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State v. Chisolm

Citations: 139 So. 3d 1091; 2014 La. App. LEXIS 1254; 2014 WL 1911933Docket: No. 49,043-KA

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 14, 2014; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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William T. Chisolm was charged with armed robbery under LSA-R.S. 14:64 and convicted by a jury, receiving a 90-year prison sentence without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension. The incident occurred on September 26, 2011, at an Exxon station in Shreveport, Louisiana, where David Alexander and Shane Campbell were conducting an inventory assessment. During a smoke break, Alexander encountered Chisolm, who initiated a conversation and later approached him with a small .32 caliber pistol, demanding Alexander's laptop bag. Despite his physical advantage, Alexander complied due to the threat posed by the gun. The defendant fled with the bag, which contained the laptop, but it was recovered later that day. Alexander testified in court, identifying Chisolm as the robber and recalling a letter from him two years post-incident, where Chisolm admitted to the crime but claimed the gun was not real. Campbell corroborated the events, noting his awareness of a commotion outside while he was inside the store.

Campbell witnessed a suspect fleeing with a laptop bag, prompting him to chase the man, who was described as wearing a white, long-sleeved shirt and dark pants. The pursuit ended when the suspect brandished a gun, leading Campbell to take cover. The laptop bag was later recovered, but a black portfolio found inside did not belong to Campbell. Campbell stated he did not see the portfolio during the chase. 

Corporal Deitrick Williams from the Shreveport Police Department responded to a report of an armed robbery at an Exxon station, where Campbell informed him of the chase. The victim, Alexander, recounted that after conversing with the suspect, he was threatened with a handgun and had his laptop bag stolen. Both witnesses described the suspect as a black male, approximately 5'9", weighing 150-165 pounds, wearing a white shirt and black pants, and possessing a small black handgun believed to be .38 caliber.

Corporal Jeffery Hammer, from the K-9 Division, tracked the suspect using his dog, Jasko, leading them to a white shirt found near Johnny’s Pizza, which was left untouched. Dr. Jessica Esparza, a forensic DNA analyst, reviewed DNA testing from the shirt, confirming that the DNA matched the defendant's buccal swab with an extremely high probability, indicating that the likelihood of the DNA belonging to someone else was approximately one in 414 quadrillion to one in 1.69 quadrillion.

Dr. Esparza clarified during cross-examination that her technical review of a case involved only reviewing notes and did not include redoing laboratory work or preparing a separate report. Detective Jack E. Miller from the Shreveport Police Department testified about his involvement in the armed robbery case. He identified a white shirt found at Johnny's Pizza and a black computer bag recovered from a shed nearby. Alexander and Campbell, suspects brought to the scene, identified the bag but noted a black leather portfolio inside did not belong to them. Inside the portfolio, Det. Miller found documents with the defendant's name and a court citation from Los Angeles. Following a computer search confirming the defendant's identity, he was developed as a suspect, although he was not apprehended immediately after the robbery.

Det. Miller obtained surveillance footage from an Exxon convenience store, which showed the defendant and Alexander with the laptop bag during the robbery, alongside Campbell. After learning the defendant had left Shreveport for New Orleans, an arrest warrant was issued, leading to his apprehension at a bus station. Det. Miller interviewed the defendant at the Caddo Correctional Center, where the defendant confessed to taking Alexander's bag but claimed he did not intend to harm anyone, stating financial stress caused him to "snap." He admitted to possessing a gun during the robbery, describing it as a non-lethal pellet gun that he disposed of afterward. The defendant recounted hiding from police after the incident and expressed remorse during the interview.

During cross-examination, Det. Miller noted that Alexander identified the defendant in photographic lineups, while Campbell could not. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of armed robbery. The trial court denied his post-verdict motions and sentenced him to 90 years in prison without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of the sentence, which the court later denied the defendant's motion to reconsider. The defendant is appealing the conviction.

