Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; October 4, 2013; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Kathy K. Torbert filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH) on October 28, 2011, seeking clarification on the rules for solid-waste collection, specifically regarding the measurement points for a 500-foot buffer zone between garbage-transfer station activities and nearby residences, schools, or parks. ADPH issued its ruling on December 5, 2011. Torbert appealed this ruling to the Montgomery Circuit Court on January 6, 2012, and subsequently filed for judicial review on February 6, 2012. In March 2012, she requested the circuit court to remand the case to ADPH to determine factual distances related to the transfer facility, which ADPH opposed, asserting that the matter did not involve factual disputes but rather the interpretation of existing rules.
The circuit court remanded the case to ADPH on July 1, 2013, prompting ADPH to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on August 8, 2013. ADPH contended that remanding the case for factual determinations was inappropriate and blurred the lines between declaratory rulings and contested cases. The court denied the petition, emphasizing that mandamus is only appropriate when the petitioner has a clear legal right, an imperative duty on the respondent, no adequate alternative remedy, and proper jurisdiction. The Alabama Administrative Procedure Act allows for declaratory rulings without a hearing, while contested cases require a hearing to determine legal rights, duties, or privileges. ADPH argued that the distinction between the two processes was critical to the integrity of administrative proceedings.
ADPH argues that the circuit court lacks the authority to remand matters to an agency when reviewing declaratory rulings, citing the difference between the contested-case and declaratory-ruling processes. However, Section 41-22-11(b) allows for circuit court review of declaratory rulings in the same manner as contested cases under Section 41-22-20, with no indication of a procedural alteration for declaratory rulings. ADPH contends that Section 41-22-20(e), which mandates a fact-finding hearing if disputed facts exist, should not apply to declaratory rulings. They assert that allowing remand for a fact-finding hearing would improperly convert a declaratory ruling into a contested case, circumventing the established procedures for initiating contested cases. Despite acknowledging the need for statutory interpretation in pari materia, the court disagrees with ADPH's interpretation, reaffirming that a petition for declaratory ruling is not classified as a contested case under the AAPA. The court emphasizes that the language of 41-22-11(b) clearly permits the application of the review process outlined in 41-22-20 for declaratory rulings and that legislative intent must be discerned from the statute's plain language, reinforcing the need to interpret statutory language in context.
When a term in a statute lacks a definition, its commonly accepted meaning should be applied, as established in Republic Steel Corp. v. Horn. Statutory language must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning, as affirmed in Ex parte Shelby County Health Care Authority and Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Department of Revenue. Section 41-22-11(b) mandates that declaratory rulings are reviewed according to the provisions of Section 41-22-20, which allows a circuit court to remand the case to the agency if factual questions need resolution. The circuit court's remand order in Torbert's case was thus compliant with Section 41-22-20.
ADPH contends that Torbert did not raise her factual dispute before ADPH, arguing this barred her from presenting the issue to the circuit court. They assert that the court was limited to the administrative record as per Section 41-22-20(j). However, this provision is subject to exceptions, including the court's ability to remand under Section 41-22-20(e), which was correctly utilized in Torbert's appeal. The court held that ADPH did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, leading to the denial of ADPH's petition for a writ of mandamus.
Additionally, Section 41-22-20(k) allows a circuit court to remand for further evidence or proceedings in appeals from declaratory rulings or contested cases, with the court’s review generally confined to the record unless otherwise permitted. The statute specifies that agency orders are presumed just and reasonable unless specific legal standards are met that warrant reversal or modification.
