Richard v. Richard

Citations: 171 So. 3d 1097; 2014 La.App. 4 Cir. 1365; 2015 La. App. LEXIS 1131; 2015 WL 3791295Docket: No. 2014-CA-1365

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; June 3, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Jolene Carter Babin Richard Thiel appeals the July 10, 2014 judgment of the trial court, which annulled a prior partition judgment in favor of James Richard and denied her exception of prescription, as well as her requests for sanctions, attorney's fees, and court costs. The appeal follows a procedural history where Mr. Richard filed for divorce in 1999, which resulted in a default judgment after Ms. Thiel could not be located. In March 2001, Ms. Thiel initiated a petition to partition community property, but service attempts on Mr. Richard were unsuccessful, leading to a judgment in her favor in 2004 regarding community debts and pension rights. Mr. Richard later sought to annul this partition judgment in 2010, leading to further legal disputes. The trial court ultimately found that Mr. Richard was not properly served, denied Ms. Thiel's exception of prescription, and rejected her requests for fees and sanctions. Ms. Thiel's appeal asserts three key errors: improper service determination, denial of her prescription exception, and denial of her fee requests, all of which she claims are manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no reversible error.

The standard of review for a trial court’s findings in an action for nullity focuses on the reasonableness of the trial court's determinations rather than their correctness. The reviewing court defers to the trial court's discretion due to its ability to observe witnesses and assess the nuances of the case, applying the manifest error rule to findings of fact. To overturn the trial court's factual determinations, two criteria must be met: 1) there is no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, and 2) the finding is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Legal questions, however, are reviewed for correctness, and if an error of law is found, the appellate court must reassess the facts de novo.

Ms. Thiel argues that the trial court erred in granting Mr. Richard’s petition for nullity, claiming that his alleged failure of service resulted from his own actions, including avoiding timely response and service attempts. She asserts that her obligation to serve him was fulfilled when she mailed the petition, and that Mr. Richard had actual notice of the trial date through his participation in a conference. Despite his avoidance of service, as evidenced by the return of certified mail and the sheriff’s return indicating he had moved, Ms. Thiel contends that the trial court's ruling to annul is manifestly erroneous.

She highlights contradictions in Mr. Richard’s statements regarding service and his residence, emphasizing that he failed to notify the court of his address change as required by Louisiana law. Furthermore, she cites Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1571, which mandates that a pro se litigant must inform the court of their current address during proceedings.

Addresses and changes of address must be recorded in legal proceedings, but a party's failure to provide this information does not invalidate judgments if notices were sent to the last known address. Ms. Thiel contends that the Fifth Circuit upheld a denial of a defendant’s annulment petition due to the defendant’s avoidance of service after receiving the original petition. According to Louisiana law, litigants must receive notice of trial when they request it in writing as per La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1572. Actions for annulment may be pursued under La.Code Civ. Proc. arts. 2002 and 2004, with art. 2002 allowing annulment for judgments against incompetent individuals, unserved defendants, or default judgments without proper procedure. The district court found Mr. Richard had not received notice of a status hearing or trial, which was supported by the record showing no service beyond the initial partition petition. Ms. Thiel’s references to La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1571(B) and the Gordon case were deemed inappropriate as Mr. Richard did not make a proper appearance to warrant a change of address notification. The court noted insufficient evidence to suggest Mr. Richard was evading service, and Ms. Thiel could have taken steps to ensure proper service. Additionally, the Partition Judgment was deemed legally invalid due to the trial court's failure to comply with procedural requirements outlined in La.Rev.Stat. 9:2801(A), specifically regarding the issuance of orders for filing sworn descriptive lists. Ms. Thiel did not contest this finding on appeal. Regarding the exception of prescription, Ms. Thiel argued that the district court erred in denying her claim based on Mr. Richard's acquiescence to the Partition Judgment and the expiration of his nullity action. The court's ruling on prescription is subject to a standard of manifest error or clear wrongness.

The inquiry into manifest error focuses on the reasonableness of the trial court's determinations rather than their correctness. If a legal error occurs, the review standard is de novo. Ms. Thiel argues that Mr. Richard voluntarily acquiesced to the Partition Judgment under La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 2003, and thus cannot annul it based on grounds in art. 2002. She cites cases where acquiescence was found due to delays in seeking nullity, failure to appeal, or not objecting during execution. However, the cases she referenced differ factually from Mr. Richard’s situation. Specifically, in Bergman, a curator represented a non-resident spouse who did not respond timely, while no curator was appointed for Mr. Richard, and he lacked notice of the judgment. In Palmer, the petitioner did not claim any procedural vices, whereas Mr. Richard alleges both form and substance vices under arts. 2002 and 2004. Hagedorn involved a delayed nullity action where the appellant acquiesced by not contesting enforcement, but Mr. Richard filed his nullity petition shortly after learning of the judgment. Nullity actions for form vices can be filed at any time unless exceptions under art. 2003 apply. The district court found that art. 2003 did not apply, and this finding was deemed not manifestly erroneous. Mr. Richard was not residing in Plaquemines Parish at the time of the judgment, and conflicting testimonies indicated he did not participate in the status conference. Additionally, Ms. Thiel argued that Mr. Richard did not file his nullity claim within one year of discovering alleged fraud or ill practices as required by art. 2004.

Ms. Thiel asserts that Mr. Richard was properly served with the Partition Judgment through certified mail in July 2014, thus fulfilling the requirements of La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1313. She argues that his annulment request under La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 2004 should be denied due to a lack of evidence of fraud or ill practice presented at trial. Although Mr. Richard's nullity petition included claims under both arts. 2002 and 2004, the trial court based its decision solely on art. 2002, rendering the timeliness of the art. 2004 claims irrelevant. Ms. Thiel contends that Mr. Richard's claims are time-barred under arts. 1974, 2087, and 2123; however, a review of these articles is unnecessary since the prescriptive period is governed by art. 2002. The court found no manifest error in denying Ms. Thiel's prescription exception. In her final point, Ms. Thiel requests sanctions and reimbursement for attorney's fees, alleging Mr. Richard evaded service to avoid property partitioning. The trial court concluded there was insufficient evidence of this evasion during the nullity hearing, and it upheld its findings as not manifestly erroneous. Consequently, the trial court's judgment to annul Mr. Richard's petition while denying Ms. Thiel's request for sanctions and fees is affirmed. Additionally, it is noted that Mr. Eggleston was not served with the partition petition and passed away in December 2001. The last service attempt for Mr. Richard regarding the bench trial order occurred on March 5, 2003, and the judgment did not list any assets or property allocations. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1572 mandates written notice of trial dates, which can be waived by counsel at a pre-trial conference, while art. 2003 stipulates that a defendant who acquiesces to a judgment or does not act to enjoin it may not annul it under the grounds specified in art. 2002.