Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; July 18, 2014; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Andra G. Thacker petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel Calhoun Circuit Judge Brenda S. Stedham to vacate an order permitting attorney Peggy P. Miller Lacher to withdraw from representing Thacker in her divorce case and to recuse herself from the action. The court reviews the history of the divorce proceedings initiated by Thacker in February 2009 and notes the case's inactivity until Alvin Thacker moved to place it on the active docket in October 2013. Following a pretrial conference in February 2014, Lacher joined Thacker's legal team. Shortly thereafter, Lacher sought Judge Stedham’s recusal, citing her candidacy for the judgeship Stedham was seeking to retain. During a hearing on the recusal motion, Judge Stedham barred Lacher from the courtroom due to the conflict of interest. The trial court acknowledged prior communications regarding Lacher's conflict and noted that both Thacker's lead attorney, Arthur F. Fite, III, and Lacher were aware that her involvement could necessitate the judge's recusal. Ultimately, Judge Stedham issued an order explaining her decision not to recuse herself, stating that Lacher’s withdrawal would eliminate the need for recusal. The court denies Thacker's petition for both a writ of mandamus and recusal.
The trial court permitted Lacher to withdraw as Thacker's attorney, indicating that this was necessary to avoid further delays in the case, and deemed Thacker's motion for Lacher's recusal as moot. Thacker subsequently filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court incorrectly mandated Lacher's withdrawal without addressing the recusal motion. Thacker claims that this ruling improperly disqualified Lacher and requests the appellate court to compel the trial court to rule on the recusal motion instead of dismissing it as moot.
The mandamus petition is appropriate for reviewing attorney disqualifications and recusal denials, with a trial judge's discretion being the standard for review. The necessity for recusal is assessed based on the totality of facts and circumstances that could lead to reasonable questions about a judge's impartiality. A writ of mandamus can be granted if the petitioner has a clear legal right, the respondent has an imperative duty that is not being fulfilled, there is no other adequate remedy, and the court has jurisdiction.
Thacker asserts that the trial court infringed upon her right to select her attorney, citing a precedent that emphasizes the nearly absolute right to choose counsel, subject to strict scrutiny when ethical considerations do not apply. However, the precedent also acknowledges that this right is not absolute; disqualification is warranted if an attorney becomes a necessary witness or if conflicts of interest arise.
Thacker's petition notes the absence of similar cases in Alabama regarding a judge's refusal to recuse himself amidst a candidate's appearance in a case. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling in Seeco, Inc. v. Hales serves as a relevant precedent. In that case, attorney Michael Fitzhugh announced his candidacy for a judgeship while simultaneously entering the Seeco litigation as local counsel. Despite Fitzhugh's suggestion for Judge Langston to recuse himself due to his candidacy, the judge declined to do so, citing his prior involvement in the case and Fitzhugh's status as not being the lead attorney for defendants. Seeco's motion for recusal was denied, but Fitzhugh was disqualified from representing Seeco and from practicing law in Arkansas during his candidacy.
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld this decision, stating Fitzhugh had engaged in a manipulative strategy to prompt Judge Langston's recusal. The court emphasized that allowing a party or attorney to create grounds for recusal undermines judicial integrity and that the principle of a litigant choosing counsel must be balanced against the prohibition of "judge-shopping." Hales contended that Fitzhugh's actions were prejudicial and violated professional conduct rules. Although the trial judge's reasoning for Fitzhugh's disqualification differed from the court's, the Supreme Court supported the disqualification based on the violation of Rule 8.4(d). The court expressed that allowing Fitzhugh to remain counsel under these circumstances would undermine public confidence in the judicial process, particularly with an election imminent.
An Arkansas Supreme Court ruling confirmed the disqualification of an attorney whose partner was an opponent in a judicial election, emphasizing the trial court's authority to maintain court integrity. The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to uphold judicial integrity and disqualify attorneys for unprofessional conduct. The circuit court referenced the Model Rules on Professional Conduct during disqualification proceedings, particularly Rule 1.16, which prohibits representation that violates ethical rules, including 'judge shopping.' Federal courts also criticize judge shopping, asserting it undermines the judicial process. The Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct contain similar provisions against unethical conduct and upholding judicial integrity. In a related case, Thacker claimed her right to choose her attorney was denied, but evidence indicated that the association of attorney Lacher was initiated by Fite, not Thacker, who had not sought Lacher's representation. Fite's motivation for involving Lacher was to balance his own demeanor in court.
Fite's justification for needing Lacher, the attorney whose involvement would require Judge Stedham's recusal, lacked any unique facts or circumstances to suggest that their association was not an attempt at judge shopping or an effort to delay proceedings. Although the trial court's order did not explicitly accuse Fite and Lacher of judge shopping, the evidence indicated such conduct. Fite acknowledged awareness of potential recusal issues yet proceeded to involve Lacher, who subsequently filed the recusal motion, indicating her understanding of the conflict her involvement created. The court supported the view that attorneys should not engage in actions intended to compel a judge's recusal, as this undermines judicial integrity. Consequently, Thacker failed to establish a clear legal right for the requested relief, and the trial court's direction for Lacher to withdraw was deemed appropriate, rendering the recusal motion moot. Thacker's petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. Additionally, the court referenced a prior case regarding the professional conduct of attorneys, noting its irrelevance to the current matter due to changes in the governing ethical standards.