The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish he committed robbery with a "dangerous weapon," asserting the weapon was a toy pellet gun that was not fired, not pointed at the victim, and that he did not verbally threaten the victim, who did not express fear for his life. The defendant claims the interaction did not create a threatening atmosphere. The appellate court reviews sufficiency claims first, as an acquittal may be warranted if evidence is inadequate, following the principles outlined in Hudson v. Louisiana and Jackson v. Virginia. The court must determine if a rational trier of fact could find the crime's essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution. The appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder or assess witness credibility but defers to the jury's decisions regarding testimony. Conflicting evidence must be resolved favorably to the prosecution, and a single credible witness's testimony can suffice for a factual conclusion unless contradicted by physical evidence. The credibility of witnesses is evaluated by the trier of fact, and the reviewing court's intervention is limited to ensuring due process.

The defendant was convicted of armed robbery under LSA-R.S. 14:64(A), which defines armed robbery as taking property from another through force or intimidation while armed with a dangerous weapon. Evidence showed the defendant forcibly took a bag containing a laptop from the victim, Alexander, who complied after seeing the defendant's gun. The defendant confessed to the crime, stating he used a "toy" or "pellet" gun. Surveillance footage and DNA evidence linked the defendant to the crime. The key legal question is whether the weapon used qualifies as a "dangerous weapon." The defendant contends that a toy gun cannot be classified as dangerous. However, legal precedents indicate that a weapon’s classification as dangerous depends on its use and the circumstances, including the victim's perception of threat. Testimonies from both Alexander and another witness, Campbell, indicated they believed the gun was real and feared for their safety during the incident. This context supports the jury's potential conclusion that the defendant used a dangerous weapon, affirming the armed robbery conviction.

The defendant's assignment of error regarding the trial court's denial of his motion in limine is deemed without merit. He argued that the court improperly redacted certain references to plea offers in a letter he wrote to Alexander while allowing similar inadmissible content to remain. Although the court granted the defense's request to redact two statements, it did not redact the phrase "surely 10 yrs is enough for what I did," which the defendant claims also indicates guilt. He cites LSA-C.E. art. 410, which generally prohibits the admissibility of statements made during plea discussions to protect defendants from self-incrimination. The article outlines specific exceptions but notes that such statements are admissible if another statement from the same plea discussion has been introduced or in cases of perjury. 

In this instance, the handwritten letter contained references to pleas that were not in the redacted version presented at trial. Additionally, the statement in question was not read to the jury. Therefore, the defense's assertion of error is unfounded, as the statement was not introduced in a context that violated LSA-C.E. art. 410, given that the letter was addressed to the victim rather than the prosecutor. Consequently, the assignment of error lacks merit.

The defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly permitted Dr. Esparza to testify as a DNA expert since she did not conduct or observe the DNA testing related to the evidence. He claims this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser, Heather Torres. Dr. Esparza's testimony indicated that her technical review involved examining case notes rather than redoing the tests. The Confrontation Clause requires that out-of-court testimonial evidence is only admissible if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had previously cross-examined the witness. The Supreme Court has ruled that forensic reports are testimonial and must be supported by the testimony of those who conducted or observed the tests.

In Louisiana, criminal labs can submit a certificate of analysis as proof of forensic examination, provided that the prosecution gives the defendant written notice of intent 45 days before trial. The defendant has 30 days to request the testimony of the analyst who performed the tests. If the defendant makes a proper demand, the certificate is not considered prima facie evidence, and the analyst must testify. Confrontation rights claims undergo harmless error analysis to determine if any trial error affected the verdict. In a related case, the state notified the defendant three months prior to trial about introducing a crime lab certificate as prima facie evidence, to which the defendant later opposed on the trial day.

The trial court initially leaned towards the defendant's position but ultimately denied his objection due to the unavailability of the lab analyst, ruling it untimely. The court of appeal reversed the conviction, asserting that admitting the crime lab report without the analyst's live testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, noting that the defendant waived his confrontation rights by not timely requesting a subpoena for the analyst. The court stated that reasonable restrictions on confrontation rights are permissible, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an immediate subpoena request.

On February 24, 2012, the state notified the defendant of its intent to introduce the certified lab report as evidence. The defendant had the opportunity to demand the analyst's testimony but did not do so. Instead, the state presented Dr. Esparza, who performed a technical review of the analyst's work and confirmed the protocols and findings, including that the DNA on the shirt matched the defendant’s. The court found no error in allowing Dr. Esparza's testimony, and even if there were, it was deemed harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, including his confession, videotaped robbery, and identification by a victim.

