O'Gwin v. Isle of Capri-Natchez, Inc.

Citations: 139 So. 3d 783; 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 310; 2014 WL 2462989Docket: No. 2013-CA-00373-COA

Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; June 3, 2014; Mississippi; State Appellate Court

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Mary Virginia O’Gwin died due to natural causes after collapsing at Isle of Capri-Natehez, Inc. (IOC) casino, where her husband subsequently filed a wrongful death lawsuit. He alleged that IOC failed to fulfill its duty of care by not providing immediate medical assistance, such as CPR or the use of a defibrillator, within five minutes of her collapse. The circuit court dismissed the claim, stating that while IOC had a duty to render reasonable aid once aware of her condition, this did not extend to executing advanced medical procedures, which the casino employees were not trained to perform. 

Mary Virginia was found unresponsive shortly after sitting at a slot machine, and while casino staff initiated CPR and called for an ambulance, the emergency medical technicians arrived later and used a defibrillator. Unfortunately, irreversible brain damage had already occurred due to delayed oxygen supply. The husband submitted an expert pathologist's report which suggested that timely CPR could have prevented brain death. However, the judge ruled that Howard did not demonstrate IOC's negligence, as the casino was not responsible for her heart attack, which caused her death. The appeal was reviewed de novo, affirming that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the casino's obligation to perform advanced medical care.

Howard's negligence claim revolves around the duty to render aid, which encompasses four elements: duty, breach, causation, and injury. The central issue is the nature of this duty, with Howard asserting that business owners must act as trained EMTs if a patron is in distress, while IOC contends there is no duty. The ruling clarifies that the duty is not absolute; proprietors must take reasonable actions to provide first aid and support until professional care arrives. IOC met this obligation by assisting Mary Virginia, calling an ambulance, and remaining with her until help arrived, leading to the affirmation of summary judgment in IOC's favor.

Generally, there is no legal duty to render aid unless a special relationship exists, such as that between a property owner and invitees. Previous cases highlight that property owners must provide reasonable assistance to patrons once they are aware of an injury. The duty to render aid applies to all public property owners, requires only reasonable first aid, begins when the owner is aware of the patron's need, and concludes when professional care is provided or when the patron refuses further assistance. 

Howard does not claim that IOC failed to assist; rather, he argues that their actions were insufficient. However, the court concludes that his expectations exceed the established duty of care, as the actions he suggests fall outside the scope of what is legally required.

Howard contends that the aid provided by IOC was inadequate because it did not include chest compressions or defibrillator use within six minutes of Mary Virginia's collapse. However, the law stipulates that such medical procedures are outside the scope of reasonable first aid. According to section 314A, a property owner is generally only required to provide reasonable first aid and to summon professional medical assistance. IOC employees attempted to assist Mary Virginia and called for an ambulance when her condition worsened, remaining with her until EMTs arrived.

Although IOC did not perform CPR or use an AED immediately, they were not legally obligated to do so. Case law from other jurisdictions supports the view that performing CPR or using an AED does not fall within the reasonable first aid requirement. For instance, courts have ruled that gyms are not required to perform CPR or have an AED on hand. First aid is defined as assistance that can be provided by an untrained individual, unlike CPR, which requires training and recertification. Non-medical employees certified in CPR are still considered laypersons and should have discretion in its application.

The case Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc. is cited as a precedent, where the Third Circuit affirmed that the duty to render aid under section 314A does not entail providing comprehensive medical care, such as intubation. Howard's assertion essentially suggests that IOC employees failed to promptly recognize and address Mary Virginia’s cardiac arrest, but the legal duty of business owners is limited to providing reasonable first aid and ensuring the patron receives care from medical professionals without the expectation of delivering extensive medical services.

Howard's claim against IOC-Natchez, Inc. was rejected due to a lack of evidence demonstrating that IOC had a duty beyond what the Mississippi Supreme Court recognizes, specifically the duty to provide reasonable first aid. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of IOC, stating that Howard failed to establish that IOC had a duty to perform CPR or use an AED on Mary Virginia, despite claims about the pathologist's report concerning the timing of the ambulance's arrival. The circuit judge accepted the expert report for summary judgment but did not accept Howard's argument regarding IOC's duty. The judge also expressed skepticism about the expert's opinion on proximate causation but clarified that her ruling was based on the lack of established duty rather than the expert's credibility. Additionally, the court noted the categorization of individuals injured on another's property into trespassers, licensees, and business invitees, defining business invitees as those who enter a property based on the owner’s invitation for mutual benefit. The judgment of the Adams County Circuit Court is affirmed, with all appeal costs assigned to Howard.