State v. Armstead

Citations: 159 So. 3d 502; 2014 La.App. 4 Cir. 0036; 2015 La. App. LEXIS 103; 2015 WL 392667Docket: No. 2014-KA-0036

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 27, 2015; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Randolph Armstead's case was remanded by the Louisiana Supreme Court for consideration of his six assignments of error after his conviction for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile. He was sentenced to ten years of hard labor. The assignments of error include claims of insufficient evidence, a trial judge's error in reversing a prior ruling on the indictment's time limitation, violation of his right to confront DNA analysts, exclusion of statements from the victim’s mother, and denial of a new trial despite the victim's availability. The court reviewed these claims, affirming the conviction and sentence. 

Upon reviewing the first assignment, the court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard and determined that the evidence sufficiently supported the guilty verdict. For the second assignment, it found the trial judge's decision regarding the indictment's time limitation was legally sound. The third assignment related to the confrontation of the DNA analyst was not preserved for review due to a lack of timely objection. The remaining assignments were assessed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, with no such abuse identified. The court also found no patent errors affecting the conviction. The case details include that Armstead was initially indicted for aggravated rape and second-degree kidnapping, but the latter charge was dismissed, and a new charge was substituted. A motion to quash the indictment was initially granted but later reversed upon reconsideration. After a jury trial in 2013, Armstead was found guilty, and his motion for a new trial was denied.

Detective Clifton Neely investigated a sexual assault case involving a minor victim that occurred on November 18, 2001. The victim received a sexual assault examination at University Hospital on November 19, 2001, where a vaginal swab was collected for DNA analysis. The evidence was stored securely and later transferred to Central Evidence and Property. During his investigation, Detective Neely obtained conflicting statements from the victim, who initially named two boys as attackers but later changed her account. The victim consistently identified the assault location, but Detective Neely could not develop a suspect due to these inconsistencies. He also spoke with the victim’s mother, leading him to believe the allegations were unfounded, resulting in the case being administratively closed without testing the collected evidence.

In 2004, the sealed sexual assault kit was sent to ReliaGene, a private DNA lab, as part of a program to address a backlog of untested kits. The case remained inactive until 2007, when Detective Francis Jarrott, part of the cold case unit, received a CODIS hit related to the case. He re-interviewed the victim, who identified the defendant and denied consensual sex. Detective Jarrott obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and a warrant for a buccal swab sample. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence detailing the collection, testing, and analysis of the DNA samples, including a report from the New Orleans Crime Lab, which was discussed by DNA expert Angela DeLatte.

Ms. DeLatte prepared a DNA report based on buccal swabs from the defendant and an unknown DNA profile from a victim's 2001 vaginal swab. She concluded that the defendant could not be excluded as the donor of the victim's DNA, with a probability of one in 14.5 quadrillion for finding the same profile from an unrelated individual. Mr. Armstead challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, arguing that: 1) the victim initially reported two boys as attackers, 2) he is ten years older than the victim, making it impossible for them to have attended middle school together, 3) the case was deemed unfounded by Detective Neely based on information from the victim's mother, 4) potential degradation of DNA evidence due to improper storage, and 5) ReliaGene's prior violations related to DNA analysis. The appellate court must first assess whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction. The elements of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile under Louisiana law require that the defendant be 19 years or older, the victim be between 12 and 17 years old, the victim not be married to the defendant, and sexual intercourse must occur, although consent is not required. The marital status of both parties is a critical element of the offense.

Evidence presented at trial confirmed that the victim was a sixteen-year-old female, while the defendant, Mr. Armstead, was twenty-one years old. The victim was identified as “single,” with no contradictory information in the records. DNA obtained from a semen sample found in the victim matched Mr. Armstead's DNA. Nurse Rooney provided testimony on the sexual assault examination and sample collection procedures, while former ReliaGene employees confirmed the DNA analysis. Ms. DeLatte stated that the DNA from the victim's 2001 sexual assault examination corresponded with the defendant's DNA from a 2007 sample, with a statistical probability of one in 14.5 quadrillion that the DNA profile matched an unrelated individual.

The standard for reviewing evidence sufficiency in state criminal convictions is outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, requiring a reviewing court to assess if, when viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find all essential crime elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The review includes all evidence presented to the jury, even if some was erroneously admitted, and considers reasonable inferences from the evidence. Circumstantial evidence must point to the main fact through collateral facts and circumstances. Additionally, the evaluation is limited to defense theories presented at trial, and appellate courts are deferential to the fact-finder's conclusions.

Appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited to legal questions as per La. Const. art. V, § 10(B). The trier of fact is tasked with resolving testimonial conflicts, weighing evidence, and making reasonable inferences, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. Testimony from a single witness can suffice to establish each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, provided it is accepted as credible. Appellate review respects the jury's function unless a witness's testimony is implausible or conflicts with physical evidence. A rational fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Armstead was guilty of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, despite his attempts to undermine the prosecution's case by highlighting inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. The jury was entitled to favor DNA evidence over the victim's statements. Mr. Armstead did not contest the scientific validity or chain of custody of the DNA evidence, merely suggesting potential degradation without evidence. Testimony indicated that degradation would not yield an incorrect genetic profile. The presence of Mr. Armstead's sperm in the victim’s vagina established penetration and sexual intercourse, corroborated by a physician's analysis indicating recent sexual activity. The prosecution successfully demonstrated that Mr. Armstead engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim when he was over nineteen and she was sixteen, and they were not married.

The court concluded that the evidence presented was sufficient to support Mr. Armstead's conviction for carnal knowledge of a juvenile, as all essential elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Armstead contended that the trial court mistakenly denied his motion to quash his indictment, asserting that the District Attorney had three years from the DNA identification in June 2007 to initiate prosecution, which did not occur until December 2010. The court elaborated on the nature of a motion to quash, explaining it as a pre-trial plea not addressing the merits of the charges, governed by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles. Such motions are limited to legal questions rather than factual determinations, with the trial judge's role confined to assessing whether a crime has been charged based on the facts in the bill of information. The judge's decision on a motion to quash is strictly a legal question, reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Evidence may be introduced during a motion to quash, but solely for the purpose of establishing that a crime is charged, not to support a defense on the merits.

Factual findings made by the trial judge regarding the merits of the defense are not afforded deference because they are unauthorized. Under Louisiana law (La. R.S. 14:80), a District Attorney must initiate prosecution for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile within ten years after the victim turns eighteen. In this case, the victim was born on March 27, 1985, and the offense occurred on November 18, 2001, allowing prosecution until March 27, 2018. The District Attorney filed an indictment in December 2010 and amended it in September 2012, thus ensuring timely prosecution against Mr. Armstead.

Mr. Armstead raised a constitutional right to confront his accusers, claiming a violation occurred when the trial court permitted the trial to proceed without the DNA technicians' testimony. However, he did not object during the trial regarding the introduction of the ReliaGene report or the absence of the technicians, and the supervising analyst's testimony was provided instead. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 841 requires contemporaneous objections to preserve issues for appeal, which Mr. Armstead failed to do.

Additionally, Mr. Armstead's request to admit hearsay testimony from the victim’s mother was properly denied. He argued this should be allowed as a statement against interest under La. C.E. art. 804 B(3), but the trial court correctly sustained the prosecution's objections, affirming the refusal to allow that testimony.

Hearsay is defined as a statement made outside of court, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies, as outlined in Louisiana Code of Evidence Articles 801 and 802. The credibility of hearsay statements is questioned because the declarant cannot be cross-examined. One notable exception is the "statement against interest," which allows certain statements to be admissible if the declarant is unavailable and the statement is contrary to their interests, as specified in La. C.E. art. 804 B(3). A declarant is deemed unavailable if they cannot or will not testify, provided that their absence is not due to the proponent's actions to prevent their attendance. Furthermore, an absent witness within the state is generally not considered unavailable, as they can be subpoenaed, according to La. C.C.P. art. 1352. Efforts must also be made to secure a witness's presence at trial for them to be deemed unavailable. Rulings on evidentiary matters are typically upheld unless there is clear abuse of discretion, and errors that do not affect substantial rights of the accused do not warrant reversal.

In the current case, Mr. Armstead sought to introduce testimony about a statement made by the victim to her mother, which was later relayed to Detective Neely. This was ruled inadmissible as hearsay. Although Mr. Armstead argued that the testimony qualified as a statement against interest, he failed to demonstrate any diligent effort to ensure the attendance of the victim and her mother at trial, which is necessary to establish their unavailability.

Mr. Armstead's attempt to utilize an exception to the hearsay rule was unsuccessful, as he did not demonstrate the necessary trustworthiness for the statement made by the non-testifying victim’s mother. Louisiana law stipulates that statements against interest are inadmissible for exculpation unless corroborated by trustworthy evidence, which Mr. Armstead failed to provide. Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion by not allowing this testimony.

In a separate issue, Mr. Armstead claimed a violation of his constitutional right to confront his accuser due to the victim's absence at trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to confront witnesses in criminal proceedings, a principle upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Testimonial statements from absent witnesses can only be admitted if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements is critical; statements made during police interrogations aimed at addressing ongoing emergencies are nontestimonial, while those aimed at establishing past events are testimonial.