The defendant also contested his 90-year sentence as excessive and disproportionate to the crime, claiming it effectively served as a life sentence despite returning stolen items. Additionally, he argued that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of unverified extradition documents from California. The appellate court applies a two-pronged test for reviewing sentence excessiveness, requiring acknowledgment of the criteria in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

The trial judge is not obligated to enumerate every aggravating or mitigating factor as long as the record demonstrates adequate consideration of relevant guidelines. The focus of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 is to articulate a factual basis for sentencing rather than rigid compliance with its specifics. If the record provides a clear factual foundation for the sentence, a remand is unnecessary despite any lack of full adherence to the guidelines. Key considerations during sentencing include the defendant's personal history, such as age, family ties, health, employment, prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, and rehabilitation potential. No specific factors must be weighted in a particular manner.

Additionally, the court must assess whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive, defined as grossly disproportionate to the offense or merely a needless infliction of suffering. A sentence that shocks the sense of justice when considering the crime's impact on society may be deemed grossly disproportionate. Under LSA-R.S. 14:64(B), armed robbery carries a sentence of 10 to 99 years without parole, probation, or suspension. Trial courts possess broad discretion within these limits, and appellate courts will not overturn sentences as excessive unless there is clear evidence of abuse of discretion. Maximum sentences are typically reserved for the most serious offenders.

In this case, the defendant received a 90-year sentence at hard labor without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension. The court referenced LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 during sentencing, highlighting the defendant's extensive criminal history, which included multiple drug offenses, a juvenile murder conviction, and other serious crimes. The court observed that the defendant's actions exhibited cruelty towards the victim, despite not being the shooter, as the victim appeared significantly frightened during testimony.

The court determined that a real pistol was involved in the offense, supported by witness testimonies and the defendant's admission of discarding a 'toy' or 'pellet gun' into a river, indicating consciousness of guilt. The victim, unarmed, surrendered valuables to the defendant, who knowingly endangered multiple individuals by brandishing the weapon at one victim and using threats of violence. After the robbery, the defendant waited hours still armed, posing a risk to others. Although the crime did not result in significant economic damage to the victim, the psychological impact of armed robbery persists. The court noted the involvement of multiple victims, including one subjected to aggravated assault, and highlighted the defendant's extensive criminal history, which includes serious offenses like murder and theft. The defendant's actions were deemed intentional and premeditated; there were no mitigating factors justifying his behavior, as he sought quick financial gain through the robbery despite being employed. He made no efforts to compensate the victim for the trauma caused. The court found no evidence of familial reliance on him for support and noted the absence of significant health issues that would complicate imprisonment. Although the stolen items were recovered undamaged, they were not returned by the defendant. The court expressed concern over the likelihood of reoffending upon release. Despite the defendant's claims of a substantial employment history, the court deemed this dubious given his incarceration duration. Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant required correctional treatment within an institutional setting, asserting that a lesser sentence would undermine the seriousness of the crime. The imposed sentence was found not to be constitutionally excessive, considering the defendant's extensive felony record and the dangerous nature of the robbery, which instilled significant fear in the victims and posed a threat to public safety.

The defendant's sentence is deemed appropriate given the severity of his crime and extensive criminal history, not constituting an abuse of the trial court's discretion or being constitutionally excessive. The trial court's decision to consider the defendant's criminal records from California was proper, as the defendant did not object to their authenticity during sentencing. It is established that prior criminal activity, including arrests and hearsay of suspected offenses, can be included in sentencing considerations. The trial court is not limited to prior convictions and may review all relevant criminal history, even if some evidence would be inadmissible at trial. The defendant's attempt to negotiate plea deals, including multiple offers for reduced sentences, reinforces the gravity of his situation. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence after a thorough review for errors, finding no issues. Additionally, the defendant's confusion regarding the robbery incident was contradicted by witness testimony, emphasizing the lack of credibility in his claims.