Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; September 17, 2014; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Kawana Jasper appeals her conviction for two counts of aggravated battery under La. R.S. 14:34, stemming from an incident at a "Sweet Sixteen" party on October 29, 2011. Charged on May 3, 2012, she pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on May 21, 2012. Following a preliminary hearing on January 17, 2013, where probable cause was established, a jury trial in April 2013 resulted in her conviction. On May 22, 2013, the district court denied her motions for acquittal and new trial, sentencing her to four years at hard labor on each count, to be served concurrently, without probation or suspension. Jasper’s motion to reconsider her sentence was denied on July 9, 2013.
The incident involved two fights during the party, with the charges stemming from a second altercation in the restaurant's lobby. The victims, Paris and D’Miria Livas, went downstairs to find the party host and were met with an attack from Jasper, who threw bleach at them from a styrofoam cup. The bleach caused burns to their eyes and skin, prompting a visit to the emergency room where a nurse documented their injuries and reported the incident to authorities.
Officer John Walker of the New Orleans Police Department responded to a disturbance at a restaurant where victims reported a liquid, possibly chemical, thrown in their faces. Unable to find the victims initially, he later learned they were at Children’s Hospital, suffering from chemical conjunctivitis, which caused redness and pain in their eyes. Dr. John Bardigan treated them, prescribing ointment and recommending follow-up with an ophthalmologist. A week later, one victim, Paris, reported permanent vision impairment requiring constant use of corrective lenses, while D'Miria, previously only wearing glasses for reading, now needs them for distance due to blurred vision.
Both victims identified Ms. Jasper as the assailant who threw bleach at them. In her defense, Ms. Jasper claimed she was at the restaurant to pick up her daughter and had asked the manager to call the police. She denied throwing bleach, asserting that the bleach was thrown by Paris, who allegedly took it from a cleaning cart during a fight. The defense called three witnesses (the Trio), who testified that a confrontation began when Ms. Jasper was hit, leading to chaos where Paris threw bleach, and another girl, "Pinky," threw bleach back into the crowd. However, there were discrepancies in their accounts regarding the container used by Pinky. After the incident, Ms. Jasper left without speaking to the police. Detective Wayne DeLarge conducted a follow-up investigation, gathering information from various witnesses, including the victims and the restaurant manager.
Detective DeLarge testified during cross-examination that the only witnesses he interviewed regarding the incident at the Restaurant were the victims and the manager. Both victims identified Ms. Jasper as the assailant who threw bleach in their faces. Mr. Tran also identified Ms. Jasper as the parent who complained about her daughter's injuries from a fight. Following his investigation, Detective DeLarge obtained an arrest warrant for her.
A review of the record identified a patent error related to the imposition of Ms. Jasper’s sentence immediately after the denial of her motion for a new trial. According to La.C.Cr. P. art. 873, sentencing should not occur until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. The defense did not waive this right, but the court deemed the error harmless due to three factors: (i) a seven-week interval between conviction and sentencing, (ii) no evidence suggesting that the sentence was hastily imposed, and (iii) no demonstration of actual prejudice by Ms. Jasper regarding the timing of the sentencing.
In her first assignment of error, Ms. Jasper argued that the district court erred by denying her motion for a new trial, claiming that the jury's verdict lacked support from the law and evidence. This argument included two main points: (i) insufficient evidence to prove she threw the bleach, and (ii) insufficient evidence to classify bleach as a dangerous object. Jurisprudence indicates that denials of new trial motions based on verdicts being contrary to law and evidence are generally not appealable. However, upon review, it appears Ms. Jasper intended to challenge the denial of her post-verdict judgment of acquittal, asserting that the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime, specifically that bleach constituted a dangerous weapon.
Ms. Jasper's appeal focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence related to her conviction for two counts of aggravated battery, arguing primarily that the State failed to prove two critical elements: (i) her identification as the person who threw bleach at the victims and (ii) that the bleach constituted a dangerous weapon. The court clarifies that her initial reference to a motion for a new trial was a misstatement, as her actual intent was to challenge the denial of her post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not to seek a new trial.
To evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, the court applies the standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, which requires that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact-finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard mandates that all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, be considered, and that the reviewing court must adopt the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution unless no rational trier of fact could disagree.
