Eastman v. R. Warehousing & Port Services, Inc.

Citations: 141 So. 3d 77; 2013 WL 4618594; 2013 Ala. LEXIS 99Docket: 1111323

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; August 30, 2013; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Jessica Eastman, as the dependent widow of David Bentley and on behalf of Bentley’s three minor children, appeals a jury verdict favoring R. Warehousing and Port Services Inc. The plaintiff claims entitlement to judgment as a matter of law regarding R. Warehousing's "loaned-servant" defense and argues for a new trial, alleging that R. Warehousing's counsel improperly implied during opening statements that she had received workers' compensation benefits from Richway Transportation Services, in violation of the collateral-source rule. 

The facts reveal that David Bentley, a truck driver for Richway, sought to have two worn front tires on his truck examined before a delivery. Although he was provided with new tires, he was instructed to have them installed at Richway's Georgiana facility. Bentley allegedly requested installation at a different location for balancing but was denied. While traveling to Georgiana, a tire blowout occurred, resulting in Bentley's death. The plaintiff subsequently filed a wrongful-death action against R. Warehousing, a brokerage that does not own trucks or employ drivers but shares ownership and management with Richway. The plaintiff contends that R. Warehousing, through its employee Michael Richardson, exercised control over Richway’s operations, including tire maintenance, leading to the fatal incident.

R. Warehousing contended that Michael Richardson was a "loaned servant" to Richway, although evidence established he was exclusively employed by R. Warehousing and reported to his father, Nolan Richardson. Nolan testified in a video deposition that Michael managed daily operations and oversaw the maintenance shop at Richway, directing necessary repairs. Michael confirmed in his deposition that R. Warehousing temporarily assigned him to oversee operations at Richway. 

Chance Richardson acknowledged that Michael was in charge of Richway Transportation in Alabama and was sent there by their father to manage it, confirming Michael’s employment with R. Warehousing but disagreeing that he controlled Richway's operations. Chance asserted that Richway and R. Warehousing did not share operational control, with no trucks or drivers owned by R. Warehousing. He also noted that R. Warehousing did not provide benefits to Richway employees and limited Michael's role to potentially brokering loads. 

The definition of a loaned servant was provided, indicating such individuals assist another company while remaining employed by their original employer. Michael's oversight of Richway began in 2001, with a more active role from 2004 onwards, although his presence was not constant. He was recognized as the key person at Richway, having instituted policies on tire inspection and installation, and had the authority to hire and fire employees, as testified by Richway's operation and sales manager.

Shaw asserted he usually consulted Michael before deciding on tire replacements, but on the day of Bentley’s accident, Michael was absent from the Richway office. Shaw decided to give Bentley two new steering tires due to diminishing tread depth. He noted that new tires were typically installed at the Georgiana facility, where Richway’s maintenance team was located. Although Shaw could have sent Bentley to McGriff Tires for installation, Bentley did not request this service. Randy Matthews, a Richway truck driver, stated he heard Bentley ask Shaw three times to have his tires installed at McGriff Tires, but Shaw denied these requests. Keenan Bishop, the safety administrator, and Patrick Freeman, the terminal manager, both confirmed Michael's authority in directing tire inspections and installations, citing his policy to have installations done at the Georgiana facility to manage costs. 

After the trial, the plaintiff sought a judgment as a matter of law (JML) regarding R. Warehousing's defense based on the loaned-servant doctrine, which the trial court denied, allowing the case to go to the jury. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of R. Warehousing, leading to a judgment based on this verdict. The plaintiff then filed a motion to alter or vacate the judgment or request a new trial, which the trial court denied, prompting an appeal. The discussion includes the standards for reviewing a JML motion, emphasizing that substantial evidence must exist for the jury to consider the case, and the court must view evidence favorably towards the nonmovant while maintaining no presumption of correctness for legal rulings made by the trial court.

The loaned-servant doctrine, as established in Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, allows for an employee to temporarily serve a third party with their consent, creating a new servant-employer relationship with legal implications. Determining whether an employee is a loaned servant typically involves factual inquiries about whose work the employee is performing and under whose control they are operating. The reserved right of control is critical; the true test of the relationship lies in who has ultimate authority over the employee's actions, not merely who provides suggestions. Factors such as the nature of the service, the duration of employment, and who compensates the employee are essential when there is ambiguity regarding the employer. In the case at hand, R. Warehousing needed to present substantial evidence that Michael Richardson was a loaned servant to Richway. The plaintiff contends that Chance Richardson's assertion lacks supporting evidence, citing the absence of a formal contract, lack of indication of a temporary nature of employment, and insufficient evidence of control by Richway. The pivotal issue is determining which employer had the right to control the actions related to Bentley's death, emphasizing the necessity of identifying the employer in relation to the specific act performed.