Upon reviewing Mr. Armstead's claims, it was determined that the victim’s absence did not violate the Confrontation Clause or the ruling in Crawford. His conviction did not rely on the victim's testimony; rather, it was based on the ages of the involved parties and DNA evidence from the sexual assault examination. Additionally, the victim did not identify Mr. Armstead as a perpetrator during police inquiry, and no out-of-court statements from her accusing him were presented. Therefore, Mr. Armstead's Sixth Amendment rights were not compromised by the victim's absence from the trial.

Mr. Armstead contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, specifically the victim's testimony during the hearing, where she stated that he did not rape her or have sexual intercourse with her. Despite this, she was unable to explain how his sperm was found in her vagina. The victim also mentioned that the prosecution advised her not to appear for the trial's first day and that she had received a subpoena but did not intend to testify. 

The court reviewed the applicable law regarding motions for new trials, which can only be granted if it can be shown that an injustice has occurred, according to La.C.Cr.P. art. 851. This article outlines five grounds for granting a new trial, including the emergence of new and material evidence that could have influenced the trial's outcome had it been presented. The burden of proof lies with the defendant when seeking a new trial following a conviction. 

To successfully claim a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must demonstrate: 1) the evidence was discovered post-trial; 2) the failure to uncover it before trial was not due to a lack of diligence; 3) the evidence is material to the trial's issues; and 4) it is likely to result in a different verdict if retried. The trial judge's role is not to assess the new evidence as a jury would but to determine if the criteria for a new trial have been met. Ultimately, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

The trial judge must evaluate newly-discovered evidence against the backdrop of all existing evidence to ascertain its materiality and potential to alter the verdict. In cases with significant contradictions in the evidence supporting a guilty verdict, even minor newly discovered evidence may suffice to warrant a new trial. However, motions for new trials must be approached with caution to maintain the finality of judicial decisions. Granting a new trial nullifies the original verdict, allowing a retrial with minimal prejudice to either party.

Review of a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a new trial is limited to legal questions, as specified in Louisiana law, and does not extend to factual determinations. The appellate court's jurisdiction in criminal cases is strictly confined to questions of law. The trial judge has considerable discretion in assessing the impact of newly discovered evidence, and their denial of a new trial will not be overturned on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion. The judge's firsthand observation of witnesses places them in a unique position to gauge the potential influence of new evidence on the case outcome. As long as the trial judge has not abused their discretion, their ruling on a motion for new trial stands.

The trial court's denial of Mr. Armstead's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion. Mr. Armstead failed to demonstrate that the inability to present new evidence, specifically the victim's testimony denying sexual intercourse, was due to a lack of diligence on his part. He had opportunities to communicate with the victim or subpoena her for trial but did not provide explanations for his inaction. Furthermore, the court found that the victim's testimony would not likely alter the verdict upon retrial, as her consent to the act was irrelevant to the charges of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile. The victim's claims were also contradicted by DNA evidence linking Mr. Armstead to the crime, and he did not propose an alternative explanation for the DNA findings. Consequently, the trial court concluded that Mr. Armstead did not meet his burden of proof.

The court affirmed Mr. Armstead's conviction and sentence under La. R.S. 14:80, acknowledging a procedural error concerning the sentencing timing relative to the motion for a new trial. The trial judge sentenced Mr. Armstead immediately after denying the motion, violating La. C.Cr.P. art. 873, which requires a 24-hour delay. However, since Mr. Armstead did not challenge his sentence on appeal, this error was deemed harmless. The prosecution was also noted to have the authority to amend indictments before trial without issue, and ambiguity in the victim’s statements regarding consent was acknowledged.

A person aged nineteen or older who engages in consensual sexual intercourse with a person aged twelve to less than seventeen, or a person aged seventeen or older with a person aged twelve to less than fifteen, not being the spouse of the victim, commits an offense. This includes repeat offenders of misdemeanor carnal knowledge of a juvenile or those previously convicted of sex offenses requiring registration. Sexual intercourse encompasses anal, oral, or vaginal acts, and lack of knowledge of the juvenile's age is not a defense. The crime is completed with any slight penetration, and violators face up to a $5,000 fine and/or up to ten years' imprisonment without eligibility for conviction dismissal under specific Code of Criminal Procedure provisions.

Nurse Rooney described the method for obtaining a vaginal swab for evidence collection. The legal standard for reviewing certain motions to quash is based on abuse of discretion. Legislative changes in 2005 extended the prosecution period for certain offenses from ten to thirty years after the victim turns eighteen, deemed constitutional by the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal. The prosecution in this case adhered to the statute's timeline. The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a procedural right to a new trial after conviction, although historical principles from English common law allowed for retrials based on newly discovered evidence.