Bell v. Louisiana State Police

Citations: 168 So. 3d 518; 2013 La.App. 1 Cir. 0863; 2014 La. App. LEXIS 3023; 2014 WL 7276012Docket: No. 2013 CW 0863 R

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 22, 2014; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs’ counsel delivered discovery responses to opposing counsel within three years of the last answer filed, which constituted a step in prosecution under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561, preventing abandonment of the case. As a result, the previous decision granting Sheriff Mike Cazes’ application for supervisory writs and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims is vacated. The court denies Cazes’ writ application and remands the case for further proceedings.

In August 2008, plaintiffs Gerald Bell, Sr. and Lularose S. Bell initiated a personal injury lawsuit against the West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff’s Office, and the Louisiana State Police. The Bells allege that in September 2006, Mr. Bell was violently attacked during the booking process after being arrested by a Louisiana State Police trooper, resulting in severe injuries requiring multiple surgeries. They claim the incident was due to the defendants' intentional acts, negligence, and inadequate training.

The Attorney General’s office, represented by Assistant Attorney General F. Jonathan Rice, enrolled as counsel for the Louisiana State Police and the Sheriff’s Office in October 2008. The Sheriff, responding on behalf of the Sheriff’s Office, acknowledged being incorrectly designated as a defendant. The State Police also filed an answer in the same month. On April 14, 2011, the Bells submitted their discovery responses, certifying that copies were hand-delivered to all counsel of record, including F. Jonathan Rice.

Mary Olive Pierson was enrolled as additional counsel for the Bells on April 28, 2011. On January 11, 2013, Sheriff Cazes filed an ex parte motion to dismiss the Bells' suit for abandonment, claiming no prosecution steps had occurred for over three years, with the last action dated July 6, 2009, during a Rule 10.1 conference. Sheriff Cazes provided an affidavit from his counsel, Jason P. Wixom, stating that the 18th Judicial District Clerk confirmed no interruptive actions were taken since July 6, 2009, and noted that Sheriff Cazes had not received the Bells' discovery responses. An attached letter from Mr. Rice referenced the July 6 conference but did not confirm service to Ms. Pierson or other counsel. Sheriff Cazes contended that while the Bells filed discovery responses in April 2011, they failed to serve him directly. The district court denied Sheriff Cazes' motion on March 28, 2013, ruling that the filing of discovery responses interrupted the abandonment period. The court questioned whether the Bells had properly interrupted the prescription, given they only mailed responses to the State's attorney. Subsequently, Sheriff Cazes sought supervisory writs, which were granted on September 24, 2013. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment, ruling that the Bells' discovery responses did not meet the service requirement under La.Code Civ. P. art. 561, thus failing to constitute a prosecuting step. The dissenting opinion argued for denial of the writ.

The Bells filed an application for supervisory writs with the supreme court, Docket No. 13-CC-2505, challenging a lower court's decision regarding the significance of discovery responses filed "In the Record" under La.Code Civ. P. art. 561. They argued that even though these responses were not mailed to the Sheriff's attorney, their filing constituted a clear indication of non-abandonment of the case and should be recognized as a "step" in the prosecution, interrupting the three-year abandonment period outlined in Article 561A. The Bells contended that the legislative amendment expanding "steps in the prosecution" to include "off the record" discoveries did not negate the validity of filings "in the trial court." They asserted that no prior court had ruled that such filings, served on fewer than all parties, did not count towards prosecution steps. They cited Delta American Corp. v. Reliant 6 Technologies, Inc. to support their position that filing discovery in the record, regardless of service, constitutes a prosecutorial step. The supreme court granted their application for a remand for further consideration and directed a discussion of the Delta American Corp. case.

On remand, Sheriff Cazes reiterated that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, arguing that the discovery responses were ineffective since they were not served on all parties, based on La.Code Civ. P. art. 561B. He also claimed the responses were invalid as they were signed by an attorney who was not yet enrolled as counsel at the time. Cazes asserted abandonment occurred by July 6, 2012, due to inactivity since July 6, 2009. In response, the Bells argued that Mr. Rice was enrolled as counsel for both the State and the Sheriff's Office, asserting that the delivery of discovery responses to him on April 14, 2011, constituted valid service and a prosecutorial step, thus interrupting the abandonment period. The Bells reasserted that filing the 2011 responses was a significant step and requested reinstatement of the district court’s prior judgment denying Cazes’ dismissal motion.

