State v. Pollard

Citations: 160 So. 3d 826; 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 72; 2013 WL 4710413Docket: CR-10-1560

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; August 30, 2013; Alabama; State Appellate Court

Lead Opinion SummaryLead Opinion OriginalDissent Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

On December 14, 2012, the Court withdrew its previous opinion regarding George Willie Pollard, who was indicted for first-degree unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance under Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-12-218. Pollard filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop on June 1, 2011, arguing that the search was conducted without a warrant, thus making the evidence and statements inadmissible. During the suppression hearing, it was established that on January 12, 2011, Corporal Brantley Cargill received a 'Meth Check Alert' indicating Pollard had purchased pseudoephedrine at a Wal-Mart. Cargill explained that such alerts are generated for individuals on a watch list, typically due to prior methamphetamine-related activities. Pollard had been added to this list following a prior arrest in September 2010 for possessing precursor substances. Cargill informed Detective Michael Rogers of Pollard’s purchase, prompting Rogers to monitor the area near Interstate 85 to observe Pollard's vehicle. Rogers recognized a vehicle containing Pollard and his wife, Christy, whose red hair matched the description in the alert. After determining the vehicle was registered to Steve Madden, who had an outstanding theft warrant, Rogers initiated a traffic stop based on both the warrant and Pollard's recent purchase of pseudoephedrine. Upon stopping the vehicle, Rogers contacted Madden and requested consent to search it.

Madden consented to a vehicle search by Rogers, who found items associated with methamphetamine production, including Coleman camp fuel, Aleve-D cold pills, and household drain cleaner. After discovering these items, Rogers read Pollard his Miranda rights, which Pollard acknowledged before waiving them and providing a statement. Pollard filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the search lacked a warrant. During the suppression hearing, the circuit court focused on whether an email alert, which prompted the stop, was a sufficient basis for temporary detention. The court noted it had not encountered a case involving a stop based on an electronic alert and requested the parties to research relevant case law. Pollard’s counsel reported an inability to find cases addressing electronic databases but referenced *Ex parte Aaron* and *B.J.C. v. State*, arguing the tip's reliability was questionable and did not assert illegal conduct. The prosecutor acknowledged the case was unprecedented. The court expressed doubt about the necessity of calling Madden to testify and considered whether Pollard had valid grounds to waive his rights, given he had paid for the ride.

The circuit court granted Pollard’s motion to suppress evidence related to an investigatory stop based on an email alert, which it likened to an anonymous tip. The court noted that this situation was a matter of first impression, as it involved an electronic communication. It requested the parties to find relevant case law, but none was identified. The court relied on the precedent set in Ex parte Aaron, determining that the email did not establish reasonable suspicion necessary for the stop. The State appealed this ruling under Rule 15.7, arguing that the circuit court erred by not considering Detective Rogers's testimony regarding the driver’s outstanding warrant and by mischaracterizing the email alert. The appellate court emphasized that its review of the law’s application to the undisputed facts would be de novo, without any presumption in favor of the circuit court’s ruling. Under Terry v. Ohio, reasonable suspicion requires a particularized basis for suspecting criminal activity, which the circuit court found lacking in this case.

The circuit court's reliance on the Alabama Supreme Court case Ex parte Aaron was deemed inappropriate due to key distinctions from the current case. In Aaron, an anonymous tip led to a warrantless stop of a vehicle, which was deemed insufficient for establishing reasonable suspicion because it lacked corroboration by police investigation. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that, without evidence corroborating the tip, the stop and subsequent evidence obtained were inadmissible. The ruling emphasized that the tip alone did not meet the constitutional requirement for reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop as outlined in Terry v. Ohio. 

In the current case, the situation differs because the stop was not based solely on an anonymous tip. Testimony presented during the suppression hearing indicated that Officer Rogers observed Pollard in the passenger seat of the vehicle, ran the vehicle's license plate, and found it registered to Steve Madden, which provided additional basis for the investigatory stop. Thus, unlike Aaron, the evidence here was supported by independent police action, which potentially established reasonable suspicion.

Rogers had knowledge of an outstanding warrant for Madden's arrest related to theft of property, which prompted him to initiate a traffic stop on Madden's vehicle. Rogers justified the stop not only based on the warrant but also on information regarding Pollard's purchase of pseudoephedrine. The court found that Rogers had adequate grounds for the investigatory stop, referencing Alabama law that allows an officer to arrest a person with known outstanding warrants. Consequently, the circuit court's decision to grant Pollard's motion to suppress the evidence was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 

Pollard challenged the validity of the warrant argument, claiming it was not raised at the circuit court level, but the appellate court determined it was properly before them since it was based on undisputed evidence. The court clarified that while new arguments may be introduced on appeal, questions of law not raised in the lower court are typically waived. The appellate court affirmed that the stop was lawful but did not address the legality of the search that followed, as this was not the focus of the circuit court's ruling.