Laws v. Louisville Ladder, Inc.

Docket: No. 2013-CA-00427-COA

Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; August 26, 2014; Mississippi; State Appellate Court

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The appeal arises from a decision by the Tallahatchie County Circuit Court, which struck Anthony Laws’s expert witness and subsequently granted summary judgment to Louisville Ladder Inc. Laws contends that the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and erred in dismissing his case based on the exclusion of his expert witness. The appellate court determined that the trial court did indeed abuse its discretion by arbitrarily imposing discovery sanctions, as evidence showed that both Laws and his expert, Dr. Richard Forbes, complied with a subpoena issued by Louisville Ladder. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In the original suit filed on April 7, 2010, Laws alleged product liability for injuries sustained from a defective stepladder manufactured by Louisville Ladder. An amended scheduling order was issued on June 12, 2012, detailing deadlines for discovery and trial. In August 2012, Laws's attorney agreed to produce Dr. Forbes for a deposition, which was scheduled for September 27, 2012, following a subpoena duces tecum sent by Louisville Ladder. However, while the subpoena requested extensive documentation from Dr. Forbes, it did not compel his physical appearance for the deposition.

Laws's attorney later sought to delay Dr. Forbes’s deposition, arguing that he needed to review documents from a deposition of Louisville Ladder’s corporate representative first. Louisville Ladder objected, stating that discovery was to be completed by September 28, 2012, and that the proposed dates for the corporate representative's deposition were after Dr. Forbes’s scheduled date.

Laws claims an agreement was reached between the parties on September 20, 2012, to extend the discovery deadline to November 15, 2012, supported by emails; however, Louisville Ladder contends that no formal agreement was made despite discussions. The pretrial discovery order allowed for amendments to deadlines by either party or the court. An email from Louisville Ladder’s counsel suggested extending discovery, but noted that the motion deadline remained October 30, 2012, which could only be extended by the court.

On October 1, 2012, Louisville Ladder filed a motion to dismiss or for sanctions, asserting that Laws failed to produce his expert, Dr. Forbes, for a scheduled deposition on September 27, 2012, and did not follow proper procedure to quash the deposition. They argued this failure prejudiced their defense preparation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but struck Dr. Forbes as a sanction under Rule 37(a) for Laws's failure to produce him. Consequently, Laws had no expert witness for trial after the original discovery deadline expired on September 28, 2012.

Laws sought an interlocutory appeal and a stay from the Mississippi Supreme Court to reverse the exclusion of Dr. Forbes and postpone the trial, but the court denied both requests on January 16, 2013. On January 18, 2013, Laws filed a motion to continue the trial to secure a new expert, which was denied by the trial court on February 7, 2013. The court subsequently granted Louisville Ladder’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Laws could not prove the ladder’s defectiveness without an expert witness. Laws is now appealing this decision.

The standard of review indicates that trial courts have considerable discretion regarding sanctions and discovery matters, with appellate courts applying an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing such decisions. The appellate court will affirm unless it finds a clear error in judgment or a manifest abuse of discretion in granting or denying a continuance.

The Court employs a de novo standard of review when evaluating the grant of summary judgment, requiring that there be no genuine issue of material fact for the moving party to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Evidence is considered in favor of the non-moving party. Regarding Rule 37 sanctions, Laws contends that the trial court erred by imposing sanctions, claiming he did not violate any court orders or discovery rules, and asserting that the sanctions were based on misrepresentations by Louisville Ladder. The appellate review of sanctions follows an abuse-of-discretion standard, and the trial court must apply the correct legal standard.

In the case, while the trial court partially granted Louisville Ladder's motion to dismiss and awarded Rule 37 sanctions, it initially decided against complete dismissal, deeming it too severe. Ultimately, the case was dismissed due to Laws’s failure to present an expert witness to establish liability. Laws argues that he complied with the subpoena issued to Dr. Forbes, the expert witness, and claims the trial court's findings were based on incorrect assertions made by Louisville Ladder regarding subpoenas and the production of documents. Laws maintains that he made Dr. Forbes available for deposition and disputes several claims made by Louisville Ladder concerning compliance and scheduling, including that the discovery deadline was never extended and that the Mississippi Supreme Court supported the trial judge's decision on the sanctions.

