Norman Jett v. Dallas Independent School District

Citations: 837 F.2d 1244; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 2092; 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,815; 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 238; 1988 WL 7120Docket: 85-1015

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; February 5, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Norman Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a suggestion for rehearing regarding the applicability of respondeat superior in imposing liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court rejected Jett's assertion that its previous ruling conflicted with Garner v. Giarrusso, noting that Garner was decided prior to the landmark case Monell v. Department of Social Services, which established that municipalities can be considered "persons" under § 1983. The court clarified that Garner did not address the issue of respondeat superior concerning municipal liability under § 1981. Instead, Garner differentiated between § 1981 and § 1983, ruling that municipalities are not wholly exempt from § 1981, despite previous judicial interpretations. The court emphasized that Garner's case involved direct liability of the city for employment discrimination, as the city was responsible for ensuring non-discriminatory practices, distinguishing it from the concept of vicarious liability. Thus, the court reaffirmed that while a municipality can be liable under § 1981, such liability does not stem from the actions of its employees alone but from the municipality's own failure to uphold anti-discrimination responsibilities.

The superintendent's involvement in the reassignment of Jett implicates the city in liability beyond respondeat superior. In this case, there is a clear finding that Todd, Jett's principal, acted with racial motivation in recommending Jett's reassignment. However, Superintendent Wright, who had the exclusive authority for the reassignment, lacks any findings of racial bias or knowledge regarding Todd's racial motivations. The case differs from Garner, where the issue of respondeat superior was not fully examined. Garner acknowledged potential issues for municipalities regarding respondeat superior liability but did not address them. The city's additional argument in Garner for absolute or qualified immunity was rejected. 

The Supreme Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence suggests that rejecting municipal qualified immunity under section 1981 is incompatible with municipal respondeat superior liability. Owen emphasized that if local governments are responsible for constitutional violations, it is reasonable for the public to absorb the cost rather than the individual harmed. Jett's claim that the rationale against respondeat superior liability under section 1983 does not apply to section 1981 is unconvincing. Similar concerns exist, as Monell highlighted that imposing respondeat superior liability on municipalities would raise constitutional issues. Monell also noted the absence of language in section 1983 that establishes respondeat superior liability, an observation equally applicable to section 1981, which merely articulates rights without defining prohibited conduct or assigning liability.

Monell challenges the interpretation of the 'shall subject, or cause to be subjected' language in Section 1983, emphasizing its significance arises from the statute's assignment of responsibility to certain parties, a concept not present in Section 1981. The 1866 Act's Section Two is the only provision that imposes responsibility for depriving rights established in Section One. The language in the 1871 Act was derived from Section Two of the 1866 Act, suggesting that this phrase should not serve to differentiate between Sections 1981 and 1983 regarding municipal respondeat superior liability.

The Monell decision primarily established that municipalities are included as 'persons' under Section 1983, thus making them liable for violations of federal constitutional rights under color of state law. This conclusion is supported by historical legislative context indicating that Congress intended for municipalities to be liable under Section 1983, with no explicit language negating respondeat superior liability. In contrast, Section 1981 lacks any language indicating municipal liability and does not create a cause of action or assign responsibility to any party. Consequently, liability for violations of Section 1981 relies more on inferred legislative intent or judicial interpretation rather than explicit statutory language. Earlier cases, such as Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., illustrate the evolving recognition of damage actions under Section 1981, further complicating the liability framework compared to Section 1983.

Congress did not intend to impose vicarious municipal liability under section one of the 1866 Act while not doing so under section one of the 1871 Act, considering the constitutional issues surrounding such liability. The court rejects Jett's claims regarding the section 1981 complaint against the school district, maintaining its previous decision. The request for rehearing en banc is treated as a petition for panel rehearing and is denied due to lack of support for polling the Court. Garner's concerns about holding private parties liable under section 1981 while exempting municipalities are addressed, noting that a Monell approach does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities. Sections one and two of the 1866 Act are linked, with section two being described as the enforcement section. The common law history of municipal immunity is reviewed, clarifying that while municipalities generally had immunity for governmental functions, this does not apply under section 1981, which does not classify municipalities as liable. The reasoning about immunity under section 1983 is distinguished from section 1981. The opinion does not question private liability under section 1981, and the court remains unconvinced by contrary opinions from other circuits.