Kyne v. State

Citations: 141 So. 3d 759; 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10607; 2014 WL 3377076Docket: No. 2D12-4278

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 11, 2014; Florida; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Kevin Lee Kyne appeals his conviction for second-degree murder and the revocation of his probation. The court reversed his murder conviction and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the introduction of extrinsic evidence regarding his prior violent disputes with his stepfather, William, was improper. The circumstances of the case involve the strangulation and smothering of Diane Kyne on August 15, 2010, with Kevin and William being the only individuals present. Both called 9-1-1, accusing one another of the murder. Their conflicting statements and inconsistencies with physical evidence complicated the investigation. 

Prior to trial, Kevin sought to exclude evidence of past violent incidents with William, arguing it was irrelevant, while acknowledging that evidence of his relationship with his mother could be pertinent. The State, however, contended that the prior disputes were essential for understanding the household dynamics and Kevin's behavior pattern, particularly his tendency to call the police during conflicts. Kevin countered that the State had not filed a notice of intent to use such evidence, as mandated by Florida Statutes section 90.404(2)(d), which further supported the argument for exclusion.

The State contended that it was not required to comply with section 90.404(2) because it was presenting evidence of prior incidents involving Kevin and his stepfather William as inextricably intertwined with the events leading to Diane's murder. The State referenced an incident where Jeremy, Kevin's son, observed Kevin provoking William to react violently, which the State argued demonstrated a pattern of behavior relevant to the case. Kevin countered that this evidence was irrelevant to the murder charge. The court ultimately allowed the admission of this evidence but limited the State from calling police officers as witnesses and from emphasizing this evidence during the trial. Kevin appealed, asserting that the court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of prior disputes between him and William, arguing it did not meet the criteria for being inextricably intertwined with the murder charge. The appeal referenced legal standards that require such evidence to adequately describe the crime, provide context, or present an intelligible case. The court agreed with Kevin, determining that the evidence of prior disputes was unnecessary to understand the murder or its context, and thus, it constituted inadmissible testimony regarding Kevin's character. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, stemming from a misapplication of the law regarding the relevance of the contested evidence.

The improper admission of evidence necessitates a new trial. The State argued that the issue was not preserved for review because Kevin failed to object during the trial, referencing Correll v. State. However, section 90.104(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes states that a definitive pretrial ruling on evidence negates the need for further objections to preserve a claim for appeal. The trial court's prior ruling on the evidence eliminated the need for additional objections from Kevin, and his attempts to address the erroneous admission during closing arguments do not constitute a waiver. 

The State also suggested a tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm Kevin’s conviction despite the error, but this was dismissed after a review of the record. The evidence, potentially admissible under the Williams rule for prior acts, lacked the required pretrial notice, and the State did not argue its admissibility under that rule in court. Furthermore, the State used the disputed evidence to impeach Kevin’s grand jury testimony, but impeachment on collateral issues using extrinsic evidence is impermissible. Since the testimonies on prior disputes could only serve to impeach Kevin's statements, they were deemed purely collateral and inadmissible. 

Finally, the State argued the error was harmless, but this was refuted given the circumstances of the murder. With three individuals present—William, Kevin, and Diane—each accused the other, and inconsistencies in their statements, alongside inconclusive physical evidence, meant that the error in admitting the evidence could not be dismissed as harmless.

The jury had to choose between two impeached witnesses, William or Kevin, leading to uncertainty about the impact of improperly admitted evidence on Kevin's conviction. Citing State v. DiGuilio, the court found a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the conviction and thus reversed Kevin's murder conviction, remanding for a new trial. The court also reversed the revocation of Kevin's probation, which was based on his murder conviction and a positive drug test. Since it was unclear if the trial court would have revoked probation solely for the drug test violation, the court instructed on remand to reconsider the probation status in light of the murder conviction reversal and to determine any appropriate penalties. The judges, Altenbernd and LaRose, concurred. The use of first names for the family members involved was to prevent confusion, referencing the tipsy coachman doctrine.