Pettway v. Del Marsh

Citations: 145 So. 3d 744; 2013 WL 5298570Docket: 1120781

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; September 20, 2013; Alabama; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher, members of the Alabama Legislature during the 2013 Regular Session, are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Montgomery Circuit Court to reverse its denial of their motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by Lynn Pettway. The lawsuit contends that House Bill 84 (HB 84), concerning education, was passed improperly, violating Rule 21 of the Joint Rules of the Alabama Legislature and the Alabama Open Meetings Act. 

Initially, HB 84 was approved by the House and sent to the Senate, where it received a favorable report. Following an amendment and passage in the Senate, the House voted against the amended bill, leading to its referral to a conference committee. The committee, which included both House and Senate representatives, met but the defendants arrived late, unveiling a "substitute" version of HB 84 that was significantly longer and renamed the "Alabama Accountability Act of 2013." The committee approved this substitute version, which was then adopted by both the House and Senate.

Rule 21 prohibits the introduction of new provisions or appropriation items not present in the original House or Senate versions during conference committee discussions. On March 4, 2013, Pettway filed suit alleging violations of this rule and the Open Meetings Act, resulting in a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the bill's progression. However, this TRO was vacated by the court on March 13, 2013, on grounds of ripeness since HB 84 had not yet become law. The governor subsequently signed the bill on March 14, 2013. Following this, Pettway filed a new complaint and sought permission to serve the defendants, which was granted by the circuit court.

Pettway claims that the defendants, as a majority of the conference committee, conducted a private meeting to revise HB 84, constituting an "unannounced executive session" that violated the Open Meetings Act and Rule 21. He seeks a declaration that the Alabama Accountability Act is void due to these alleged violations. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and quash service, but the circuit court denied the motion, stayed proceedings, and certified an appeal on whether the court must dismiss the complaint based on absolute legislative immunity and non-justiciability due to the nature of legislative activities. The defendants have not been served due to the stay. On April 4, 2013, they filed a petition for permissive appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing the circuit court erred in not dismissing the complaint based on immunity and separation-of-powers concerns. The court denied the permissive appeal on April 23, 2013, and ordered responses for the mandamus petition. The writ of mandamus is a suitable recourse for reviewing immunity denials and jurisdiction issues. For the writ to be granted, the petitioner must demonstrate a clear legal right, the respondent's duty to act, no other adequate remedy, and proper jurisdiction. The defendants emphasize that the Alabama Constitution offers protections to legislators, including immunity for their actions related to legislative duties.

§ 29-1-7 of the Alabama Code grants legislative members immunity from arrest, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of peace, during their attendance at legislative sessions and while traveling to and from them. Anyone who knowingly denies this privilege commits a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $1,000, imprisonment for up to one year, or both. The defendants argue that the "speech or debate clause" under § 56 is designed to protect legislators from distractions that may hinder their legislative duties, thereby shielding them from litigation and the burdens of defense. Allegations in Pettway’s complaint are said to directly pertain to internal legislative activities, which fall under this protection. The clause bars inquiries into actions and motivations related to legislative conduct, as affirmed by case law, including Dombrowski v. Eastland and Marion v. Hall. The U.S. Supreme Court has similarly established that legislative acts are immune from lawsuits, emphasizing that such immunity is essential for maintaining legislative discretion free from judicial interference. This immunity extends to local legislators, acknowledging that part-time citizen-legislators face unique challenges, including the time and energy required to defend against lawsuits. The threat of civil liability can deter individuals from serving in local government roles, emphasizing the need for protection to uphold the rights of public representation in a democratic system.

In Hillman v. Yarbrough, a consulting engineer filed a slander lawsuit against a county commissioner, the county commission, and a local newspaper regarding the commissioner's remarks about the engineer's performance on a county project. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decisions in Brewster and Bogan, affirming that Alabama law grants absolute privilege to legislative bodies concerning their legislative functions, as established in Butler v. Town of Argo. This legislative immunity protects against inquiries seeking evidence to challenge legislative decisions. The case involves allegations related to the Alabama Accountability Act's procedural history, specifically targeting legislators' actions during the conference-committee hearing and the passage of HB 84. The defendants’ conduct is deemed part of legitimate legislative activity, falling under the speech or debate clause. The court acknowledged that § 29-1-7 extends legislative immunity, shielding legislators from service of process during sessions. The defendants argued that the circuit court improperly allowed service during the legislative session, but this issue became moot since the legislature had adjourned. They also claimed the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that adjudicating Pettway’s claims would constitute judicial second-guessing of legislative actions. Furthermore, they contended that if the Open Meetings Act conflicts with constitutional principles, the constitution prevails. The Alabama Constitution empowers the legislature to set its own procedural rules, a power that is unlimited unless restricted by other constitutional provisions, meaning courts cannot interfere with the legislative rules concerning their proceedings.

In Goodwin v. State Board of Administration, the plaintiff contended that a legislative act was invalid due to a violation of House rules. The court ruled that since the rules were not constitutionally mandated but adopted for convenience, any oversight in following them did not affect the act's validity. Legislative procedure rules are under the control of the legislative bodies and are not subject to judicial review unless they conflict with the constitution. 

The Alabama Open Meetings Act mandates public access to governmental deliberations, including those of the Legislature. However, the court addressed whether alleged violations of this Act by the Legislature could be adjudicated. Section 36-25A-8 provides immunity to governmental members for statements made during compliant meetings, and legislative immunity under § 56 further protects legislators. The Alabama Constitution does not require public meetings for the Legislature and allows it to set its own procedural rules, which take precedence over the Open Meetings Act.

Consequently, the court determined that the legislature's alleged violations were not justiciable, and it is beyond the judiciary's role to enforce legislative adherence to its own rules. The court granted a writ of mandamus for the circuit court to dismiss the complaint, agreeing that the claims were nonjusticiable and would lead to unwarranted judicial interference in legislative matters. The petition was granted, and the writ was issued with concurrence from several justices.