Koonce v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Citations: 172 So. 3d 1101; 15 La.App. 3 Cir. 31; 2015 La. App. LEXIS 1488; 2015 WL 4634934Docket: No. 15-31

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 5, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiff Draughn Koonce (Appellant) appeals the trial court's summary judgment favoring Defendants Tony Mancuso (Sheriff of Calcasieu Parish) and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Appellees), as well as the denial of Appellant’s motion to strike Appellees’ supplemental answer and affirmative defenses. The case arose from a September 22, 2005, incident where a school bus transporting Appellant and other prisoners crashed during evacuation efforts related to Hurricane Rita. Appellant filed a damages petition on September 22, 2006, which Appellees answered on October 24, 2006, but no action occurred until Appellant filed a supplemental petition on January 22, 2014. Appellees' subsequent answer introduced affirmative defenses of immunity, which Appellant contested as untimely. Following a hearing on June 24, 2014, the trial court denied the motion to strike, granted summary judgment to Appellees, and dismissed Appellant’s claims. 

In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly interpreted La.R.S. 29:735 regarding "willful misconduct," asserting it requires specific intent to cause injury. The appellate court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same criteria as the trial court, which aims for a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Determining whether conduct amounts to "willful misconduct" or "criminal, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct" is a legal standard that influences liability assessments. This determination is a question of law for the trial court, particularly at the summary judgment stage, as established in Haab v. E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. of Jefferson Parish. The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act defines emergency preparedness and outlines the criteria for disasters and emergencies. According to La.R.S. 29:735, the state, its political subdivisions, and their agents are generally immune from liability for injuries or damages resulting from homeland security activities unless there is willful misconduct involved. This immunity extends to activities conducted during emergencies, such as the evacuation efforts due to Hurricane Rita, as confirmed by Gubernatorial Proclamation No. 53 KBB 2005. The critical issue is whether the actions of state agents during these evacuation activities constituted willful misconduct under La.R.S. 29:735. Furthermore, statutory interpretation is the responsibility of the judicial branch, focusing on discerning the legislative intent behind laws, as emphasized in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

The interpretation of a statute begins with its language. If a law is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written without further interpretation. Conversely, if the language allows for multiple interpretations, it should be construed in a manner that aligns with the law's purpose. In cases of ambiguity, context and the overall text must be examined. The terms "willful," "misconduct," and "willful misconduct" are not defined in the statute, prompting reference to Black’s Law Dictionary. "Misconduct" is characterized as a dereliction of duty or improper behavior, especially by those in authority, while "willful" denotes a voluntary and intentional act, which may imply conscious wrongdoing or extreme carelessness. Therefore, "willful misconduct" requires a voluntary, intentional breach of duty that may be unlawful, dishonest, or improper, executed with bad intent or disregard for consequences, reflecting legislative intent.

The Act's purpose is to prepare for emergencies and disasters to safeguard lives and property in Louisiana. It aims to reduce vulnerability to various threats and ensure effective responses to disasters. Although not legally binding, Louisiana Attorney General Opinion No. 08-0093 summarizes the legislative intent, emphasizing the importance of governmental immunity to promote efficient governance and discourage litigation that could impede officials from performing their duties. The opinion highlights the societal costs associated with lawsuits against government officials and the legislative history indicating broad immunization for emergency activities conducted in good faith. Recent rulings further support the intent to protect those engaging in emergency preparedness.

The court's interpretation aligns with established jurisprudence, particularly in defining terms such as "willful," "wanton," and "reckless" as degrees of fault that fall between wrongful intent and ordinary negligence. In Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, the court noted that these terms describe conduct that, while not intentionally harmful, reflects a significant departure from acceptable standards of care, indicating a conscious disregard for known risks that likely lead to harm. Similarly, in Sandrock v. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t, gross negligence was characterized as a lack of even slight care, merging conceptually with willful or reckless conduct. The fifth circuit further affirmed this view in Haab, stating that only the most egregious actions, showing a desire to cause harm or blatant disregard for risks, would negate immunity protections for public entities and their employees under relevant statutes. The analysis will next consider whether the actions of Jeffrey Miller, Assistant Warden at the time of a 2005 incident, amounted to such misconduct as he was responsible for overseeing inmate evacuations.