Aggravated battery is defined as a battery committed with a dangerous weapon, which includes any substance likely to cause death or great bodily harm. The court notes that Ms. Jasper argues misidentification based on contradictory testimony from the victims, which she claims undermines the State’s case. The court intends to separately address the issues of misidentification and the classification of bleach as a dangerous weapon in the context of the appeal.
Paris testified that an unknown individual, later identified as Ms. Jasper, threw bleach at her and her sister. However, on cross-examination, Ms. Jasper claims Paris stated her daughter, Corianna, was responsible for throwing the bleach. The dialogue reveals that Paris indicated Corianna identified her to Ms. Jasper, who then threw the bleach. Additionally, a pretrial disclosure from the State indicated that one victim identified another girl, Jarameshia (also known as "Pinky"), as an accomplice but did not directly implicate her in throwing bleach. The victim also stated she did not know Corianna Jasper. The State argued the accomplice aided in targeting the victims but did not throw bleach. During cross-examination, when asked about picking up bleach from a cart, Paris denied it and questioned the evidence of bleach being thrown. Both Paris and another individual, D’Miria, sustained injuries in a fight that night, suggesting the possibility that someone else, not Ms. Jasper, could have thrown the bleach. The State countered that the victims' consistent testimonies and their identification of Ms. Jasper in photographic line-ups were sufficient for a conviction, supported by case law stating a single credible witness can establish guilt.
Furthermore, Ms. Jasper argued the State failed to prove that the bleach constituted a dangerous weapon. The State asserted that bleach can be deemed a dangerous weapon depending on how it is used, referencing jurisprudence that allows for various items to be classified as dangerous based on their potential to cause harm. A Florida case supported this view, recognizing bleach as a dangerous weapon under similar circumstances.
The Florida court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the claim that bleach was used in a manner likely to cause great bodily harm. The victim testified that bleach was "sloshed" into her face multiple times, affecting her eyes, mouth, and throat, and necessitating an emergency room visit. The jury needed to determine whether bleach was used rather than its effects. Testimonies from witnesses Paris and D'Miria indicated that Ms. Jasper threw bleach directly into their eyes, and expert witnesses confirmed the harmful effects of bleach on the eyes, including potential blindness and tissue damage. The court found that the manner of Ms. Jasper's actions constituted the use of a dangerous weapon.
In a separate assignment of error, Ms. Jasper argued that the court erred by allowing Detective DeLarge to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses, claiming he should have been sequestered. Initially, defense counsel did not object to Detective DeLarge's presence but only to the exemption of the victims from sequestration. After multiple witnesses had testified, the court overruled Ms. Jasper's later objection, affirming that the State had announced Detective DeLarge as its representative at the trial's start. According to Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 615, a court may exempt witnesses from exclusion orders in the interests of justice.
Exceptions to the exclusion of witnesses under this Article include a single officer or employee of a non-natural person party, designated by their attorney as a representative or case agent. Comment (d) to La. C.E. art. 615 warns that mechanically applying exemptions for representatives could lead to unfairness, particularly regarding the right to cross-examination. The Article does not limit a trial court's authority to sequester witnesses to ensure justice. In criminal cases, issues arise when a law enforcement officer, serving as the state's representative, must also testify as a fact witness. To mitigate prejudice, it is advisable for the officer to testify before other witnesses. Sequestration aims to prevent witness influence from prior testimonies and to enhance cross-examination effectiveness.
Case law supports the trial court's discretion in addressing sequestration issues, with appellate courts only intervening in cases of abuse of discretion. In State v. Ondek, the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision to exempt a police officer from sequestration, noting the officer's position as the first witness to discuss critical aspects of the case, thus mitigating concerns of influenced testimony. Similarly, in State v. Holden, the Second Circuit found no error in exempting a police officer, emphasizing that the defendant did not object when the officer was designated as the case representative and that the officer's testimony did not overlap with earlier witnesses.
