Jupiter Ocean & Racquet Club Condominium Ass'n v. Courtside Properties of Palm Beach, LLC
Docket: No. 4D08-3753
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; September 2, 2009; Florida; State Appellate Court
A condominium association is appealing a final judgment favoring its lessee, arguing that the trial court incorrectly ruled the association was time-barred from canceling a lease under section 718.302, Florida Statutes (1977). In a cross-appeal, the lessee contends a prior judge erred in denying its motion for partial summary judgment concerning the lease's applicability to the statute, which was enacted after the lease was signed. The court agrees with the lessee's position on the cross-appeal and affirms the judgment based on the Tipsy Coachman rule.
The lease agreement, entered into in December 1976 between the developer, Jupiter Ocean and Racquet Club, and the condominium association, included terms binding the association as the anticipated owner of the leased premises. Prior to the lease, a membership agreement was established for the construction of tennis facilities, with the developer agreeing to convey the property to the association later. The lessee, while not paying monetary rent, was responsible for constructing and maintaining the Tennis Club.
The condominium development consisted of eleven condominiums, each documented by a recorded declaration that did not mention the lease or membership agreement but affirmed the association's ownership of common recreational facilities. The association transitioned to the unit owners in February 1984, and the leased property was conveyed to the post-turnover association in 1992.
Disputes regarding the lessee's operation of the Tennis Club led the association to file an Amended Complaint seeking to declare the lease unfair and subject to cancellation. The lessee argued that the association was estopped from canceling the lease due to prior consent documents. A prior judge denied this motion, citing that allowing estoppel would amount to waiving cancellation rights, which is prohibited by law. Following this, the case proceeded to trial, where the successor judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that the unit owners had not exercised their cancellation rights within a reasonable timeframe, thus applying the doctrine of laches and denying the association's requested relief.
The association is appealing a judgment while the lessee cross-appeals an order from a previous judge. The lessee contends that section 718.302 of the Florida Statutes is inapplicable because it was not in effect when the lease was signed. The court agrees, affirming the lessee's judgment under the Tipsy Coachman rule. The central issue is whether section 718.302 can retroactively apply to the lease. Statutes are generally presumed to apply prospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise. Even if retroactive application were intended, it cannot impair contractual obligations as per Article I, Section 10 of both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions.
The lease was executed in December 1976, while section 718.302 took effect in 1977. Applying the statute retroactively would be impermissible. Although the association argues that some condominiums were formed after the statute's enactment, thus not retroactively applying it, the court finds this case distinguishable from a precedent (Hovnanian) where a specific condominium was involved. Here, the association seeks to cancel the entire lease for all condominiums, which would violate constitutional protections against contract impairment.
Therefore, the court concludes that the predecessor judge incorrectly determined that section 718.302(1) applied to the lease. However, as the successor judge ruled in favor of the lessee on different grounds, the judgment is upheld. The court clarifies that this ruling does not preclude the association from exercising other cancellation rights under the lease terms.
