Hinton v. State

Citations: 172 So. 3d 355; 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 10; 2013 WL 598122Docket: CR-04-0940

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; February 14, 2013; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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In 1986, Anthony Ray Hinton was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death, with his convictions upheld by both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court. In 1990, Hinton sought postconviction relief under Rule 32, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not hiring a qualified firearms-identification expert. The circuit court denied his petition in 2005, asserting that counsel had engaged Andrew Payne for this purpose. This decision was upheld on appeal.

However, the Alabama Supreme Court later reversed the appellate court's judgment, stating it was premature to discuss counsel's effectiveness without a specific finding on Payne's qualifications as an expert. The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine Payne’s qualifications based on his credentials. Following the retirement of the original circuit judge, the case was assigned to a new judge. The circuit court initially failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s instructions, prompting a second remand.

Upon compliance, the circuit court found Payne qualified as an expert, a determination affirmed by the appellate court, which deemed Hinton's ineffective assistance claim meritless. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently reversed this affirmation, criticizing the appellate court for applying an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the circuit court’s qualifications finding, as that determination was based solely on the trial record, not additional evidence.

The Alabama Court reviewed the circuit court's judgment on Andrew Payne's qualifications as a firearms-identification expert under a de novo standard, affirming that the circuit court did not err in finding Payne qualified. Previously, Anthony Ray Hinton, convicted of capital murder in 1986, argued ineffective assistance of counsel for not hiring a qualified expert, claiming his lawyer failed to recognize an amended statute removing the funding cap for expert witnesses. The circuit court initially denied Hinton's postconviction petition, finding that the testimony from Payne supported Hinton's defense. However, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this decision, emphasizing the need for specific findings on Payne's qualifications. Consequently, the case was remanded for the circuit court to make those determinations according to Rule 32.9 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case for the circuit court to conduct proceedings aligned with its earlier opinion regarding expert testimony. After the circuit court found Andrew Payne qualified as a firearms identification expert, this Court affirmed the judgment, concluding there was no abuse of discretion. However, in a subsequent review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this decision, asserting that the circuit court's finding was based solely on the trial record, which did not place it in a better position than an appellate court to make such determinations. The Alabama Supreme Court then mandated a de novo standard of review for the circuit court's judgment regarding Payne's qualifications. Upon reevaluation, this Court confirmed Payne's qualifications as an expert.

Later, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacating this Court's earlier judgment that denied Hinton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to secure a qualified firearms expert. The Supreme Court applied the Strickland v. Washington test, determining that trial counsel's failure to pursue additional funding to hire a capable expert constituted deficient performance. The Court emphasized that the attorney's lack of knowledge about the state funding law and failure to investigate available resources reflected unreasonable performance. Furthermore, the Court criticized the Alabama Supreme Court's prior focus on Payne's qualifications rather than considering whether hiring a better expert, had funding been requested, could have strengthened Hinton's defense.

The Court determined that if there is a reasonable probability that Hinton’s attorney would have hired an expert to create reasonable doubt regarding Hinton’s guilt, had the attorney been aware that the statutory funding limit for expert witnesses had been lifted, then Hinton experienced prejudice due to ineffective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a new trial. Since no Alabama court had properly assessed the prejudice component of the Strickland standard in this context, the Supreme Court vacated the previous judgment and remanded the case for an Alabama court to evaluate whether the trial counsel would have hired a different expert had they known about the funding change. 

The circuit court has yet to make necessary factual findings regarding this prejudice prong, as required by Rule 32.9(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which mandates specific findings on material factual issues during an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 32 petition. The Alabama Supreme Court's decision emphasized the importance of these findings before an appellate court can review the issues. Consequently, the case is remanded to the circuit court for it to issue specific written findings regarding the likelihood of hiring a different expert and to conduct further proceedings as necessary. A return with findings and any new evidence must be filed within 180 days. 

The background details note that Anthony Ray Hinton was convicted in 1986 of capital murder and sentenced to death, with his convictions upheld on appeal. In 1990, he filed a Rule 32 petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not hiring a qualified firearms expert, citing the attorney's unawareness of the removal of the previous funding limit for expert witnesses.

The circuit court initially denied Hinton's petition, which was upheld through extensive appellate litigation, ultimately affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. The United States Supreme Court later granted certiorari, vacating the appellate court's judgment regarding Hinton’s claim of ineffective trial counsel for not hiring a qualified firearms-identification expert. The Supreme Court determined that counsel's failure to recognize that the statutory funding limit for experts had been lifted constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. However, it noted that no Alabama court had addressed whether Hinton was prejudiced by this deficiency, particularly whether a knowledgeable counsel would have hired a different expert capable of creating reasonable doubt about Hinton’s guilt. Consequently, the case was remanded for an Alabama court to assess this prejudice inquiry.

Upon remand, the circuit court concluded that had counsel been aware of the lifted funding limit, he would have retained a more qualified expert, whose testimony could have led the jury to doubt Hinton's guilt. This finding resulted in the granting of Hinton's Rule 32 petition. Since Hinton achieved the relief sought, the appeal was deemed moot and subsequently dismissed. The report notes that on April 2, 2015, the case against Hinton was dismissed and his convictions were overturned for evidentiary reasons.