge Boddie’s judgment had superseded the California order. Consequently, it was concluded that Judge Boddie’s May 10, 1993, judgment superseded the California support order.
DCFS-CSE later challenged the trial court's affirmation of a recommendation by Hearing Officer Sullivan from 2010, which was addressed in a November 5, 2013, judgment. Judge Benjamin Jones upheld the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, stating no funds would be sent to California, suggesting the matter should be concluded. The April 16, 2013, proposed judgment vacated the UIFSA registration, confirming that Judge Boddie's prior judgment superseded the California support order and indicating no new issues were presented by California's collection efforts in 2013.
Hampton filed a petition on October 15, 2010, to prevent CSS from enforcing an income assignment related to a judgment from April 17, 1987. The hearing officer dismissed DCFS-CSE from the case due to improper joinder, noting it had no active file for Hampton after his 2008 payments. CSS was identified as the proper defendant but had not been served the petition. The hearing officer allowed Hampton 30 days to amend the petition, scheduling a hearing for January 21, 2011. DCFS-CSE claims this hearing never occurred, nor did any hearing for CSS regarding the petition, arguing that the October 15 ruling was not a final judgment but a recommendation. They assert that CSS was not properly served and thus, under La. C.C.P. art. 2002(A)(2), any judgment against it should be annulled. The trial court's November 5, 2013 ruling, adopting the hearing officer's recommendations, is supported by the finding that Judge Boddie’s May 10, 1993 judgment superseded the California order, making DCFS-CSE's challenges regarding URESA and UIFSA moot. Additionally, DCFS-CSE objected to the hearing officer’s res judicata ruling from 2010, asserting that CSS was not a party at that time, and therefore the ruling was invalid. However, the court found the October 15 judgment was merely a recommendation, which was later amended and served on California. Ultimately, the trial court's determination that the 1993 judgment superseded the California support order nullified DCFS-CSE's assignments of error.
DCFS-CSE asserts that the trial court erred by failing to fix the arrearage, claiming that under Louisiana’s Children’s Code, the law of the issuing state governs support obligations and arrears. DCFS-CSE highlights that California established arrears five times between 1996 and 2008, although Mr. Hampton testified he was unaware of this. It notes that California lacks a prescriptive period for collecting arrears and cites URESA, which allowed enforcement of conflicting state orders. DCFS-CSE disputes the hearing officer’s finding regarding California's enforcement efforts over the past 13 years.
Additionally, DCFS-CSE argues the trial court wrongly suspended income assignments from California, which was obligated to collect child support for Joycelyn Gordon. Louisiana law permits the enforcement of out-of-state income assignments without registration or petition. DCFS-CSE claims the October 15, 2010, ruling was not a final judgment and lacked further hearings. However, this claim is deemed without merit, as the April 8, 2011 judgment permanently enjoined the income assignment based on a “nunc pro tunc” order that was later nullified. Hearing Officer Sullivan ruled the issue was res judicata since CSS did not appeal the earlier ruling.
In its sixth assignment, DCFS-CSE contends the district court erred in denying its motion for a new trial, arguing that CSS sought legal representation but could not find a Louisiana attorney. DCFS-CSE claims that a scheduled hearing on April 8, 2011, was canceled due to the “nunc pro tunc” judgment, which they believed rendered the hearing unnecessary. However, the nullification of that judgment led DCFS-CSE to seek a new trial. Ultimately, the determination that the 1993 judgment superseded the California order renders DCFS-CSE's arguments moot.
DCFS-CSE asserts that the district court incorrectly determined that CSS acquiesced to a reduced child support amount under La. C.C.P. art. 2003. It argues that the applicable law allowed a state to modify a support award from another state without nullifying the original order unless specified by the court, as stated in La. Children’s Code Art. 1333 (1996). The article mandated that reduced payments be credited to the California judgments, which they were. DCFS-CSE maintains that CSS was complying with the law, not acquiescing. Although Judge Boddie did not explicitly state that his judgment replaced the California judgment, it is concluded that his judgment superseded it, given that the assistant district attorney acted on behalf of California in proposing the reduction and the hearing transcript suggests intent to replace the California support award.
In assignment of error number eight, DCFS-CSE claims the district court erred by not ruling that the November 5, 2013, judgment was contrary to law and evidence, warranting a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1972(1). Citing State v. Watkins, it notes that res judicata did not prevent California from collecting a significant arrearage following a Louisiana ruling that limited the arrearage due to prescription. The facts of this case differ from Watkins since the assistant district attorney offered a reduction to $103 per month, which Hampton accepted, leading to a consent judgment without contest from California. Although the judgment does not explicitly state it supersedes the California order, other factors support this conclusion.
The November 5, 2013, judgment is affirmed. UIFSA, enacted in Louisiana under Articles 1301.1 through 1308.2 in 1996, aims to streamline child support proceedings and replaced URESA. The accrued interest has reportedly raised the amount due to $79,758.94. UIFSA allows direct income assignments to employers without needing a local court order. It is evident that DCFS-CSE communicated with CSS regarding the hearing, with CSS requesting representation; however, DCFS-CSE indicated it could not represent CSS without a new UIFSA registration, having closed its file on Hampton under the prior URESA order.
A request to register a UIFSA support order to establish arrearages was submitted on April 1, 2011, coinciding with notice of a "nunc pro tunc" hearing. Hampton's counsel referenced a "private hearing" on that date, suggesting the hearing officer informed CSS of the "nunc pro tunc" judgment and intended to grant an injunction based on it. A proposed judgment from October 15, 2010, was noted, which predates a later nullified "nunc pro tunc" judgment. The hearing officer believed Judge Boddie intended his judgment to supersede the California order. However, there was no certificate of the mailing date for the November 5, 2013 judgment, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1913(D), which is necessary for filing a motion for a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1974. The proposed judgment indicated that J. Boddie likely intended his support modification to supersede the California award. The original California support order from 1987 and the 1993 judgment occurred before UIFSA's effective date, making URESA applicable for orders prior to 1996, while UIFSA governs those issued after. The hearing implied the two orders were unrelated, each concerning different children of Hampton. The California order required $160 per month per child, while the Louisiana order mandated a flat $103 per month. The California support for the older child was set to end when the child turned 18 on October 1, 1993, reducing the obligation by $57 per month. Further, the October 15, 2010, proposed judgment determined that DCFS-CSE was improperly joined and dismissed from the case, instructing Hampton to amend his petition to name California as the proper defendant. At a January 21, 2011 hearing, CSS's attorney requested a continuance and permission to appear by phone, which the court granted, rescheduling for April 8, 2011. CSS did not respond to the petition to enjoin. A rule filed on June 13, 1996 alleged that Hampton owed $22,823.87 in arrears from March 1, 1987, to August 31, 1992, prior to the amended order.