Detective DeLarge served as the State’s sixth witness, providing testimony focused on his investigation and interactions with the defendant. Prior witnesses included Officer Walker, who detailed the initial investigation and victim interviews, and medical professionals who discussed the victims' treatment and condition. Notably, Detective DeLarge was the first to identify Ms. Jasper as a suspect based on victim identification, distinguishing his testimony from earlier witnesses. There is no indication that his testimony was influenced by prior witnesses, as it was distinct and not cumulative. Ms. Jasper argues that prior testimonies supported Detective DeLarge's case formation, referencing State v. Lopez, where a conviction was reversed due to the influence of a witness’s testimony on a key officer. However, the current case differs significantly; Detective DeLarge's credibility is not central to the State’s case, which relies more on victim testimonies, and he did not receive any aiding information from earlier witnesses. Additionally, he confirmed during the preliminary hearing that bleach was the substance thrown by Ms. Jasper.
Detective DeLarge's application for an arrest warrant indicated that Ms. Jasper threw bleach at the victims. During the trial, Detective DeLarge's testimony was not influenced by subsequent discussions among Officer Walker and other experts, leading to the conclusion that Ms. Jasper was not prejudiced by the district court's decision to allow Detective DeLarge to remain in the courtroom. The court found no error in overruling Ms. Jasper’s objection to this exemption from the sequestration order.
In a separate assignment of error, Ms. Jasper argued that her sentence was unconstitutionally excessive and that the trial court failed to consider all factors outlined in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1. The court reiterated that the constitution prohibits cruel or excessive punishment and that the review of excessive sentence claims focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion, rather than whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. A sentence will not be overturned for excessiveness if the record supports it. The appellate court evaluates whether the trial court complied with Article 894.1's guidelines and if the circumstances justify the sentence imposed. The primary goal of Article 894.1 is to provide a factual basis for the sentence, allowing for flexibility in compliance. A trial judge has broad discretion when sentencing, and a reviewing court will only intervene in cases of manifest abuse of that discretion. Sentences within statutory limits can still be challenged on constitutional grounds if deemed disproportionate to the offense.
A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the crime or unnecessarily inflicts pain and suffering. The statutory penalty for aggravated battery allows for a fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to ten years. Ms. Jasper was sentenced to four years at hard labor for aggravated battery after a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) was conducted. During the sentencing hearing, both defense and prosecution presented arguments, and a witness testified in support of leniency for Ms. Jasper. The court considered the PSI, which revealed discrepancies in Ms. Jasper’s account of events and noted her lack of remorse, as well as the permanent injuries suffered by the victims. Although Ms. Jasper had no prior convictions, her record included five arrests for various offenses. The court determined the four-year sentence was not excessive given these factors.
Ms. Jasper contended that she was denied the opportunity to review the PSI report for errors. While defendants have the right to contest information in a PSI, they must request access before sentencing and show that the report contains materially false or misleading information. Ms. Jasper’s defense mentioned disagreement with the PSI during the hearing but did not specify any errors. Consequently, the appellate court found no merit in her argument. The court affirmed her convictions and sentences, noting that while the statute does not explicitly state that sentences must be served without probation or suspension, a related statute prohibits such suspension for violent crimes, which includes aggravated battery. The document also clarifies a familial relationship, stating that a person referred to as a cousin is merely a friend.
Paris, aged sixteen, and D’Miria, aged eighteen, are identified as victims in a fight that took place at a Restaurant. Their optometrist, Dr. Seth Stanton, testified that both sisters had normal eye exams prior to the incident, noting they were slightly near-sighted. Witness Mr. Tran recounted an interaction with an irate parent who reported that her daughter was injured and requested police involvement; he instructed her to wait outside while he called the authorities. Following this, the parent returned to the Restaurant in a distressed state. Paris and D’Miria claimed that no cleaning supplies or utensils were present in the lobby area of the Restaurant, contrary to Mr. Tran's testimony, who stated that no bleach or janitorial carts were located there before the fight. He explained that the Restaurant did not utilize bleach during meal service and stored cleaning supplies in the dish room behind the kitchen, away from public areas. Both sisters denied engaging in the fight or throwing any objects, including bleach. On appeal, Ms. Jasper highlighted that Detective DeLarge inquired about a student named "Pinky" at Lake Area High School, but it was noted that Jarameshia, known as "Pinky," did not attend that school. During oral arguments on September 5, 2014, defense counsel was unable to specify any errors in the presentencing investigation report.
