T.C.S. v. D.O.

Docket: 2130010

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; June 20, 2014; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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A child was born to D.O. (father) and T.C.S. (mother) who were never married. On October 28, 2009, the Marion Juvenile Court awarded joint legal and physical custody of the child to both parents. In January 2011, the father petitioned for modification of custody, leading to a June 27, 2011, judgment that granted him sole custody and allowed the mother visitation at his discretion. The mother appealed, but the court affirmed the judgment based on her failure to raise relevant issues earlier.

In June 2012, the mother sought more defined visitation rights, to prevent the father from relocating with the child, and requested that the child be returned to counseling. The father countered with a child support claim. Following a three-day hearing, the juvenile court issued a September 6, 2013, order granting the mother a standard visitation schedule and requiring her to pay child support. The mother’s subsequent postjudgment motion was denied, as it did not reference a final judgment.

On April 8, 2014, the juvenile court finalized its rulings, denying the mother’s requests related to the child's relocation and counseling. The mother contended that the court erred in its child-support award, as the $200 monthly obligation did not comply with the mandatory Rule 32 child-support guidelines. She argued there was no clear evidence that the court's deviation from these guidelines was justified or that it resulted in a lower obligation. The parties did not submit the required child-support forms, which are essential for establishing or modifying support obligations, thus raising questions about the legitimacy of the support determination. There is a presumption that amounts calculated using the required CS-42 form should be the correct child support amount.

A court can deviate from the child support amounts calculated using the CS-42 form but must provide written findings to justify such deviations, as mandated by Rule 32(A)(1) of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration. In *Abbett v. Treadwell*, the trial court's decision to deny postminority support for a disabled adult child was reversed because the required child support forms were not completed, preventing an accurate assessment of the father's financial obligations. Compliance with Rule 32 is essential, and failure to do so can hinder appellate review, as illustrated in *Martin v. Martin*. In the current case, the juvenile court failed to determine the proper child support amount or the extent of deviation from the guidelines, necessitating a reversal and remand for proper calculation and form completion. Upon remand, if the juvenile court finds the calculated support amount unjust or inequitable, it may deviate from the guidelines with stated reasons. Additionally, the mother claimed error in the denial of her joint legal custody request. In custody modification cases, the noncustodial parent must show a material change in circumstances that serves the child's best interests, as established in *Ex parte McLendon*.

A change in legal custody must prioritize the child's best interests, as established in Harris v. Harris, 775 So.2d 213 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). The court clarified that modifications to legal custody do not disrupt the child’s environment and differ from modifications of physical custody, which require adherence to the McLendon standard. To change legal custody, the trial court only needs to determine that such a change serves the child’s best interests, as outlined in 30-3-152, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court has broad discretion in this matter, and its decisions are only overturned if clearly erroneous, per Hodgins v. Hodgins, 84 So.3d 116 (Ala.Civ.App.2011).

The juvenile court conducted hearings across several dates in 2012 and 2013, where it was established that the mother had three children, none of whom were in her custody. Following a June 27, 2011 judgment that granted the father sole custody and limited the mother’s visitation, the father allowed her only brief supervised visits. The father expressed concerns about the mother's relationships with multiple men, some with criminal records, including one convicted of a sexual offense against a minor. He described her lifestyle as unstable, citing multiple relocations since the judgment.

The father remarried and moved into his wife’s property, while expressing plans to relocate again. Both parents described each other as difficult, with the mother seeking more involvement in decision-making for the child. Following testimony, the juvenile court granted a pendente lite order on April 17, 2013, allowing the mother unsupervised visitation on weekends and certain weekdays during the summer. Evidence suggested that recent visitations went well, and the parties communicated effectively regarding visitation arrangements. The mother emphasized her desire for shared decision-making regarding the child.

The mother contended the father notified her last minute about their child's kindergarten graduation and testified that the father opposed sharing legal custody. Despite recent successful visitations, the father did not want the mother to have overnight visitation. The mother argued that the father's actions aimed to undermine her relationship with the child, warranting joint legal custody to safeguard that bond. She referenced Faellaci v. Faellaci, where the court emphasized the importance of both parents' involvement in child-rearing and awarded joint legal custody despite the mother's claims of a power struggle. The mother also cited Fricks v. Wood, which upheld a trial court's decision to grant primary physical custody to the father due to the mother's behavior undermining the father's relationship with the child, reinforcing the state's policy encouraging parental involvement. The court found that while the father had restricted the mother's access to the child, her past choices raised concerns, which could justify the juvenile court's decision against joint legal custody. Although the appellate court might not have agreed with the juvenile court's conclusion, it could not determine that the decision was plainly wrong, thus affirming that part of the decision. The appellate court noted the father’s claim that joint legal custody was not tried before the juvenile court; however, the mother's request for joint custody was ultimately accepted without objection from the father. The court identified the error in granting visitation at the father's discretion but noted the mother did not preserve this issue for appeal.