The district court's determination that the Bells' action was not abandoned is under review. The standard of review involves a factual assessment of whether any steps were taken within three years, analyzed for manifest error, while the legal question of whether the proven actions qualify as steps preventing abandonment is reviewed for correctness. According to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561, an action is deemed abandoned if no steps are taken in its prosecution or defense for three years, and this can be formalized through a motion. Formal discovery actions, whether filed or not, are considered steps in the litigation process. Articles 1474 and 1313A outline the requirements for serving various legal documents and affirm that discovery actions count as steps even if not filed. To avoid abandonment under Article 561, three criteria must be met: a party must take a step in the litigation, the step must be recorded (except for formal discovery), and it must occur within three years of the last action. A "step" is defined as a formal court action aimed at advancing a case or formal discovery. The intent of Article 561 is to prevent prolonged litigation while balancing the rights of litigants to have their cases heard against the need to avoid indefinite delays in the judicial process.

Article 561 mandates a liberal interpretation to favor the continuation of lawsuits, emphasizing that dismissal for abandonment should only occur when a plaintiff's inaction over three years clearly indicates abandonment. The focus is on the intent and substance of a party's actions rather than strict adherence to technicalities. The Bells argue that their hand delivery of discovery responses to Mr. Rice constituted service on all parties under La. Code Civ. P. art. 561B. The court agrees that this service was effective, confirming Mr. Rice's status as counsel for both the State Police and Sheriff Cazes throughout the proceedings, despite Sheriff Cazes being additionally represented by Mr. Schroeder. The record shows no motion by Mr. Rice to withdraw as counsel, reinforcing his role. Additionally, it was noted that no formal discovery activity or conferences were documented until January 11, 2013. The court concludes that the discovery responses served to Mr. Rice are valid as steps in prosecution, making the lack of service to Mr. Schroeder irrelevant. Sheriff Cazes’ challenge regarding Ms. Pierson's enrollment as counsel at the time of filing is dismissed, as her motion to enroll was uncontested and subsequently approved.

Sheriff Cazes' challenge regarding the effectiveness of Ms. Pierson's motion to enroll as counsel was not presented during trial court proceedings and is thus not considered on appeal. Under La.Code Civ. P. art. 1420A, a discovery response from a party represented by an attorney must be signed by at least one attorney of record, which Ms. Pierson did. Following the trial court's order enrolling her, the discovery responses complied with Article 1420, satisfying the necessary steps to avoid case abandonment under Article 561. Consequently, the plaintiffs had not failed to prosecute their case for three years after Sheriff Cazes' answer in October 2008. The ruling aligns with the principle of liberal construction of Article 561. Furthermore, the Bells' April 2011 discovery responses were served on all parties as mandated by La.Code Civ. P. art. 561, effectively interrupting the abandonment timeline. As a result, the prior ruling from September 24, 2013, which granted Sheriff Cazes' application for supervisory writs and dismissed the Bells' claims, is vacated, and the writ application is denied. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Additionally, the Bells and the State had requested jury trials, but Sheriff Cazes successfully struck the Bells' request in December 2008. Ms. Pierson's withdrawal as counsel occurred in December 2012, though she reappeared for a hearing in March 2013. The formal order of dismissal can be issued if no timely steps are taken in prosecuting or defending the action per La.Code Civ. P. art. 561A(3). Louisiana District Court Rule 10.1(a) requires parties to confer before filing motions to compel discovery. It is acknowledged that the discovery responses were not served on all counsel of record except for Mr. Rice. The excerpt also references a related case concerning service of discovery and motions to compel.

On April 30, 2008, Reliant filed an ex parte motion to dismiss based on alleged abandonment, arguing that no actions had occurred involving them from April 2002 to April 2008. The court rejected this motion, noting that discovery requests directed to Ashland and a motion to compel were filed, indicating that the lawsuit had not been abandoned. The court emphasized that any formal action taken by a party in a lawsuit affects all parties, focusing on the act of prosecution rather than individual notice. Citing Delta Dev. Co. Inc. v. Jurgens, the court reiterated that abandonment is interrupted for all co-defendants when any one defendant is served with discovery. Additionally, the record showed that Mr. Rice was enrolled as counsel for the Louisiana State Police and the West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office on October 21, 2008. On January 30, 2013, Darrell J. Saltamac-hia, Special Assistant Attorney General, filed to enroll as counsel for the State, indicating Mr. Rice was no longer representing the Louisiana State Police. The court clarified that Mr. Rice's enrollment should be interpreted as representing Sheriff Cazes, rather than excluding him. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that scheduling a discovery conference under Louisiana District Court Rule 10.1 is a prosecutorial step, but found no evidence that the July 7, 2009 letter intended for such a conference was sent to all parties, which would be necessary for it to qualify as a step under La.Code Civ. P. art. 561A.