Davis v. State

Citations: 171 So. 3d 537; 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 38; 2015 WL 326699Docket: No. 2014-CP-00076-COA

Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; January 26, 2015; Mississippi; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

David Davis appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting that his indictment is defective and his sentence illegal. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding no error. Davis was indicted on August 5, 2011, for sale of cocaine and as a habitual and subsequent offender. He pled guilty on November 15, 2011, receiving a 40-year sentence without the habitual offender designation, as the state agreed to dismiss related charges. 

Davis filed multiple motions for reconsideration and a PCR motion, claiming entrapment, an improper indictment, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court treated these filings as one request, concluding that Davis voluntarily entered his guilty plea and was aware of the potential punishment. The indictment was deemed valid, as it mirrored statutory language, and his guilty plea waived his right to challenge the indictment's details. 

The court found no evidence of coercion by his counsel and noted that Davis did not provide supporting evidence for his claims. Consequently, the trial court denied relief, and Davis now appeals the decision, maintaining his arguments regarding the indictment and sentencing. The appellate court will review factual findings for clear error but questions of law de novo, with Davis bearing the burden of proof for relief.

Davis waived any defects in his indictment by pleading guilty, yet he claims it is invalid due to several alleged deficiencies: it does not state that he "unlawfully possessed the cocaine," lacks a specific charge under section 41-29-139(3), fails to identify the person to whom he sold the cocaine, and does not include all essential elements of the offense. He argues that these errors are jurisdictional and thus not waived by his plea. Under Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 7.06, an indictment must provide a clear and concise statement of essential facts, ensuring the defendant is adequately notified of the charges against them. 

The essential elements for selling a controlled substance, as per section 41-29-139(a)(1), involve knowingly selling, transferring, or distributing the substance. Davis’s indictment correctly charged him with selling approximately 0.2 grams of cocaine to a confidential source for forty dollars, adhering to statutory language. Davis contends the indictment is insufficient for not alleging unlawful possession or intent to sell; however, the law allows for charging based solely on the act of sale or possession with intent to sell. 

Additionally, Davis argues that the identity of the confidential informant is an essential element that should have been included in the indictment, referencing Umphress v. State. In contrast to Umphress, the court finds that Davis's indictment provided sufficient information regarding the charges he faced.

The supreme court has determined that the identity of the recipient of contraband is not necessary for an indictment related to a sale (Jenkins v. State, 308 So.2d 95, 96). A guilty plea waives the right to confront adverse witnesses (Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172). Davis contends that his forty-year sentence for selling a controlled substance is illegal, arguing that he was never facing a maximum sentence of sixty years as claimed by the trial court in its denial of his post-conviction relief (PCR) motion. He interprets sections 41-29-139 and 41-29-147 to mean he should have received no more than eight years. At the time of his sentencing, section 41-29-139(b)(1) allowed up to thirty years for sale of certain controlled substances, while section 41-29-147 permits enhanced sentencing for repeat offenses, allowing for imprisonment of up to twice the standard term. The State asserts that, under Mississippi law at the time of Davis’s conviction in November 2011, the penalty for selling cocaine was uniform regardless of the amount, granting the trial court discretion to impose a sentence of up to sixty years. The trial court found Davis's forty-year sentence to be within legal guidelines and upheld this in its order denying the PCR motion. The appellate court affirmed this decision, concluding that there was no clear error in the trial court's ruling. All costs of the appeal are assigned to Lauderdale County. Although the State's brief raised issues concerning Davis's guilty plea and ineffective counsel, Davis clarified that these were not issues in his PCR motion.