Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; September 30, 2014; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Linde Gas and Zurich American Insurance Company appeal a decision by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission ruling that Larry Edmonds experienced a compensable work-related injury. The central issues are whether the Commission incorrectly applied the 'going and coming' rule regarding Edmonds' employment scope at the time of his accident, and whether he acted with willful intent to injure himself.
Edmonds has been employed as an instrumentation technician by Linde Gas since 2007, primarily assigned to the Columbus plant, with responsibilities including instrument maintenance across multiple locations. He used a company-issued 2006 Ford F-150, authorized by Linde Gas for travel to and from work, and was compensated for travel during emergency calls, although not for regular commutes. The company also provided fuel and maintenance for the truck.
On October 21, 2010, Edmonds sustained a back injury in a car accident while traveling to the Columbus plant for his scheduled shift. He claimed the accident occurred within the course and scope of his employment. Linde Gas denied this claim, invoking the 'going and coming' rule and asserting that Edmonds was not on duty at the time.
Edmonds testified about the conditions leading to the accident, detailing his lack of sleep due to prior work-related back pain and his adherence to speed limits while driving. He reported the accident to authorities and cooperated with the investigation but was ultimately terminated from his position before returning to work.
Eric Pate, the transportation supervisor at Linde Gas, testified that employee Edmonds had previously sustained two back injuries but continued full-time work after a short absence. Pate confirmed that Edmonds was authorized to use a company vehicle only for work-related travel and would receive pay for after-hours emergency calls. The route Edmonds took on the day of his accident was not designated by Linde Gas. An investigation conducted using Synergi included an interview with Edmonds, and due to prior incidents involving Edmonds driving the company vehicle, the accident was classified as severe. Linde Gas engaged an external firm to conduct a forensic crash investigation, leading to the conclusion by John C. Glennon Jr., an automotive technologist, that the accident was Edmonds's fault due to his headlights being off, lack of seatbelt use, and speeding. Consequently, Linde Gas terminated Edmonds's employment.
A workers’ compensation hearing focused on the compensability of Edmonds’s claim resulted in stipulations, including an average weekly wage of $1,208, the necessity of medical treatment for Edmonds's lumbar spine injury, and entitlement to temporary total disability benefits if compensability was established. The administrative judge ruled that Edmonds's claim was not barred by the 'going and coming' rule, as it fell under the employer-sponsored-travel exception, and found that Linde Gas did not prove that the accident was due to Edmonds's willful intent to injure himself, which would have precluded compensation under Mississippi law.
Linde Gas appealed this ruling, which was affirmed by the Commission. The Court applies a substantial-evidence standard for workers’ compensation cases, affirming the Commission's decisions unless there is a legal error, in which case a de novo review applies. The Commission serves as the trier of facts, and its findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, regardless of contrary evidence that might have persuaded a different fact-finder.
The Commission's decision to classify Edmonds’s injury as compensable under an exception to the 'going and coming' rule is under scrutiny. Generally, this rule states that injuries occurring while an employee is commuting to or from work are not compensable unless certain exceptions apply. Key exceptions include situations where the employer provides transportation, pays travel costs, or the employee performs duties related to their employment while traveling.
Linde Gas contends that Edmonds must demonstrate both that the employer provided transportation and reimbursed travel costs for his claim to be valid. They argue that Edmonds’s journey in a company vehicle lacked a substantial work connection, as he was traveling to the Columbus plant and was not on call or traveling to an off-site location.
However, the analysis indicates that there is no legal requirement for an employer to fulfill both conditions for the travel-related injury to be compensable. The law recognizes that providing a company vehicle or paying transportation expenses suffices to hold the employer responsible for travel hazards. Thus, the employer-provided transportation exception applies, potentially overriding the 'going and coming' rule.
Linde Gas references case law indicating employees were not acting within the scope of employment during specific accidents. In *Phillips Contracting v. Adair*, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that a claimant returning to work in a company vehicle without compensation for travel was ineligible for death benefits after a fatal accident, as it was not within the course of employment. Similarly, in *Tommy Brooks Oil Co. v. Leach*, an employee injured traveling from an employer-sponsored Christmas party in a company vehicle was also deemed outside the scope of employment, thus ineligible for compensation.
Linde Gas contrasts these cases with others where compensable claims were recognized for claimants compensated for their travel time, asserting that Edmonds needed to be compensated or on-call at the time of his accident for his claim to be valid. However, Mississippi law requires only proof that the employer provided transportation or compensated travel as an exception to the 'going and coming' rule. The courts in *Phillips Contracting* and *Tommy Brooks Oil* emphasized that the exception did not apply when employees used company vehicles for unauthorized personal trips.
Importantly, the law places the burden on the employer to demonstrate that the employee deviated from work-related duties for personal reasons to invoke the 'going and coming' rule as a defense against compensation. In Edmonds's case, he was driving a company vehicle authorized for travel to and from work sites, with no evidence of deviation for personal purposes. His travel was closely connected to his work duties, as he was en route to his scheduled shift. Substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that his employer-sponsored travel constituted an exception to the 'going and coming' rule, rendering it compensable. Thus, Linde Gas's arguments lack merit.
The Commission's finding that Edmonds did not act with willful intent to cause injury to himself was upheld. Linde Gas contended that Edmonds' actions—such as not wearing a seatbelt, driving without headlights before dawn, speeding, being sleep-deprived, and taking pain medication—demonstrated willful intent. However, the Commission found substantial evidence supporting its conclusion that these actions did not equate to such intent. Linde Gas failed to provide legal authority linking Edmonds’ behavior to willful intent or evidence showing that his lack of sleep or medication contributed to the accident. Consequently, the judgment of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission was affirmed, with all appeal costs assigned to the appellants. A dissenting opinion was noted, and one judge did not participate.
