United States v. Jose Luis Castro, Alberto Duque, Gaston Pereira, Jaime Bayon, Defendants

Citations: 837 F.2d 441; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 18772; 1988 WL 3109Docket: 86-5315

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; February 8, 1988; Federal Appellate Court

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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed petitions for rehearing from both the government and defendant-appellant Duque regarding a prior ruling in United States v. Castro. The government contended that the court's interpretation of the crime of misapplication of bank funds and its findings on the misjoinder of defendant Castro were incorrect. The court clarified that its prior discussion in footnote 25 was not a holding and would not alter the elements of the crime, reaffirming that notice to the bank is merely a factor in consideration, not an absolute defense. Consequently, the government remains free to retry Castro for any applicable offenses.

Duque's request for rehearing challenged the court's interpretation of the Federal Bill of Lading Act, asserting that it did not apply to bills of lading issued abroad. The court acknowledged a misreading based on the statute's United States Code heading but maintained that the original outcome was still correct. It referenced the legal principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which suggests that mentioning one item implies the exclusion of others, but recognized that this principle has limitations, particularly when contrary legislative history exists.

In Bailey v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, the court determined that the powers of intermediate credit banks listed in 12 U.S.C. § 2072 were not exclusive, allowing for the implicit authority to remove officers of production credit associations. The decision was upheld with certiorari denied. In State of Illinois, Dep't of Public Aid v. Schweiker, it was held that an agency's disallowance decision was subject to judicial review despite the absence of explicit language in the statute, contrasting with provisions for appellate review of plan nonconformity. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Ass'n clarified that the enumeration of specific liens in 12 U.S.C. § 1713(g) did not imply that other liens were unrecognized. The principle from Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States emphasized that while an action may comply with the letter of the law, it could still be contrary to its spirit. 

Appellant Duque argued that the lack of mention of foreign imports in section 81 indicated an intent to exclude bills of lading related to these imports. However, the court noted that the legislative history suggests Congress intended to include imports, as indicated in the Senate Report discussing total exports and imports and referring to the law's application to both. The Federal Bill of Lading Act aimed to mitigate fraud related to bills of lading to facilitate bank lending, indicating a comprehensive solution was intended. Furthermore, the legal context of 1916, when section 81 was enacted, supported a broad interpretation of congressional authority over commerce, affirming Congress's plenary power to regulate foreign commerce.

Legislative history indicates Congress intended for the Act to have extensive constitutional reach, with section 81 clarifying certain ambiguities rather than limiting the scope of covered traffic. The absence of specific references to intrastate commerce or imports does not imply exclusion; rather, it reflects Congress's recognized authority over foreign commerce and its presumed inability to regulate purely intrastate transactions. Even if section 81 were deemed exhaustive, section 121 establishes its own broader scope, defining "any bill of lading" in a way that encompasses all fraudulent representations, irrespective of the origin of the bills. The language in section 121 suggests Congress aimed to penalize any person engaging in fraudulent activities related to bills of lading, not just those by common carriers. This interpretation prevents absurd outcomes where a person could evade penalties by using foreign bills. Congress's intent was to ensure that all fraudulent bills of lading, regardless of origin, are subject to criminal penalties to maintain the integrity of commercial transactions.

Section 121 of the FBLA applies to appellant Duque and does not alter existing law. The statute's language is clear and unambiguous, adequately warning Duque that using false bills of lading could lead to prosecution. Title 49 U.S.C. sec. 121 specifically penalizes the use of false bills representing goods shipped across state lines or internationally. Duque's argument that 49 U.S.C. sec. 81 limits these penalties is unfounded, as no court has previously ruled that section 121 cannot apply to false bills of lading from abroad. Consequently, Duque's motion for rehearing is denied. 

The court withdrew specific paragraphs from its earlier opinion, which incorrectly referenced the heading of 49 U.S.C. sec. 81 as part of the statute’s legislative intent. This heading was added during codification and does not reflect congressional intent. The court noted that such headings, which are merely for convenience, should not influence statutory interpretation unless they were part of the original legislation. Additionally, the government initially raised the significance of this heading, but Duque did not challenge its relevance during prior briefs. The oversight highlights the importance of accurate legal arguments in the judicial process.

The expressio unius principle, which suggests that mentioning one item implies the exclusion of others, is acknowledged as having significant limitations and is not universally applicable. This maxim serves primarily as a tool for statutory construction rather than a definitive rule of law, and it is not conclusive, requiring careful application and contextual support. Its effectiveness can be overridden by clear legislative intent or specific circumstances that justify the omission of certain items. Moreover, it lacks a presumption of exclusion without context, functioning more as a retrospective explanation of judicial findings rather than a prescriptive rule.

The discussion highlights the complexities of statutory interpretation, particularly in the context of bills of lading and interstate commerce regulation. Congress has the authority to regulate these bills as part of its broader power over interstate commerce, notwithstanding potential international law limitations. The document also clarifies that the jurisdiction for prescribing laws is not necessarily the same as enforcement jurisdiction, which remains largely territorial. Despite the defendant's arguments regarding jurisdiction, the fraudulent use of bills of lading to deceive an American bank was sufficient for legal action. Lastly, specific language was added to legislation to affirm its constitutionality concerning interstate and foreign commerce, reflecting the importance of clarity in statutory provisions.

The amendment's language indicates that it encompasses bills of lading related to both exports and imports, as suggested by the preposition "with," which reflects the reciprocal nature of merchandise movement. If Congress intended to address only exports, the phrase "to foreign nations" would have sufficed. Relevant case law reinforces this interpretation: Kordel v. United States establishes that language associated with drug misbranding applies broadly, while United States v. Gonzalez affirms that individuals on vessels carrying illicit narcotics are aware of the legal risks involved. United States v. Engler confirms that strict liability under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not violate due process as the conduct involved is not passive. In Knutson v. Brewer, the court found that a kidnapper could reasonably foresee that sodomy during the act might be interpreted as a "thing of value." Bouie v. City of Columbia highlights the principle that new interpretations of statutes cannot be retroactively applied to impose criminal penalties for past conduct. Lastly, Duke v. University of Texas at El Paso suggests that a broad interpretation of statutory terms should ensure fair warning of punishable behavior, adhering to the principle of strict construction.