Miller testified that over 1,200 inmates were evacuated from two facilities using fifty to sixty school buses, facilitated by an arrangement with the Calcasieu Parish School Board. Volunteers, including deputies who drive for the school board, were sought to operate the buses. Due to the emergency situation, some deputies without the proper bus-driving endorsements were allowed to drive. Lavergne, a transport officer, operated a bus despite lacking the necessary endorsement, citing the urgent need to evacuate inmates and a shortage of licensed drivers. Appellant claims the deputies' actions amounted to willful misconduct under La.R.S. 29:735, arguing that they violated state laws and Sheriff’s Office policies regarding prisoner transport. He points out that Lavergne lacked the required commercial driver's license and that Miller allowed unqualified deputies to drive without verifying their qualifications. However, the court concluded that the deputies' actions during an emergency were precisely the type of conduct intended to be protected from liability under La.R.S. 29:735, thus rejecting the assertion of willful misconduct.

Appellant failed to provide evidence of willful misconduct by officials Miller and Lavergne during the evacuation of prisoners from a hurricane. Their actions, made under pressing circumstances with limited resources, demonstrated good faith rather than bad intent or recklessness. The Legislature's intent was to safeguard lives and ensure effective disaster response, which Miller and Lavergne aimed to fulfill despite the challenges. Consequently, the court ruled that there were no material facts in dispute, affirming the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

In a separate matter, Appellant's amending petition was served in February 2014, followed by a scheduled jury trial for June 23, 2014. Appellees raised defenses citing statutory immunity, leading to a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted after a hearing. Appellant contended the trial court erroneously denied his motion to strike Appellees' answer, arguing that the immunity defense was not timely pled and that he lacked fair notice. However, the trial court has significant discretion regarding amendments to pleadings, and its ruling was upheld as there was no abuse of that discretion.

An affirmative defense introduces new matters that, if the plaintiff's allegations are accepted as true, can defeat the plaintiff's case on its merits. The defendant's answer must include all affirmative defenses, as stipulated by Louisiana Civil Code Articles 1003 and 1005. If an affirmative defense is not included in the answer, evidence regarding it can only be presented if there are no objections. The rationale for requiring affirmative defenses to be raised early is to prevent "trial by ambush," ensuring the plaintiff is informed and can adequately prepare a response to the defense.

The law favors liberal amendments to pleadings to serve justice, as long as the amendments are made in good faith and do not unduly prejudice the opposing party or delay the trial. In the current case, there is no indication that the Appellees acted in bad faith or sought to delay proceedings. The Appellant's motions for summary judgment led to trial delays, providing ample time for investigation into the defenses. The Appellees filed their amended answer well before the trial and before the deadline for amendments. Although the Appellant emphasizes the late assertion of immunity defenses, this court has clarified that the timing of such defenses should primarily facilitate the plaintiff's opportunity to respond and adjust their case.

Appellees’ affirmative defenses of immunity, although not initially asserted, were introduced early enough for Appellant to adequately respond and adjust trial strategy. Appellant argued that Appellees’ supplemental and amending answer, filed thirty-one days after fax service and twelve days after formal service, should be stricken. The court disagreed, citing La.Code Civ. P. art. 1002, which allows answers to be filed before default confirmation. The appropriate action for failing to answer an amending petition is to seek default judgment, as demonstrated in Russell v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. The trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to strike was deemed not an abuse of discretion. Additionally, Appellant’s request for remand based on Appellees’ alleged bad faith in recusing the judge pro tempore was not addressed, as the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Consequently, all appeal costs are assigned to Appellant. The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.