Laws contends that Louisville Ladder improperly failed to subpoena Dr. Forbes for personal testimony at a deposition, as they only issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring document production. He argues this omission invalidates the trial court's sanctions against him, asserting he complied with the subpoena served. Additionally, Laws claims that Louisville Ladder did not seek a court order to compel discovery, making the sanctions improper under established legal precedents. 

In response, Louisville Ladder disputes the need for a court order before imposing sanctions, referencing a case that allows sanctions to be enforced without it. However, it is noted that sanctions for discovery violations require evidence of noncompliance or failure to cooperate. The trial court's error lies in sanctioning Laws for the absence of a nonparty witness, Dr. Forbes, when no subpoena for his personal appearance was issued. 

The review of the case record confirms that Louisville Ladder issued a subpoena duces tecum and not a subpoena ad testificandum, which is necessary for compelling a witness's attendance. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 45 delineates the types of subpoenas and the requirements for compelling testimony and document production. The trial court's sanctions against Laws were erroneous, as he complied with the subpoena that was issued. Furthermore, legal precedent indicates that sanctions for discovery violations necessitate proof of willful noncompliance, which was not demonstrated in this instance.

The emails between the parties indicate an agreement to extend the discovery deadline to November 15, 2012. Louisville Ladder did not take advantage of this extension to subpoena Dr. Forbes for testimony. The trial court's discretion in such matters is limited and must align with fairness and legal standards, as established in Douglas v. Burley, 134 So.3d 692, 697 (Miss.2012). Precedent requires a clear demonstration of noncompliance to justify sanctions, which the record does not support in this case.

The subpoena duces tecum issued to Dr. Forbes required him to produce various documents related to the Laws case, but did not mandate his personal appearance. Dr. Forbes complied with the subpoena by providing the requested documents by the stipulated deadline. Thus, the trial court incorrectly concluded that there was a lack of cooperation from Laws and unfairly imposed sanctions.

Furthermore, the trial court amended the scheduling order on June 12, 2012, allowing for extensions of discovery deadlines by mutual agreement or court permission. Email correspondence confirms that both parties agreed to extend the deadline to November 15, 2012. Laws had agreed to present Dr. Forbes for deposition within this timeframe, but Louisville Ladder failed to issue a subpoena for him during the extended period, instead opting to file a motion for dismissal and sanctions after the original deadline had expired. The record does not demonstrate any willful noncompliance by Laws regarding discovery.

Finally, it is acknowledged that prior discovery orders remain effective unless altered, as per the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling in Douglas. Upon remand, the trial court should clarify the extension of the discovery deadline procedure to avoid confusion.

Laws contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue the trial and by granting Louisville Ladder's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the exclusion of his expert witness. Louisville Ladder had filed for summary judgment on October 29, 2012, arguing that Laws could not substantiate his products-liability claim without expert testimony regarding the adequacy of ladder warnings. The trial court granted this motion on February 28, 2013, concluding that Laws could not demonstrate the ladder's defectiveness without expert testimony. 

The record indicates that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Laws for not producing Dr. Forbes at a deposition, as Louisville Ladder did not properly subpoena him. This unjustified exclusion of Laws's expert witness led to an erroneous summary judgment ruling. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's orders regarding the expert witness and the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. 

The judgment of the Tallahatchie County Circuit Court is reversed, and all costs of the appeal are assessed to the appellee. Laws had also sued Davidson Ladders Inc., Discount Lumber, Hardware, and Hardware Distribution Warehouses Inc., but these defendants were dismissed. The case was initially set for trial on November 4, 2011, but was removed to federal court and later remanded back to state court. The comments to M.R.C.P. 45 clarify that failure to properly subpoena a witness for a deposition does not justify excluding their testimony, and prior discovery orders remain effective upon remand unless amended by the court.