Michael Richardson was employed by R. Warehousing, receiving paychecks from them, while serving as a loaned servant to Richway, where he managed daily operations since 2001. Chance Richardson, owner of R. Warehousing and president of Richway, distinguished the two companies, stating R. Warehousing is a brokerage without trucks or drivers and lacked authority under Alabama DOT regulations to control Richway's operations. The plaintiff claims that a policy instituted by Michael, leading to Shaw ordering Bentley to drive on worn tires, caused Bentley's death. The jury could infer that Michael, while employed by R. Warehousing, acted as a special servant of Richway, indicating that R. Warehousing surrendered control over him due to his managerial role at Richway, which involved tire inspection policies. Despite R. Warehousing and Richway being separate entities, they shared officers, and although Michael reported to Nolan Richardson of R. Warehousing, he did not consult with him regarding his work at Richway. This led to the inference that Michael operated independently at Richway, performing tasks relevant to the plaintiff's claim. The evidence presented created a jury question about the control and employment relationship concerning Michael's work.

The trial court’s jury instruction on the loaned-servant doctrine was deemed appropriate, and the jury's verdict was further supported by the court's rejection of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff argues for a new trial based on the alleged introduction of workers’ compensation evidence, violating Alabama's prohibition against such evidence at trial. The plaintiff had previously filed a motion in limine to exclude references to her workers’ compensation benefits, yet during opening statements, R. Warehousing's counsel allegedly suggested that the plaintiff had received these benefits. 

The court cites Baldwin County Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Fairhope, outlining that trial judges have significant discretion regarding evidence admission but may exceed this discretion if they admit prejudicial, non-probative evidence. Furthermore, a judgment cannot be reversed for evidentiary errors unless it is shown that such errors likely affected the parties' substantial rights, with the burden of proof resting on the appellant. The collateral source rule strictly prohibits showing that the plaintiff received payments from independent sources, which constitutes reversible error. 

Statements made by R. Warehousing’s counsel during opening remarks went unchallenged, suggesting that R. Warehousing did not introduce the issue of workers’ compensation. The company argues that no ruling on the plaintiff's motion in limine was made and that the plaintiff's failure to object at the time forfeited any claim of error for appeal.

Reusch contends that the trial court improperly admitted certain testimony but failed to object during the trial or obtain a ruling on a motion in limine regarding that testimony. Consequently, there are no adverse rulings presented for review. The plaintiff argues that if a motion in limine is absolute and unconditional, no further objection is necessary to preserve the error for appeal. However, the record does not indicate whether such a ruling occurred. The plaintiff infers from the trial transcript that a ruling was made and was unconditional. During the trial, the plaintiff’s counsel referenced the motion in limine to exclude evidence of workers' compensation, but the trial court indicated readiness for an objection, which did not occur, suggesting any ruling might have been preliminary. The court's response indicated that no absolute ruling was established, and the plaintiff’s counsel appeared satisfied with merely requesting an instruction to refrain from mentioning related topics rather than formally preserving the error through an objection. The relevant legal precedent indicates that a party cannot complain if they do not invoke further action by the court. A similar issue was noted in Johnson v. L.O., where improper testimony was also allowed during an opening statement.

Steven filed a motion in limine prior to trial to exclude evidence regarding the specific allegations related to his arrest and indictment. The trial court granted this motion but instructed that any further discussion about the indictment should be addressed at the bench first. During the opening statement, L.O.’s attorney mentioned incidents leading to Steven's indictment for domestic violence, but neither Steven nor his attorney objected or sought a mistrial at that moment. On appeal, Roy claimed he was prejudiced by this statement. The court noted that the trial court's order was not absolute, meaning the parties could still bring up the indictment details; however, Roy had the responsibility to object at the time to preserve the issue for appeal. Citing previous case law, the court explained that failing to object during the trial waives the right to challenge the ruling later. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating there was no error regarding the motion in limine. The plaintiff's appeal also included a summary judgment favoring Robin International, but as the plaintiff did not address this in the appeal briefs, the court did not consider that aspect, focusing solely on the issues relevant to R. Warehousing.